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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
 
 
1.1 Background to the project 
 
In a series of three country reports, we present the findings of the project, Making 
Transitional Justice Work for Women: Rights, Resilience and Responses to Violence Against 
Women in Democratic Republic of Congo, Northern Uganda and Kenya (Grant ID: 
G160214). This report details findings from northern Uganda; the other two country reports 
present findings from Democratic republic of Congo and Kenya. A summary report has also 
been produced for each country.1 
 
The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) funded this project under 
the Australian Development Research Awards Scheme (ADRAS) 2012.2 The scheme, which 
is no longer available, funded primary research into Australia’s priority development themes, 
with the purpose of informing policy development. This research project addressed the 
priority themes of “Gender” and “Africa.” It was a multi-partner collaboration between the 
University of Sydney (Sydney Law School), University of Technology Sydney (Arts and 
Social Sciences), and ActionAid Australia, DRC, Uganda, and Kenya. The project ran from 
April 2013 to October 2015.  
 
The research was designed to investigate transitional justice processes for addressing 
women’s rights and justice priorities in three countries in sub-Saharan Africa: Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), Uganda, and Kenya. This regional focus reflects the priority 
accorded by the international community to transitional justice, as a means to address past 
human rights violations experienced during civil war and other mass violence, and to 
promote lasting peace and stability. The countries for study were selected because each has 
transitional justice processes in place; gender-based violence is significantly prevalent in each 
conflict; and the researchers had existing partners on the ground who could facilitate a 
logistically feasible, meaningful, and culturally and gender-sensitive research process.  
 
1.2 Project methodology 
 
1.2.1 Introduction 
 
This project investigates the efficacy of transitional justice for women in conflict and post-
conflict contexts in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, northern Uganda, and Kenya. 
The research sought to identify women’s priorities for justice, their experiences when seeking 
                                                
1 Rita Shackel and Lucy Fiske, “Making Justice Work for Women: Kenya Country Report” (August 2016) 
http://opac.library.usyd.edu.au:80/record=b5334992~S4; Rita Shackel and Lucy Fiske, “Making Justice Work 
for Women: Democratic Republic of Congo Country Report” (August 2016) 
http://opac.library.usyd.edu.au:80/record=b5332962~S4.; Lucy Fiske and Rita Shackel, “Making Justice Work 
for Women: Uganda Summary Report” (August 2016) http://opac.library.usyd.edu.au:80/record=b5365444~S4; 
Rita Shackel and Lucy Fiske, “Making Justice Work for Women: Democratic Republic of Congo Summary 
Report” (August 2016)  http://opac.library.usyd.edu.au:80/record=b5365440~S4; Rita Shackel and Lucy Fiske, 
“Making Justice Work for Women: Kenya Summary Report” (August 2016) 
http://opac.library.usyd.edu.au:80/record=b5365443~S4 
2 This grant scheme was originally administered by the office of Australian Aid for International Development 
(AusAID). 
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justice, and both enabling factors and obstacles in justice processes. Justice was defined in a 
fluid, broad, and holistic way to include legal, health, economic, social, and psychological 
elements (Olsen et al. 2010, 983; Fischer 2011, 412; Szablewska and Bradley 2015, 261). 
The project has developed a rigorous, reliable, and substantive evidence base of the 
experiences, views, and opinions of women affected by violence in the research sites. The 
project entailed researchers travelling to multiple locations within each country, including 
major regional towns and villages in remote and difficult to access areas; this was done to 
enable women who are rarely, if ever, able to participate in research, consultations, and 
decision-making processes to contribute to this project. The extensive fieldwork, conducted 
over a two-year period and engaging 274 women affected by violence, provides unique 
insights into women’s access to justice, and the efficacy of different justice strategies and 
mechanisms in conflict and post-conflict sites. These insights are extended further by 
interviews with 68 key informants, including local community leaders, prosecutors, judges, 
health and welfare workers, policy workers, and development workers, as well as those 
working in transitional justice, human rights, and women’s rights internationally.  
 
1.2.2 The research questions  
 
The research addressed the following key research questions: 
 
1. What do women in northern Uganda, Kenya, and eastern DRC identify as their 
priorities in relation to justice? 
2. What efforts have been made to provide justice and rights protection for women who 
have experienced violence in northern Uganda, Kenya, and eastern DRC?  
3. How have women responded to these justice interventions, and what impact have 
these had on addressing women’s rights and justice priorities?  
4. How can transitional justice interventions be adapted to better address women’s rights 
and justice priorities, build resilience, and prevent violence against women? 
 
The research partners, in consultation with in-country researchers, formulated the research 
questions for this project. 
 
1.2.3 Methodology 
 
Epistemology and paradigm  
 
The research is qualitative, feminist, and phenomenological. It was designed to capture and 
interpret women’s experiences and opinions of justice in conflict and post-conflict settings. 
The methodology recognises that the voices of women are often muted by social, economic, 
and political factors, which are further enlivened during war and then systemically embedded 
into justice processes. This project proactively sought to understand transitional or post-
conflict justice from the perspective of women affected by conflict and post-conflict justice 
initiatives. A phenomenological method was selected as it is particularly suited to research of 
this kind, where the aim is to make women’s perspectives a central concern in policy 
development and practice. Phenomenological enquiry begins with individuals’ unique 
accounts of a shared experience, and uses multiple individuals’ accounts to discern key 
structural characteristics of the meanings the participants ascribed to the experience, in order 
to situate personal experience within a broader political context (Dukes 1984, 198; Gatta 
2010, 12). Individuals’ experiences and perspectives are then triangulated with key informant 
perspectives, and with existing literature and research. It is in this way that phenomenological 
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enquiry mediates the transition of private experience to public political concern. 
Phenomenological research requires in-depth interviews with multiple participants, and 
secondary research and analysis to enable the generation of knowledge with relevance 
beyond the anecdotal.  
 
The research team 
 
The research was conducted by a multidisciplinary and multi-country research team with 
expertise in a range of fields necessary to conduct a rigorous, high-quality research project 
with vulnerable and difficult-to-access populations.  
 
Researchers 
 
Name Organisation/Position Role in Project 
Associate Professor Rita 
Shackel 
Sydney Law School, The 
University of Sydney 
Principal Investigator, 
Project Lead 
Dr Lucy Fiske Social and Political 
Sciences, University of 
Technology Sydney 
Principal Investigator (2) 
Carol Angir ActionAid Australia, Senior 
Policy and Program 
Coordinator 
Principal Investigator (2)  
Casey McCowan ActionAid Australia 
(Partnership Co-ordinator) 
(April 2013 – Sept 2015) 
Program Manager 
Michelle Higelin  ActionAid Australia (Deputy 
Executive Director) 
Advisor  
Miriam Chelo Huguette  Consultant ActionAid DRC, Transcription and 
Interpreting  
Nicole Iafola ActionAid DRC, Youth 
Advisor  
Researcher 
Serge Kalubi Consultant ActionAid DRC, Transcription 
Clement Kone ActionAid DRC (Country 
Director) 
Advisor 
Adalbert Lumpali Consultant ActionAid DRC Transcription 
Anne Songa Murekatete Consultant ActionAid DRC Interpreting 
Makena Mwobobia ActionAid Kenya, Acting 
Country A/Director Head of 
Programs (August 2013 – 
March 2014) 
Researcher, In-country 
Coordinator, Kenya 
Justine Ndabugi ActionAid DRC, 
Administrative and 
Logistical Assistant  
Administration and 
Logistics Support 
Raisa Ndogole ActionAid DRC Policy and 
Campaigns Coordinator  
Researcher 
Mireille Ntambuka 
Nzigire 
ActionAid DRC (Consultant 
September 2013 – April 
2014) 
Researcher 
David Abwang ActionAid Uganda Local Field Research Assistant 
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Rights Program Coordinator 
Amuru 
Kevin Aciro ActionAid Uganda Local 
Rights Program Coordinator 
Pader  
Field Research Assistant 
Martha Wanda Mercy 
Achiro 
ActionAid Uganda Research 
Assistant (April 2013 – 
December 2014) 
Data Collector, Research 
Assistant, Interpreter and 
Transcriber  
Hellen Malinga Apila ActionAid Uganda, National 
Women’s Rights 
Coordinator 
(April 2013 – October 2015) 
Principal Researcher, In-
Country Uganda 
Okello Emmanuel ActionAid Uganda/Lango 
Language Board. 
Translator 
Josephine Laker  ActionAid Uganda Women 
Protection Centre Project 
Officer Amuru/Nwoya 
Field Research Assistant 
Arthur Larok ActionAid Uganda  Country 
Director (April 2013 – 
October 2015) 
Co-Researcher and 
Advisor 
Hope Masika ActionAid Uganda Women 
Protection Centre Project 
Officer Gulu 
Field Research Assistant 
Nickson Ogwal ActionAid Uganda 
(Director, Partnership 
Funding and Sponsorship) 
Advisor  
Lucy Atieno  ActionAid Kenya 
(Consultant) 
Transcriber  
Mabel Isoilo ActionAid Kenya 
(Consultant) 
Lead Researcher  
Alice Kimani  ActionAid Kenya (Project 
Officer August 2013 – 
August 2014) 
Researcher  
EllyJoy Kithure ActionAid Kenya Women 
Rights Coordinator (June 
2013 – September 2014) 
Researcher  
Lawrence Mwachidudu ActionAid Kenya (Local 
Rights Program Manager)  
Translator  
Naomi Wambui ActionAid Kenya-PO 
Women Rights (July 2013 –
August 2015) 
Researcher, 
Administration and 
Logistics 
 
 
A number of other people also participated in the project in various roles. Appendix A lists 
all research assistants that contributed to, and were a part of, this research project. 
 
Research management and process 
 
Associate Professor Rita Shackel, Dr Lucy Fiske, and Ms Carol Angir designed and 
coordinated the research project. ActionAid’s Country Directors and Women’s Rights 
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Coordinators in Uganda, DRC, and Kenya provided context-specific input throughout the 
project, coordinated activities in each country, participated in data gathering, and assisted 
with aspects of data analysis. The two academic researchers made numerous fieldwork trips 
and provided mentoring, research methods, skills training, and support to in-country 
researchers, as well as conducting a large number of research interviews and focus groups in 
all three countries. Several strategies were established to ensure consistency, quality, and 
integrity of data across a large and diverse team; these included: 
 
• Regular Skype meetings between researchers throughout the project 
• Regular and ongoing email correspondence 
• A week-long intensive induction and training program involving Australian and 
country researchers (Nairobi, September 2013) 
• Collaborative pre-test fieldwork in each country, with one-on-one mentoring and 
debriefing between in-country and academic researchers (September– November 
2013) 
• A follow-up skills and inception workshop with Australian, DRC, and Kenyan 
researchers (Goma, November 2013) 
• A public stakeholder forum including Australian, DRC, and Kenyan researchers 
(November 2013) 
• A follow-up interview skills workshop with Australian and Ugandan researchers 
(Kampala, April 2014) 
• Multiple fieldwork trips (3–4 each year) by academic researchers working with in-
country researchers in each country (2013–2015), including detailed planning and exit 
meetings 
• Development of a comprehensive “Fieldwork Handbook” tailored for each country 
(available at http://www.justiceforwomen.net.au) 
• Staged collection and transcription of interviews, with written and verbal feedback on 
interviews, data quality, and emerging themes for further probing provided after each 
transfer of data 
• Additional in-person team meetings in New York (March 2014), Netherlands (April 
2015), and Sydney (September 2015) with researchers from ActionAid Australia, 
Kenya, Uganda and DRC 
 
The multidisciplinary and multi-country collaboration enhanced the quality of the research, 
as it enabled the team to draw on expertise in several different fields, including social and 
legal theory; legal frameworks; qualitative research methods; development work; and 
country- and culture-specific knowledge. The collaboration with in-country ActionAid 
offices meant that otherwise difficult-to-reach populations and locations were included in the 
research. The project’s reach beyond larger regional towns, into remote villages, is a 
distinguishing feature of this research. 
 
Definitions 
 
In recognising justice as fluid, we defined it broadly and in a holistic way to include legal, 
health, economic, social, and psychological elements (Olsen et al. 2010, 983; Fischer 2011, 
412; Szablewska and Bradley 2015, 261). This definition was expanded and refined through 
the input of women participants, who were invited to reflect on what was necessary for them 
to feel justice had been done. This open question led to a rich understanding of justice as 
understood or desired by women participants, and forms the backbone of the reports. Justice 
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was often expressed as a process spanning the past, present, and future, with the elements of, 
and demands for, justice varying in each temporal phase. Restoration, however, was 
consistently viewed as a key element; women wanted to be restored to a position which 
resembled, at least subjectively, their pre-conflict state. For example, truth-telling was 
important to establish recent history and acknowledge wrongs done; reparations, health, and 
detraumatisation were required in the present; while education of children and enabling them 
to have a “better future” was almost universally cited as central to justice.  
 
Data collection 
 
Data was gathered from three distinct sources:  
 
• Women affected by violence  
• Key informants with experience in justice initiatives 
• Documentary and other secondary sources  
 
Primary data was gathered using semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions with 
both women affected by violence and key informants. Documentary and secondary data were 
gathered through extensive literature reviews addressing the conflicts in each country, the 
histories of each country, justice interventions, and reform in each country; these were 
supplemented by thematic searches addressing transitional justice, justice, gender, human 
rights, development, poverty, violence, and related themes in law, anthropology, sociology, 
psychology, history, and women’s studies. Documentary and secondary material included 
academic articles and books, policy and research reports, relevant public databases, case law, 
legislation, reports of government and non-government inquiries and investigations, and 
media reports. 
 
Women affected by violence 
 
The project interviewed a total of 274 women affected by violence, with 113 women in DRC, 
98 in Uganda, and 63 in Kenya. Women were selected for inclusion in the project if they met 
the following criteria: 
 
• They were 18 years of age or older. 
• They were living in a conflict affected area and a selected research site. 
• They had been affected by conflict, either directly or indirectly.  
• They had experience of some form of transitional justice process (including criminal 
prosecutions, truth commissions, amnesties, reparations, informal traditional 
approaches, or community-based initiatives).  
• They were willing and able to speak about their experiences. 
 
Fieldwork was conducted in Acholiland in northern Uganda in Pader, Gulu, and Amuru, and 
in several villages and parishes outside these central towns (a map of research sites is 
provided in Chapter 2). A total of 98 women in northern Uganda participated in the research 
– 50 through individual interviews, and 48 through focus group discussions. Ages ranged 
from 21 to 90 years. Thirty-five women’s primary experience of the conflict had been 
abduction by the LRA, and 51 women identified being in an Internally Displaced Person’s 
(IDP) camp as their primary conflict experience. While many women had experienced both 
internal displacement and abduction, one experience was usually spoken about as dominant 
or definitional by the woman. Of the women interviewed, only five identified both abduction 
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and encampment as equally significant experiences of the conflict. Women participants were 
married, cohabiting, never married, separated, divorced, and widowed. 
 
All interviews were conducted in a language in which the participant self-assessed as 
proficient. The majority of interviews used a female interpreter, a small number were 
conducted in English. Interpreters were sourced locally through ActionAid networks. 
Interviews and focus groups lasted between 45 minutes and two hours, with most taking 90 
minutes to two hours. Focus groups had between three and seven women participants. 
Fieldwork was conducted in stages to ensure a broadly representative sample of women was 
recruited (age, marital status, ethnicity, experience of war [i.e. internally displaced, abducted, 
or both], experience of justice [i.e. formal and informal]), to enable transcription of data and 
feedback to non-academic researchers from the academic researchers, and to enable 
identification of emerging themes and further probing of particular issues that emerged. 
Interviews in Uganda were conducted from September 2013 to June 2014, both by ActionAid 
Uganda staff members and by an academic researcher. All except three interviews were audio 
recorded and transcribed. Extensive notes were taken during the three interviews, for which 
permission to record was refused. Notes were also taken during the recorded interviews. 
 
Interviews and focus group discussions were semi-structured, following pre-identified themes 
and relevant unanticipated themes as raised by participants during the interview. Pre-
identified themes were generated through consultation with ActionAid staff, a literature 
search conducted before fieldwork, and through a one-week pre-test fieldwork trip in 
September 2013. Initially identified themes included: legal, economic, social, political and 
health justice, psycho-social and emotional well-being, traditional and/or informal justice 
mechanisms, roles of women in justice processes, and the effects of justice. Women were 
advised during the consent process that violence was not the focus of the research, and that 
researchers would not be asking direct questions about their experiences of violence. 
Participants were, however, asked indirectly about the sort of violence experienced, in order 
to provide context to their subsequent discussion of justice. A number of women chose to 
share their accounts of violence. 
 
The number and diversity of women interviewed provided an extensive survey of issues, such 
that saturation, although not a goal of the research, had been reached by the end of the 
fieldwork process. The semi-structured in-depth interviews allowed for rich information to be 
elicited and probed thoroughly. Focus group discussions helped present women with a range 
of views for them to reflect upon, and to compare and contrast with their own experiences, 
views, and opinions. The staged nature of the fieldwork enabled emerging themes to be 
further explored with later respondents, thereby allowing them to be tested for structural, 
rather than individual, significance. The resulting evidence base is rich; it is both extensive 
and of a high quality. 
 
Key informants 
 
Interviews with key informants were conducted from September 2013 to June 2015. A total 
of 68 key informants participated in the research across the three countries under study; this 
consisted of 28 in DRC, 26 in Kenya, and 14 in Uganda. The 14 key informants interviewed 
in Uganda included senior prosecutors, a magistrate, an inter-governmental policy officer, a 
police commander, lawyers, NGO workers, a parish level councillor, a former IDP camp 
leader, and a law and policy advocate working at the international level. Interviews were 
sought with health and policy workers in Uganda, but could not be conducted due to 
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timetabling or logistical issues. Consequently, the range of key informants interviewed in 
Uganda was not as broad as was hoped. Interviews with key informants were conducted by 
the academic researchers, together with the Uganda country researchers. Most interviews 
were audio recorded and transcribed. Notes were also taken.  
 
Interviews with key informants were semi-structured, and the focus of each interview varied 
depending on the participant’s area of expertise and experience in justice processes. For 
example, the interview with the former IDP camp leader followed very different themes to 
that with the senior prosecutor, which was different again to the police commander and the 
NGO workers. 
 
Data analysis 
 
The majority of recorded interviews and focus groups were transcribed. The two academic 
researchers read and re-read these multiple times to identify themes using inductive analysis 
– that is, by allowing the patterns, themes, and categories of analysis to come from the data 
(Srivastava and Hopwood 2009, 77). This method of analysis was chosen, because the 
primary objective of the research was to understand women’s experiences and opinions on 
justice post-conflict. The research did not seek to test any pre-existing theories or hypotheses. 
To pre-determine themes risked imposing external meanings on participants’ accounts, 
thereby skewing the analysis and working against the feminist epistemology of the research 
by displacing women’s views from the centre to the margins. 
 
Themes were identified and pursued if they related to the research questions, and  
 
• were repeated frequently (either in a single interview, or across more than one 
interview); 
• were discussed by several participants;  
• extended existing theoretical understandings or provided further insights into 
literature available on the theme; or 
• provided a basis for developing new theoretical insights and a contribution to 
understanding women’s experiences of justice processes (Bryman 2012, 580).  
 
Emerging themes were incorporated into later interviews, with women affected by violence 
and key informants asked to elicit their perspectives on issues or opinions put forward by 
earlier participants. This process of continual review and analysis of data enabled further 
probing of issues, as the project progressed and assisted in refining participant-generated 
understandings of key issues.  
 
Identified themes then formed the basis for further secondary research, and provided the 
structure for the reports on each country.  
 
Transcripts were also analysed with NVivo software for word repetition and thematic 
repetition. This analysis confirmed the strength of recurring issues and themes raised by 
women as identified by the researchers. Despite the use of NVivo, the primary mode of 
analysis was manual.  
 
This project also incorporated a novel and important step in analysis and validation of 
themes. The two academic researchers travelled to each country in June 2015, and, together 
with the ActionAid researchers, conducted “validation” workshops in Goma, Kampala, and 
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Nairobi. In Uganda, a full day validation workshop was conducted with 12 women who had 
already participated in the research (June 18, 2015). A half-day workshop was conducted 
with a small group of key informants, including local and international NGO workers (June 
19, 2015). 
 
Women participants for the validation workshop were selected on a number of criteria, 
including:  
 
• Ensuring a spread of research site location, age, and experience of war  
• Including all women who had asked for follow-up about the research  
• Including women who were particularly articulate in their interviews 
• Including women whose interview transcripts provided insight on particular themes 
• Including women whose transcripts were largely emblematic of identified themes 
 
In the workshop with women affected by violence, an overview of themes and issues 
identified was presented to the participants. Participants were then given the opportunity to 
discuss the findings in small groups, including using (non-identifiable) key, emblematic, or 
potentially controversial quotes from research participants (both key informants and women 
affected by violence). Small group and plenary discussions were audio recorded with the 
women’s permission, and transcribed. The benefits of this process include the ethical benefit 
of feeding back progress on the research to participants, and, furthermore, of including 
women as co-analysts (an advantage for which all women participants expressed great 
appreciation); providing confirmation and/or clarification of particular issues put to the 
group; enabling further refining of themes, and enabling researchers to hear how women 
spoke with one another about justice without a researcher or NGO worker present. While the 
validation workshop with women participants confirmed the themes identified, it added two 
important elements in particular. The first related to the surrender to the ICC of Dominic 
Ongwen, and the beginning of the first ICC trial regarding the Uganda situation. At the time 
of fieldwork, no Ugandan indictees had been captured and discussion of international 
prosecutions was largely hypothetical. One of the small groups spontaneously began 
discussing the ICC prosecution of Ongwen, which allowed the research team to pose 
questions regarding this to the whole group. The second issue which arose generally during 
fieldwork, but was demonstrated during the workshop, was the capacity for formerly 
abducted and formerly displaced people to speak about the rift facing their communities. 
Women had expressed a desire for community dialogue and reconciliation to researchers 
during fieldwork; however, during the validation workshop, the transcripts of small group 
work revealed women from different groups discussing the issues of conflict in their 
communities with each other in considerable depth. This demonstration of self-directed 
reconciliation is important in itself for future reconciliation work and engagement with 
conflict-affected communities in northern Uganda. 
 
The researchers presented an outline of initial themes at the workshop with key informants, 
distinguishing between perspectives of women affected by violence, different categories of 
key informants, and areas of convergence and divergence between the two. Participants were 
then invited to discuss issues raised in an unstructured format. This process enabled key 
informant participants to hear what issues and priorities women affected by violence had 
identified, hear what other key informants had raised, and respond to themes. This workshop 
provided further validation of the themes identified, and initial analysis of those themes. In 
Uganda, an important outcome of the key informant validation workshop was the observation 
that participants strongly echoed the views of women on the lasting effects of the conflict on 
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the communities, and the need for local-level work addressing reconciliation, trauma, 
alcoholism, and leadership. In particular, the key informants helped clarify the interaction of 
customary and formal systems of land tenure and justice, and identified some tensions in the 
conceptual framework of human rights, women’s rights, and international justice when 
discussed in Acholi communities 
 
The Uganda country researchers also participated in the key informant workshops, adding 
their perspectives and views to discussion and analysis. 
 
Ethical approval and permissions 
 
Formal ethics approval for this project was granted by the University of Sydney Human 
Research Ethics Committee (approval number 2013/380). Ethics approval was also granted 
by University of Technology Sydney (UTS HREC 2014000246), Uganda National Council 
for Science and Technology, National HIV/AIDS Research Committee (approval number 
ARC 144), and Kenyan National Council for Science and Technology (approval number 
NCST/RCD/14/013/1335). The DRC does not have a formal human research ethics 
committee; however, an extensive consultation process was undertaken, including hosting a 
public inception and stakeholder workshop – the project was introduced in this forum, and 
stakeholders were invited to ask researchers any questions or raise concerns. Attendees 
provided feedback on the current state of conflict and security in the area, the project’s 
methodology, and the recruitment of participants and site selection. Following the workshop, 
key stakeholders were further engaged in a consultative process through which the research 
sites in eastern DRC were finally selected. Approval for the research was granted by the 
Provincial Minister of Justice in Goma, Christophe Ndibeshe Byemero. Local permissions 
were also obtained as necessary during conduct of fieldwork, from relevant formal and 
traditional authorities in each research site. 
 
In addition to complying with all formal ethics requirements, the researchers embedded 
ethical research processes throughout the project, and engaged in critical reflective practices 
at all stages (including design, development, fieldwork, data handling, research team 
relations, analysis, and writing). The well-being of individuals participating in the research 
(both as informants and researchers) was held as paramount at all times. 
 
It is important to canvas, albeit briefly, at least some of the ethical issues raised in this 
research, and steps taken to care for people and principles that underpinned this work. 
 
Recruitment processes 
 
This project sought the views of adult women and did not include children. Research with 
children requires specific design and methodology, responsive to children’s levels of 
development, cognition, capacity to give informed consent, and particular vulnerabilities. It 
also requires particular knowledge and skills from the researchers. At the outset, we took the 
definition of adult as 18 years and over, and sought ethics approval accordingly. However, 
once in the field (particularly in DRC), it became clear that this age cut-off excluded some 
young women who were, in many respects, living adult lives, and who wanted to participate 
in the research. In every stage of fieldwork in the DRC, teenage girls approached the research 
team asking to be included. These girls were typically between 13 and 17 years of age, and 
were responsible for the care of younger children (whether younger siblings, their own 
children, or orphaned children). No girls under the age of 18 years were included in the 
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project; chronological age was carefully scrutinised during the consent process. However, 
turning away young women/girls raised significant ethical dilemmas for the researchers. The 
concept of “adult” and “child” is contextual and contingent on a range of social, emotional, 
political, and individual factors. The experiences, opinions, and views of young women/girls 
acting as heads of households, despite being under 18 years of age, are important and need to 
be considered in future research projects (Arnett and Galambos 2004, 92; Nugin 2010, 49–
50). Due to ActionAid’s involvement in the project, underage girls who were not included in 
the research were able to be counselled and provided support through appropriate ActionAid 
services and programs, and, as appropriate, were referred to other services and agencies. 
 
Recruitment occurred through multiple channels, including referral by health, legal, and 
social service providers, as well as self-referral. However, most participants were recruited 
indirectly through ActionAid’s networks. Furthermore, ActionAid in each country provided 
all logistical support during fieldwork. This involved using ActionAid vehicles for transport, 
and ActionAid-managed travel reimbursements for participants (see below). Although all 
researchers stressed that the research project was led by the University of Sydney, and was 
not an ActionAid project, it must be acknowledged that this distinction may not have been 
clear to some participants. Given the prominence of NGOs in essential service delivery in 
many of the research sites (particularly in eastern DRC, where there is still live conflict and 
humanitarian aid is much relied upon), it is possible that ActionAid’s lead role in recruitment 
may have impacted on expectations of prospective participants, and on populations targeted 
for recruitment. 
 
These issues were addressed in a number of ways. Demographic information of participants 
and fieldwork included recruitment process as a standard field. This enabled academic 
researchers to provide feedback about diversity of recruitment sources, as the project 
progressed. The issue of participant expectations was addressed directly during the 
information sessions with women participants, and is explained in greater detail below. 
Nonetheless, while partnering with an NGO enabled the conduct of in-depth and extensive 
fieldwork with difficult-to-reach populations, the possible impacts of visible NGO 
participation in the project need to be considered; it is possible that some women saw 
participation in the research as an opportunity to also access other services and assistance. 
 
Free and informed consent 
 
Particular care was taken to ensure that consent was both informed and freely given. 
Information about the project was provided both individually and to groups of prospective 
participants. Project information was provided through written participant information sheets, 
which participants could take away, as well as orally in a language understood by 
participants. Information provided to participants covered the membership of the research 
team (taking care to distinguish between academic and NGO organisations, and the 
individuals involved); the aims and methodology of the research; confidentiality; storage and 
security of data; the nature of questions to be asked; participants’ rights to not participate, to 
withdraw at any stage, and to decline to answer some questions and not others; and the risks 
and benefits of participation. The project’s public documents were translated into the 
languages spoken by women participants; translated public documents were certified locally. 
Prospective participants were encouraged to ask questions, and any concerns raised were 
addressed by the research team. Participants provided consent in writing or orally, and were 
specifically asked if they consented to their interview being recorded. In the case of focus 
group discussions, it was made clear to participants that it was not possible to erase 
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recordings if they decided to withdraw after the focus group discussion had commenced, 
because of the group nature of the interview. No participants withdrew from the research 
after consenting. 
 
A significant number of women affected by violence in northern Uganda (as in the other 
research countries) asked how the research would benefit them, and whether the researchers 
would bring the research back to them later in the project. Several women said that they had 
participated in research before, and had neither personally benefited nor been informed of the 
progress or outcomes of the research. The researchers explained that there would be no direct 
benefit to individuals who participated in the research, and possibly not to the population of 
women affected by violence in northern Uganda (or in the other countries under study). The 
researchers explained that the research would produce reports with particular attention to 
amplifying the views and experiences of women who participated in the project, and that the 
reports would be disseminated widely. The academic researchers would write the reports, 
drawing together views of all women interviewed, and would present the analysis at a range 
of academic and policy forums. The NGO partner would use the reports to inform their 
programming and advocacy. It was explained that neither the universities nor the NGOs had 
the power to promise changes in the women’s lives, and that, while this research would make 
a significant contribution to the field, it could not assure direct benefit to participants or their 
communities.  
 
The researchers assured prospective participants that every attempt would be made to return 
and present the research to them, and to provide access to the report. This aim has been 
partially achieved through holding the validation workshops in June 2015, during which 
much of the initial analysis was presented to the women present. Every participant who had 
asked for follow up on the research was invited to attend this workshop, although not all were 
able to attend. ActionAid Uganda, Kenya and DRC will deliver the report to women who 
participated in the study, when it is complete.  
 
Reimbursement of travel costs was provided to all participants in the research. This typically 
ranged from UGX5,000 to UGX10,000 (AU$1.25–AU$2.50). Refreshments (water) were 
sometimes served. No rewards that might rise to the level of inducement were offered, being 
particularly mindful of the particular context of poverty and need amongst participants.  
 
The interview 
 
In recognition of the fine balance that people affected by violence may find talking about 
traumatic experiences difficult, and yet may also have a strong desire to testify to their 
experiences and participate in the research process, interviews with women affected by 
violence were designed to enable the women respondents to have as much control over the 
interview process as possible. All interviewers had experience working with women affected 
by violence. Additionally, the researcher introduction to the project emphasised the primary 
value of participant well-being, and that the respondents’ well-being was more important than 
eliciting data. Researcher induction also included significant training on research interviews 
addressing sensitive topics, responding to trauma in an interview, referral options for 
participants, and role plays on sensitive interviewing. This was further included in the 
fieldwork manual, and embedded in all fieldwork briefings and debriefings.  
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An example of sensitive interviewing 
 
Violence was not a key focus of the research; however, some information about the nature of 
violence experienced was necessary in order to provide context for participants’ subsequent 
discussion of justice. Interviewers avoided asking directly about experiences of violence, 
instead asking open questions to which the participant could decide how to respond. A typical 
phrasing of this line of questioning was to ask, “How has the conflict affected your life?” 
Respondents were then able to respond with as much or as little detail as they felt 
comfortable with, and were able to avoid recounting traumatic episodes, focusing instead on 
the present day after-effects of the conflict. Alternatively, respondents were able to tell their 
stories of violation and injustice if they wanted to. Many of the women chose to talk about 
their experiences of violence to varying degrees of detail. The way in which women 
responded to this question provided important information to the interviewer both about 
possible themes to be further explored and about the probable boundaries for further probing. 
This was an important element in enabling maximum control of the interview to reside with 
the respondent while still meeting research focus requirements. Despite using open-ended 
questions to enable women to control the interview, and to choose whether or not to discuss 
their experiences of violence (including how, and to what extent), we initially perceived that 
women’s responses may have reflected their pre-existing expectations about what 
information they should be providing in the interviews – expectations that were perhaps 
influenced by their previous interactions with NGOs, the media, or other researchers. 
However, by allowing the women to control the interview, most women, in time, moved 
beyond this expected script and into opinion, emotion, the meaning of violence on their lives, 
and shared deep insights on a number of issues important to their personhoods. This is 
reflected in the length of most of the interviews. This self-constructed space for deep 
reflection and sharing by the women made the interviews themselves affirming, enabling 
them to be more than a “victim” of violent experience, and acknowledging their own persons. 
 
Ongoing consent 
 
Even though consent was given prior to any interview beginning, this project took consent to 
be an ongoing and iterative process. The onus was placed on the researcher to check in with 
respondents periodically throughout the interview about her continued willingness to 
participate, particularly if a respondent became distressed during the interview. When 
respondents did feel upset, they were offered the opportunity to take a break, abandon the 
interview, or to move to a new area of questioning. Very often, enabling women to have 
control of the direction and depth of the interview assisted in reducing their level of distress, 
and, in some instances, helped participants feel better after the interview than they did before. 
By way of example, one woman said at the end of her interview, “What I see is that your 
coming is really a sort of counselling for us … [you] give us hope and make us look at life 
with a different perspective.”3  Another woman, when offered the opportunity to pause or end 
the interview, explained that “I have been looking to this opportunity with whom I can share 
this past experience. So from yesterday when I got this information that you are coming, I 
have been looking forward to meeting you … because as much as it’s painful and I speak and 
shed tears, cry … at least it helps me to heal. It takes away that pain that I have been holding 
this whole time.”4  
 
                                                
3 Interviewed in Agago, June 18, 2014. 
4 Interviewed in Amuru, June 26, 2014. 
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Confidentiality and security 
 
Women participants were reassured in the consent process that interviews were confidential, 
that what they shared with the researchers would only be used for the purposes of this 
research, and that they would not be individually identifiable in any reports. It was explained 
to participants that this would be achieved by removing any identifiable information from the 
interview transcripts, so that they could not be identified, and that any quotes used in reports 
would not be attributed to a woman by name. In the case of focus group discussions, the 
importance of confidentiality amongst participants was stressed as part of the consent 
process. 
 
Key informants were given the option of consenting to be identifiable in whole, in part, or not 
at all, in the reports. 
 
All interviews were conducted in a safe and secure location. Interviews were rescheduled or 
relocated where security concerns warranted such a response. 
 
Data management and security 
 
Interviews were recorded on hand-held audio recorders. During fieldwork, all recordings of 
interviews were coded and copied onto the researchers’ password protected laptops, backed 
up onto a password protected external hard drive, and then deleted from recorders. Project 
materials were copied and stored on the academic researchers’ password protected desktop 
computers, located in their Sydney offices. Project materials were at times temporarily stored 
on Dropbox and/or exchanged via USB sticks between researchers, and then permanently 
deleted. 
 
Secondary trauma 
 
The potential for secondary or vicarious trauma for researchers (Alexander et al. 1989, 58), as 
well as others working with traumatic material and trauma survivors, is well recognised 
(McCann and Pearlman 1990, 134–35; Mouldern and Firestone 2007, 67–8). Several 
strategies were used to support team members, including researchers, interpreters, 
transcribers, and research assistants, throughout the project.  
 
Self-care principles and practices were discussed during training and induction workshops. A 
section on self-care was included in the project handbooks. Most interviews were conducted 
by at least two people. Debriefs were integrated into fieldwork, most commonly at the end of 
each day, and/or when work was completed at a research site. At the end of each period of 
fieldwork, which typically extended for two to three weeks, an exit meeting was held; this 
created a space for team members to talk about their experiences of the fieldwork, their 
feelings, and raise any issues of concern. It also created an opportunity to check in with one 
another. The academic researchers also regularly checked in with research assistants through 
face-to-face meetings, via Skype or email, to allow issues to be raised and discussed. At the 
end of the validation workshops (conducted in June 2015), secondary trauma and strategies 
for self-care were directly discussed within the research team. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND TO 
CONFLICT AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN NORTHERN 
UGANDA  
 
 
2.1 Background 
 
Uganda is a land-locked country in the Great Lakes region of East Africa. It is bordered to 
the north by South Sudan, while the Democratic Republic of Congo lies to its west, Tanzania 
to the south, and Kenya to the east. South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo are 
both currently experiencing armed conflicts, and Kenya has experienced a series of violent 
upheavals in recent years. There has been a history of the conflicts in each country breaching 
national borders and impacting on neighbours. The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) 
insurgency in Uganda, for example, has had significant impacts on both South Sudan and the 
DRC, while cross border raids by the Turkana (into Uganda) and Karamojong (into Kenya) 
have increased tensions in both Uganda and Kenya. There have been regular flows of 
combatants, refugees, and weapons across Uganda’s western, northern, and eastern borders. 
The regional instability has exacerbated and prolonged Uganda’s twenty-year war with the 
LRA, and continues to impact on recovery efforts.  
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Uganda has a population of 34.9 million people, made up of more than 40 different ethnic 
groups; as such, it is among the most ethnically diverse countries in the world (Blake 2013; 
UBoS 2014, 6). The largest ethnic group is the Baganda in the south, who make up 16.9 
percent of the population. The Acholi, according to 2002 census figures, make up 4.7 percent 
of the population, the seventh largest ethnic group.5 Uganda has a very young population; the 
median age is 15.5 years and 78 percent of the population is under 30 years of age (GoU Pop 
Sec 2013, 11). Uganda has also been struggling with a high HIV/AIDS infection rate, with an 
estimated 7.3 percent of the population living with HIV/AIDS, 140,900 new infections in 
2013, 1.1 million children orphaned due to HIV/AIDS, and 62,000 deaths in 2011 (UBoS 
2014, 1; GoU Pop Sec 2013, 13, 137–38; UAC 2014, 5). All of these indicators are on a 
downward trend in response to national HIV/AIDS reduction strategies, but nonetheless 
HIV/AIDS presents a considerable challenge. Life expectancy in Uganda today is 54.5 years 
nationally (UNDP 2013, 2), compared to 44.3 years in northern Uganda in 2007 (Podszun 
2011, 130). Women can expect to live on average two years longer than men. 
 
Uganda is struggling with widespread poverty. The Government of Uganda, using income as 
a singular measure, reports that 19.7 percent of the population is living in poverty, with a 
further 43 percent at risk of poverty (GoU 2014, v). The United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), however, reports that 69.9 percent of Ugandans are living in 
multidimensional poverty (measuring income, health and education), with a further 19 
percent at risk of multidimensional poverty (UNDP 2013, 5). Uganda’s Bureau of Statistics 
reported poverty in northern Uganda to be roughly double that of other regions (UBoS 2010, 
20; Nystrand 2014, 824).  
 
The Government of Uganda has committed to addressing gender inequality as a priority goal 
and has introduced a number of pieces of legislation and planning instruments towards this 
end.6 The government has a one third quota for women’s representation in parliament, and 
every district must have at least one woman representative.7 Despite this, gender inequality is 
pronounced across almost all axes of measurement. Uganda was ranked 110 of 148 countries 
assessed in the 2012 UNDP Gender Inequality Index (UNDP 2013, 4). Uganda has achieved 
gender parity in primary school enrolments (MoES 2011); indeed, this research did not find 
any instances of parents preferring to educate their sons before their daughters, even 
including situations where poverty meant that not all children in the household could be kept 
in school. On all other measures, however, Ugandan women and girls are disadvantaged. 
Although Ugandan women have the formal right to own property (land and housing), “male-
headed households hold more than twice the land size held by female-headed households,” 
with flow on effects to women’s income earning capacity, participation in decision-making, 
and vulnerability to gender based violence, particularly from intimate partners (GoU Pop Sec 
2013, 7). The Government of Uganda Population Secretariat reported in 2013 that women 
                                                
5  Uganda conducted a census in August 2014 and has released a report titled Provisional Results. The 
Provisional Results provide a breakdown of population according to age, sex, and administrative district, but not 
ethnicity. The final comprehensive results of the census are due to be released in December 2015. For this 
reason, the 2002 figures are used for matters not yet reported on from the 2014 census. 
6 The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda (1995) contains provisions for women’s equality with men at 
Article 33, including in accessing economic opportunities (Article 33(4)). The Constitution also states that 
“[l]aws, cultures, customs or traditions which are against the dignity, welfare or interest of women or which 
undermine their status, are prohibited by this Constitution” (Article 33(6)). Additional key legislation passed to 
promote women’s equality include (but are not limited to): The Customary Marriage (Registration) Act (1973) 
Cap. (248); The Divorce Act (1904) Cap. (249); The Domestic Violence Act (2010);	 and The Equal 
Opportunities Commission Act (Act No. 2/2007). 
7 Constitution of the Republic of Uganda (1995), Article 78(1)(b).		
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earn 39 percent less than men, and that men continue to make most major household 
decisions: only 30 percent of couples reported making joint decisions about children’s 
education, and 38 percent of currently married women reported participating in decisions 
about their own health care (GoU Pop Sec 2013, 7). The same report found that gender based 
violence causes more deaths and disability each year in Uganda than malaria, motor-vehicle 
accidents, and war, combined (GoU Pop Sec 2013, 55). 
 
Uganda’s maternal morbidity rate, while almost halved in the last 25 years, remains among 
the world’s worst, at 310 deaths per 100,000 live births (GoU Pop Sec 2013, 66). Twenty-
four percent of Ugandan teenaged girls become pregnant each year, and 18 percent have a 
live birth (GoU Pop Sec 2013, 52). Twelve percent of Uganda’s children under the age of 18 
years are orphaned, almost half of whom due to HIV/AIDS. Most orphaned children are 
cared for informally by extended family members; “however, many of these care-givers are 
overburdened and often lack the socio-economic capacity to provide adequate care and 
support for these children” (GoU Pop Sec 2013, 17). 
 
Famously called the “Pearl of Africa” by Winston Churchill, Uganda’s 241,038 sq km is 
mainly good quality agricultural land. Seventy-one percent of the land is classed as 
agricultural (World Fact Book 2015), and 82 percent of the population lives in rural areas 
(UBoS 2013, xix). However, there is a north-south divide with most of the pastoral land for 
the grazing of cattle in the north, and most of the permanent cash crops in the south. Eighty 
percent of women in Uganda work in agriculture, most of whom are engaged in subsistence 
farming (GoU Pop Sec 2013, 67). Given the predominance of agriculture in the Ugandan 
economy, equal ownership of land is critical for gender equality. 
 
2.2 The Acholi 
 
As has occurred in many other parts of Africa, colonialism created more rigid ethnic 
identities in the north of Uganda. There is some debate as to how strong the identity of Acholi 
was before colonialism, and the actual word “Acholi” seems to have come into more 
common usage during the period of colonisation (Allen and Vlassenroot 2010, 4). Whatever 
the impact of colonialism, distinct cultural practices have long existed in Acholiland, and 
among the most significant are those of conflict resolution practices. Researchers describe an 
“elaborate system of conflict containment and resolution,” exemplified by Mato Oput 
(drinking of the bitter root) and gomo tong (bending of the spears), with the rituals overseen 
by anointed chiefs (Doom and Vlassenroot 1999, 11).  
 
The Acholi Sub-Region (also known as Acholiland), comprised of Amuru, Gulu, Kitgum, 
Agago, Pader, and Lira districts, is not densely populated. Traditionally, the Acholi were 
farmers and cattle herders, with cattle being the source of wealth and prestige, and binding 
families through dowries (Doom and Vlassenroot 1999, 12). It is possible that, because the 
south was the site of lucrative cash-crops under colonial rule, the Acholi constituted the main 
pool of recruitment for the Army, while the civil service was primarily comprised of 
southerners. As Ali AlAmin Mazrui explained in Soldiers and Kinsmen in Uganda: The 
making of a military ethnocracy (1975), the Acholi were thus “transformed into a military 
ethnocracy” (quoted in Doom and Vlassenroot 1999, 8); subsequently, they have dominated 
the military since independence from Britain in 1962. 
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2.3 The North-South divide and the Civil War 
 
As noted above, North-South divisions – in particular, in terms of access to power and 
differing development policies – were already present under colonisation. Uganda became 
independent in 1962, with a federal constitution, and a President, Milton Obote. However, 
Obote soon abolished the federal structure, and in particular sought to consolidate his power 
by moving against The Kabaka, the traditional king of the Baganda, the main ethnic group of 
the South. Obote exiled The Kabaka, Sir Edward Mutesa, and ordered the head of the army, 
Idi Amin, to storm The Kabaka’s palace. In 1967, Obote abolished the Kingdom of Buganda; 
at the same time, he built up a personal following of army officers from his own tribe, the 
Langi, and the neighbouring Acholi, who already dominated the army. However, Amin, 
watching these manoeuvres, was likewise building up a collection of loyal officers from his 
home region of West Nile. 
 
In 1971, Idi Amin took power in a military coup while Obote was out of the country. Amin 
was greeted as a hero by the Buganda, but, fearing a counter-strike by Obote, began mass 
killings of Langi and Acholi with “truckloads of corpses” dumped into the Nile. By the end of 
his eight-year reign, the death toll was estimated at 250,000 (Meredith 2005, 232–38). 
 
Amin was eventually toppled when he tried to invade Tanzania in 1978, and elections in 1980 
(viewed by most observers as flawed) brought Milton Obote back into power. The disputed 
elections led to a five-year civil war, with Yoweri Museveni’s National Resistance Army 
(NRA) forming in 1981; “in Museveni’s eyes there was no room for the old political circles, 
held responsible for the disaster of Amin” (Doom and Vlassenroot 1999, 9). Museveni’s 
support was particularly strong in the south, while Obote’s military, the Ugandan National 
Liberation Army (UNLA), was again made up of northerners;  this “northern” army “was 
accused by human rights groups of being responsible for 300,000 civilian deaths” (Meredith 
2005, 238). In July 1985, Acholi soldiers, angered at finding themselves always on the 
frontline compared to their Langi colleagues, overthrew Obote (ADST 2014). The coup was 
led by Lieutenant-General Basilio Olara-Okello and General Tito Okello Lutwa, and the latter 
eventually became president. President Okello Lutwa immediately began negotiations with 
Museveni, and this led to the Nairobi Peace Agreement. However, in January 1986, the NRA 
captured Kampala, and the Acholi-dominated UNLA forces fled north to reorganise in Sudan. 
 
As ethnic purges were one of the main characteristics of the recent political history of 
Uganda, many Acholi feared the NRA would wreak vengeance for acts committed under 
previous governments. The setting aside of the Nairobi Peace Agreement by the NRA, and 
the undisciplined behaviour of parts of the NRA in both Gulu and Kitgum districts during the 
first months of the NRA takeover, served only to fuel this anxiety. When the NRA High 
Command issued a directive over Radio Uganda, urging all former UNLA soldiers to report 
to Mbuya army headquarters within ten days, the memory of a similar order after Amin’s 
coup (orders which had resulted in the massacre of many Acholi soldiers) convinced many 
UNLA soldiers to join those that had already fled to Sudan. As one member of Human Rights 
Focus observed, “The order was just like in Amin’s days. The Acholi boys said to each other, 
‘This time we are not going to die like chickens. Let us go to Sudan and join our brothers, 
and fight to save the Acholi’” (Doom and Vlassenroot 1999, 13–4). 
 
The merging of various anti-Museveni forces in Juba eventually led to the Ugandan People’s 
Defence Army (UPDA). The UPDA was initially an effective fighting force, and attacks and 
counter-attacks followed. Of particular note was the UPDA’s successful overrunning of the 
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NRA’s 35th Battalion at Ukuti in August 1986. The 35th Battalion withdrew to Namu-Okora 
and organised a series of massacres. Doom and Vlassenroot wrote that “this galvanized the 
fear held by many Acholi of massive retaliation or annihilation” (Doom and Vlassenroot 
1999, 14–5). Mistreatment of the population confirmed fears of reprisal (Bevan 2007, 344). 
 
The UPDA was a spent force by the end of 1987, and in June 1988, the Gulu Peace Accord 
was signed. However, the civil war led directly into the Holy Spirit Movement and the 
formation of the LRA; for the Acholi, this meant over 20 years of destruction and 
terrorisation.  
 
Other legacies of the civil war include the mistrust in Acholiland of the Museveni 
government, and, arguably, the long history of violence after independence, which has led to 
a tradition of impunity. The International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) argued that 
“gross human rights violations committed under the regimes of Milton Obote, Idi Amin Dada 
and Tito Okello have largely gone unpunished, perpetuating a legacy of impunity that 
remains in the country to this day” (Otim and Kihika 2015, 1). 
 
2.4 The Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) and the Lord’s Resistance Army 
(LRA)  
 
Alice Auma’s Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) began as the UPDA ran out of ammunition and 
energy. Auma reported that, starting in August 1986, spirits told her to liberate young people 
from her neighbourhood who had been kidnapped by the NRA and held in the barracks of 
Gulu town. She was able to do this with the support of 150 former UNLA veterans and forty 
guns (Allen and Vlassenroot 2010, 8). Auma was said to be particularly in touch with the 
Lakwena spirit, and she became known as “Alice Lakwena.” The HSM had considerable 
military successes for a while. They were noted for being fearless in battle, “walking straight 
at the enemy without taking cover” (Bevan 2007, 344), as they had been anointed in 
protective oil (Allen and Vlassenroot 2010, 8). 
 
The HSM was eventually defeated in October 1987, in a battle only 80 miles from Kampala. 
Importantly, Auma was not only fighting against the NRA; she felt she was fighting against 
bad spirits in the Acholi (Allen and Vlassenroot 2010, 8). This is why codes of conduct, 
initiation rites, and spirituality played such an important role in her movement. The HSM was 
also occasionally violent to the Acholi who did not support them (Allen and Vlassenroot 
2010, 18). Occasionally, the HSM forcibly recruited members (Bevan 2007, 345).  
 
Joeseph Kony, alternatively described as a cousin or nephew of Auma, tried to join the 
UPDA-HSM alliance, but he was rejected by Auma. Nevertheless, Kony continued to recruit 
for his own rebel army, using techniques and ideas similar to HSM’s. Those members of the 
UPDA who did not agree with the Gulu Peace Accord found a home after June 1988 with 
Kony; of particular note is one of the UPDA’s “most ruthless and effective commanders, 
Odong Latek … [from whom] Kony seems to have learned a lot about guerrilla tactics. His 
ally was killed in battle, but by 1990 Kony’s force was the only significant armed unit still 
fighting in the Acholi homelands” (Allen and Vlassenroot 2010, 10). 
 
 
2.5 Civilian abuse, displacement and the prolonged, scorched earth nature 
of the conflict, complicated by regional dynamics 
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Civilian abuse and destruction of infrastructure by both the NRA and the rebels was common 
from 1986 onwards, resulting in large-scale internal displacement which would later become 
a huge feature of the conflict (see below). In particular, the NRA forcibly cleared 
approximately 100,000 people from homes around Gulu town in December 1988, during 
which there were reports of systematic male rape by the NRA, as well as the looting of cattle 
for food by the army (Dolan 2009, 44–45). This situation continued until 1991, when things 
got worse as Operation North was launched. This consisted of a four-month campaign by 
government troops forcibly restricting travel and rounding people up for screening (Dolan 
2009, 44–45), and where “arrest and torture to force people to cooperate with the government 
were common practices” (Doom and Vlassenroot 1999, 23). During Operation North, the 
Ugandan Army urged Acholi elders to set up civilian bow and arrow defence units (Dolan 
2009, 45); Doom and Vlassenroot (1999, 23) noted that 
 
[t]he majority of the Acholi were deeply disturbed by the permanent state of terror, and although 
the blame can be put on [Ugandan Minister of State for Defence, Major General David] Tinyefuza 
(who was replaced in 1992), people also wanted to rid themselves of the LRA… participation rate 
[in the bow and arrow brigades] was quite high.  
 
However, this participation was noted by Kony, and “1991 saw the beginning of LRA 
mutilations and maimings reminiscent of those of the Mozambican National Resistance 
(RENAMO) in Mozambique, including the cutting of lips and noses and the use of padlocks 
on the mouths of people they thought might report them to authorities” (Dolan 2009, 45). 
 
In 1991, the conflict in Acholiland also began to be influenced by regional politics. 
Museveni’s government supported the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) in its 
conflict with Sudan’s central government, including by allowing the passage of arms through 
northern Uganda. The Khartoum government responded to Museveni’s support for the SPLM 
by supporting Kony and the LRA. International politics were also at play, as the USA was 
using Uganda and the SPLM as a bulwark against the “regional jihad” proclaimed by the 
Khartoum government (Meredith 2005, 594). Ultimately, the fact that the LRA was involved 
as a proxy fighting unit in these regional and international disputes was a major factor in 
prolonging the conflict. 
 
2.6 The failed 1994 peace talks and the resulting escalation of abductions 
and terror 
 
The conflict changed nature again with a huge escalation in violence in 1994, after the failure 
of peace talks led by the Government of Uganda Minister for the North, Betty Bigombe. At 
considerable personal risk, Bigombe, an Acholi resident of Gulu, had negotiated with Kony 
for a comprehensive peace agreement. Kony asked for six months to organise the 
involvement of the Acholi people as a whole, and to gather members of the political wing 
living outside Uganda. President Museveni believed that the LRA would use the six-months 
to gain time and re-arm with help from Sudan (Doom and Vlassenroot 1999, 24). He 
“rejected the idea and gave the rebels a seven-day deadline to assemble and surrender, a 
condition that effectively ended the peace process” (Atkinson 2010, 205).  
 
The collapse of the peace process led to three outcomes. The first was the escalation of 
violence towards the Acholi. Kony reportedly felt betrayed by elders, and blamed civilians 
for his failing war (Doom and Vlassenroot 1999, 25). The second outcome was a large 
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increase in support from Sudan: “Sudan began providing the rebel group with significant 
financial assistance, military training, weapons, other supplies and sanctuary” (Atkinson 
2010, 206). There was a quid pro quo; Kony had to pay for this increase in support from 
Sudan by turning the LRA into a major fighting unit in the war against the SPLM in southern 
Sudan. This required a larger fighting force, and, being unable to recruit volunteers, the LRA 
dramatically increased its rate of abductions. At the same time, the LRA used ever more 
extreme violence, in particular by forcing children to commit atrocities against their own 
families and communities. This was a deliberate tactic aimed at keeping the children in the 
bush, by making them feel they could not return to their communities (Bevan 2007, 344). The 
extreme nature of the violence used caused widespread terror among the population, which in 
turn strengthened “the immediate power of [Kony’s] field commanders far beyond their 
logistic and military capacities” (Doom and Vlassenroot 1999, 26). 
 
Kony had no other natural resources at his disposal to continue his war; rather, the people of 
Acholiland became his resources, as soldiers in his role as a proxy force for Sudan. It was 
initially estimated that 25,000 to 30,000 children were abducted by the LRA between 1987 
and 2007 (Bevan 2007, 343), but that figure has since been revised upwards to 66,000 
(Annan et al. 2006, 16), and even as high as 75,000 (HRW 2005). 
 
The third outcome of the collapse of the peace process was another blow to the trust of the 
Acholi in the Museveni government. Museveni chose the military option as Uganda was 
headed towards the 1995 constitutional reforms. Some commentators argue it was in 
Museveni’s interest to take the “strong man” position, highlighting his role as a fighting 
general, for who else would “protect [southerners] from the Acholi and other wild 
northerners?” (Allen and Vlassenroot 2010, 12). In addition, from 1995 onwards, the 
Ugandan army’s attention was split as it was largely occupied in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC), turning DRC gold into a major Ugandan export (Meredith 2005, 541). The 
Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF) was particularly criticised for deploying forces to 
fight the Rwandan army over the mineral wealth at Kisangani, during a peak in LRA attacks 
on civilians in northern Uganda in 1999. 
 
2.7 The camps 
 
From 1996 onwards, a key tactic of the Government of Uganda (GoU) consisted of 
government troops forcibly displacing thousands of people into “protected villages” or 
Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps, and subsequently perpetrating numerous human 
rights abuses. The process by which people were displaced into camps involved threats of 
aerial bombing if the homestead was not vacated within a specified time frame; burning 
homesteads and granaries; and direct violence against civilians, including shooting, beating, 
and raping women (Dolan 2009, 154). Amnesty International reported multiple specific 
incidents of the UPDF using force, including raping women, beating men and women, 
shooting people, destroying homes and granaries, looting food and livestock, and shelling 
villages, to enforce compliance with their directive that villagers should leave their homes 
and move to an IDP camp (AI 1999, 34–36). 
  
As the war dragged on, the numbers of displaced people increased such that, towards the end, 
estimates suggested two million people were displaced (MoH and WHO 2005, 1), with 
almost 1.8 million in camps or “protected villages” (UNHCR 2012). In Gulu, Kitgum and 
Pader districts, the districts most affected by violence, nearly 90% of the population had 
relocated to camps by 2005 (MoH and WHO 2005, ii). People were either forced into camps 
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because of the scorched earth tactic of the government, or forced into camps by fear of 
unpredictable and frequent LRA violence (HRW 2005, 62). However, the camps were no safe 
haven.  
 
From the beginning, the poorly fed and equipped government rank and file soldiers saw the 
fighting as an “Acholi affair” and left the protection of IDP camps, wherever possible, to the 
Local Defence Units (LDU) (Doom and Vlassenroot 1999, 31). Initially, these local militias 
were armed with bows and arrows (Allen and Vlassenroot 2010, 11); more modern weapons 
were later provided to the local militias, but they were still poorly equipped and trained. 
Reports from survivors of LRA attacks on IDP camps claimed that the LRA’s weapons were 
still superior to the LDUs’ (IRIN 2004, under “Rebels Well Armed”). With the LRA 
specifically working on a policy of abduction, the camps became targets for violence. Lira 
county saw one of the worst single attacks of the war at Barlonyo IDP camp (IRIN 2004, 
under “No Warning”). On 21 February 2004, the Barlonyo IDP camp was being defended 
only by the Amuka Boys, a poorly trained and poorly equipped Local Defence Unit. “The 
Amuka/LDU had no radio communication with the Ugandan military and it would be three 
hours before the UPDF responded. By then, the LRA had butchered over 300 people” (JRP 
2009, 6). 
 
The policy of encampment made it easier for the “LRA as well as the UPDF to loot both the 
camps and the remaining scattered rural population” (Nystrand 2014, 823).  
 
For women, life inside and outside of the camps was marked by violence and insecurity. 
Chris Dolan (2009) documented an array of acts of violence and deprivation targeted 
specifically against women. The insufficient food relief provided in IDP camps meant that 
women were compelled to leave the camps during the day to cultivate their fields. This 
exposed them to heightened risk of abduction by the LRA, beatings by the UPDF, and the 
risk of death by landmine (estimated at two people a week) (Dolan 2009, 120). Inside the 
camps, women were targeted for beating and rape by soldiers as a form of psychological 
torture to the civilian men who were unable to protect “their” women, or simply for their own 
pleasure (Dolan 2009, 211–12; UNICEF and GoU 2005). There are reports of soldiers buying 
beer for young boys in exchange for them finding a woman for them to rape, and of women 
missing out on food distributions because of looting by youths and men (Dolan 2009, 123, 
126, 147). 
 
As well as providing questionable levels of protection, there was very little food and few 
services. The visit of Jan Egerland, UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs 
and Emergency Relief Coordinator, to the IDP Camps in November 2003, “marked a turning 
point as he raised awareness and prompted the intervention of hundreds of state and non-state 
actors” (Perrot 2010, 187). Yet, even after this intervention, a 2005 joint World Health 
Organisation and Ugandan Ministry of Health report found crisis levels of crude mortality 
rates in the camps, and suggested 1000 people a week were dying in the camps. Disease was 
the main culprit, but the same survey found violence to be the third most likely cause of 
death, with over 30 percent of violent deaths occurring inside the camps (MoH and WHO 
2005, ii). Furthermore, the enforced dependency on aid, lack of productive activity, and 
severe over-crowding had devastating consequences, as economic and social structures 
collapsed (ARLPI and JPCGA 2001; Okello and Hovil 2007). The effects of “camp life” 
have proven to be lasting, and most Acholi communities continue to struggle to recover from 
this period. The policy of encampment, conditions in IDP camps, and their present day effects 
are discussed in further detail in Chapter 4. 
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2.8 Cattle, land, oil and widows 
 
One of the consequences of the camps and the war was that the delicate balance of shared 
cattle grazing, which included cattle rustling from neighbours, was disrupted. The 
Karamojong are traditional cattle raiders who have historically raided the Acholi region 
regularly. The violence associated with these raids has escalated as a result of the war. The 
war facilitated Karamojong access to weapons, making their raiding both more effective and 
more deadly. In 1987, the Karamojong launched massive raids through Kitgum and eastern 
Gulu districts, and removed almost the entire herd. This represented a vast economic blow, as 
well as producing the loss of self-respect and social function attached to the cattle (Gersony 
1997, 28). For example, in Agago district, a Ugandan High Court judge recounted that there 
were 50,000 head of cattle in 1985, but that the herd had been reduced to a mere 400 by 1990 
(Sserunjogi 2013, 2). The cattle herds have not been restored, which has made land (much of 
which was formerly held communally) all the more important as the only resource left to the 
Acholi; as such, family and neighbour land disputes are a legacy of the war. The loss of cattle 
also meant the loss of ploughs in the form of bullocks; therefore, even for those with land, 
farming is now more difficult as it must almost all be done by human labour (Sserunjogi 
2013, 2).  
 
Land pressures are further complicated by the discovery of oil and the GoU’s development 
plans, which focus on large-scale industrial projects like sugar and biofuel (GoU OPM 2011 
[objectives]; ICG 2008, 7–8; Sserunjogi 2013, 1). 
 
Land disputes are estimated by various studies to affect between 29 percent and 59 percent of 
the population in Acholiland (Burke and Egaru 2011, 4). Women, particularly widows, are 
disadvantaged in these hotly-contested land disputes (ICG 2008, 8; Burke and Egaru 2011, 
25). This issue was foreseen by all parties, and mentioned in the comprehensive peace 
agreements (below). Some policies that might ameliorate the issues widows and women-led 
households face have been put in place, including mandating that at least two women be part 
of the five-person quorum of local court hearings (Burke and Egaru 2011, 11). However, gaps 
remain; for example, although the “Land Act (Cap. 227) makes provision for the rights of a 
spouse, it does not address the land rights of widows, divorcees, women in co-habitation, and 
children” (Burke and Egaru 2011, 25). Furthermore, the Burke and Egaru UN study suggests 
significant variation between the east and west of the Acholi Sub-Region as regards 
traditional leaders’ views as to whether women have the right to own land:  
 
The traditional leaders in Amuru, Gulu and especially Nwoya reported equal roles for men 
and women; however in Lamwo, Pader, and Kitgum approximately 10 percent of the 
respondents claimed there was no role for women. This was even more marked in Agago 
District where almost 30 percent of respondents reported no role for women in the mediation 
process over land disputes, especially in Adilang Sub-county where 50 percent claimed there 
was no role for women. (2011, 26) 
 
 
 
 
2.9 Operation Iron Fist and the end of Sudan’s support for the LRA 
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After September 11, 2001, the situation in Acholiland changed again. The Sudan government 
sought to improve relations with the US, stating that it would stop supporting the LRA and 
start working with the UPDF. Operation Iron Fist was launched, targeting the LRA in both 
northern Uganda and southern Sudan. At first, the operation was a complete disaster for 
northern Uganda, as the LRA both increased its attacks on civilians and increased its areas of 
operation in Uganda. The Sudanese government’s claims of no-longer helping the rebels were 
brought into question. However, in January 2005, the Sudanese government signed a peace 
agreement with the southern Sudanese rebels, which would eventually lead to the creation of 
the Republic of South Sudan; now, the LRA really was cut off from Sudan’s support. By this 
time, too, the International Criminal Court had brought charges against Kony and four other 
LRA Commanders.8 The LRA leadership began to consider peace negotiations, and the Juba 
peace talks opened on July 14, 2006 (Atkinson 2010, 205-214). 
 
2.10 The Juba peace process, the aftermath and today 
 
The Juba talks eventually resulted in a comprehensive peace agreement. Although Kony 
pulled out at the last minute without signing the document, the peace agreements were wide-
ranging and, as the LRA has effectively stopped operating in northern Uganda since 2006, 
these agreements have been viewed as the building blocks for reconstruction. Of particular 
note were the agreements on Agenda items 2 and 3. 
 
2.10.1 Agenda item 2 – Comprehensive solutions 
 
Agenda item 2 specifically recognised the unequal development between the north and south 
of Uganda, mentioning mechanisms for redress and for post-conflict rebuilding. 
 
In particular, the agreement set the groundwork for the Government of Uganda Peace, 
Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP). However, despite being discussed since 2006 and 
PRDP 1 officially starting in 2007, funding was delayed and nothing came into effect until 
2010. Even after programs began in earnest, they were criticised from the outset for not 
involving locals in decisions on spending, and yet simultaneously expecting district 
governments to oversee the delivery of the programs that had been decided centrally 
(Nsamba 2012, 67–68). This is despite the fact that years of conflict had left the district 
councils with a significant lack of institutional, human, and financial resources (Nsamba 
2012, 67–68). In June 2012, when announcing the funding for PRDP 2, the Office of the 
Prime Minister (OPM) acknowledged these faults, including “inadequate critical technical 
staff” and “no community involvement in PRDP planning” (GoU OPM 2012). That same 
month, the scheme was rocked by scandal, with UGX50 billion (USD14 million) stolen by 
people working inside the Office of the Prime Minister (Office of the Auditor General 2012): 
“The funds were meant for a broad range of projects and programs, such as road construction, 
school and health facilities, and included one specific and very tangible element for the local 
population – compensation for cattle lost during the forced relocation to government-
controlled IDP camps … The OPM scandal led to more public outrage than previous ones, 
                                                
8 The ICC issued indictments against Joseph Kony, Raska Lukwiya, Okot Odhiambo, Dominic Ongwen, and 
Vincent Otti. Odhiambo and Lukiywa are confirmed to have died, and proceedings have been terminated. Otti is 
also widely believed to have died, but the ICC has not terminated proceedings against him; instead, it was 
reaffirming as recently as September 2015 that the indictment against Otti remains in place. Dominic Ongwen 
surrendered to US forces in the Central African Republic in January 2015, and is currently in custody at the 
ICC. Actions taken under International Criminal Law against the LRA commanders is addressed in greater 
detail in Chapter 7. 
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not the least because the funds were intended to bridge the long-standing north-south divide” 
(Nystrand 2014, 825). The scandal resulted in the international community withdrawing 
funds from the PRDP 2 program for a period of time; however, the program has been 
reinstated, even though corruption scandals related to the initial flow of funds continue to 
surface (Odongo 2015). Despite its link to the Juba Peace Process, the PRDP does not only 
fund initiatives in the Acholi region, but throughout all of northern Uganda (International 
Alert 2013, 42); the latest incarnation, PRDP 3, is particularly focused on the Karamoja 
region (Munghinda 2015). 
 
2.10.2 Agenda item 3 – Accountability and reconciliation  
 
The agreement on Agenda item 3 had several important repercussions. Firstly, there was the 
recognition of traditional justice and Mato Oput, the drinking of the bitter root, which have 
been crucial to the reintegration of former LRA combatants/victims. Secondly, in terms of 
formal mechanisms, there was a focus on special prosecution mechanisms for the actions of 
non-state actors, leaving the actions of Ugandan army personnel to be handled by existing 
justice structures, but essentially leaving them out of the equation. Given the considerable 
human rights violations perpetrated by the Ugandan army over the long course of the war, 
this exclusion has been criticised (Otim and Kihika 2015, 7; Wijeyaratne 2008, 9–10; ICG 
2008, 10–11). The special mechanism set up for non-state actors is the Ugandan International 
Crimes Division (ICD). In 2010, Thomas Kwoyelo, a former mid-level commander of the 
LRA, was charged with war crimes. His trial, the ICD’s first, began in July 2011 (Kihika and 
Regué 2015, 4).  However, one month later the case stalled while Uganda’s Constitutional 
Court considered an application made by Kwoyelo’s lawyers that he was eligible for Amnesty 
under the Amnesty Act 2000. In April 2015 the Supreme Court of Uganda ruled in Uganda v. 
Kwoyelo ([2015] UGSC 5) that the Amnesty Act will only apply to “crimes committed in the 
furtherance of war and rebellion,” not “crimes committed against innocent civilians or 
communities” (at 41). This ruling leaves the ICD clear to continue prosecution of Kwoyelo 
(Nakandha 2015), however the commencement of his trial at the ICD has been repeatedly 
postponed throughout 2016 (Ogora 2016). Since 2011, the ICD’s role has been expanded to 
include other international crimes, not just war crimes, and it now has nine cases open, most 
of which are related to terrorism and human trafficking (Kihika and Regué 2015, 3). Dominic 
Ongwen, a high-ranking LRA commander and former LRA abductee and child soldier who 
surrendered in the Central African Republic in January 2015, will not be tried in Uganda, but 
at the International Criminal Court in the Hague.  
 
There was considerable confusion over the legality of the Kwoyelo trial. Its controversial 
nature stemmed mostly from other senior LRA commanders being granted Amnesty (Kihika 
and Regué 2015, 4). The prospective trial of Ongwen has also raised questions among Acholi 
people and Ugandans more broadly about issues such as whether Ongwen should be entitled 
to Amnesty for surrendering; whether he should be tried in Uganda; and whether he should be 
tried at all, given his history as an abducted child soldier (Loyle 2015). These divergent views 
show the gaps, inconsistencies, and contradictions in the justice system for addressing the 
crimes committed during the conflict.  
 
In 2008, the Justice, Law and Order Sector of the Government of Uganda (JLOS) established 
a Transitional Justice Working Group (TJWG) with a view to addressing how formal justice 
mechanisms, traditional justice mechanisms, and truth-seeking and accountability 
mechanisms can be integrated into a coherent policy (Otim and Kihika 2015, 4). According to 
the ICTJ, when discussions began in 2008, there was “initial goodwill towards inviting civil 
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society to participate in TJWG’s meetings and deliberations”; however, relations soured when 
some civil society groups started lobbying in 2013 for the reinstatement of the Amnesty Act 
(Otim and Kihika 2015, 4). The ICTJ report also describes the engagement process as being 
overly top-down, with debates rarely involving victims at a grassroots level; victims were 
thus left believing transitional justice “is only about reconciliation and forgiveness” (Otim 
and Kihika 2015, 8). Nevertheless, the Transitional Justice Policy is now awaiting cabinet 
approval: “the Policy proposes an autonomous body to implement the provisions, which will 
entail, a national reparations programme, the traditional justice system, a fact finding and 
truth seeking system, which by design will have to be incorporated into the national budget” 
(JLOS 2015, 18).   
 
The Accountability and Reconciliation Agreement specifically spoke of reparations, both 
monetary and symbolic. Item 3 states:  
 
Reparations may include a range of measures such as: rehabilitation; restitution; 
compensation; guarantees of non-recurrence and other symbolic measures such as apologies, 
memorials and commemorations. Priority shall be given to vulnerable groups.  
 
In 2010, President Museveni publicly recommitted to reparations; however, no mechanisms 
are yet in place. In April 2014, the parliament passed a resolution to create a gender sensitive 
reparations fund (ICTJ 2014), but the draft legislation is yet to be enacted. Some reparations 
have been paid; for example, an umbrella case representing over one million victims of cattle 
rustling during the conflict was brought against the Government of Uganda, and recently 
settled out of court. Nonetheless, JLOS reports that an analysis of the claims suggests 
“victims are not necessarily catered for through the representative action which has led to 
misrepresentation and misappropriation of victims’ entitlements” (JLOS 2015, 102). 
Furthermore, a nationwide study by JLOS was conducted in the last 12 months and will soon 
be released, with indicative findings showing “overwhelming needs of the community for 
urgent reparations especially for those suffering from medical and psychosocial effects of the 
episodes of armed conflict especially in Northern Uganda” (JLOS 2015, 102).  
 
2.11 Women’s participation in the talks 
 
The agreements of both agenda items 2 and 3 use language that recognises the specific 
challenges to women in post-conflict situations. In the Comprehensive Solutions agreement, 
widows and female-headed households are mentioned in the texts among other vulnerable 
groups which need special assistance programs for protection, resettlement, and 
advancement. In the Accountability and Reconciliation agreement, clause 11 of item 3 deals 
specifically with the needs of women and girls in accessing both reparations and justice. The 
sub clauses state that parties will: 
 
(i) Recognise and address the special needs of women and girls. 
(ii) Ensure that the experiences, views and concerns of women and girls are 
recognised and taken into account. 
(iii) Protect the dignity privacy and security of women and girls. 
(iv) Encourage and facilitate the participation of women and girls in the processes 
for implementing this agreement.  
 
However, women were initially not included in the talks, and it was only after November 
2007 that a gender advisor was appointed in line with UN Security Council Resolution 1325 
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on Women, Peace and Security. There were women delegates in both the LRA and 
government negotiating teams, and there were also women civil society groups granted 
observer status. However, the overall success of their efforts is debatable (Diaz and Tordjman 
2012; Wijeyaratne 2008, 12–14). 
 
In particular, one report claims that important grassroots women’s civil society groups from 
northern Uganda were not included, and that the two women’s coalitions which were granted 
observer status at the talks did not “sufficiently include the most vulnerable sectors of the 
communities affected by the conflict” (Wijeyaratne 2008, 12). Furthermore, the two women’s 
coalitions replicated north-south divisions, with the Northern Uganda Women’s Coalition 
perceiving the Ugandan Women’s Peace Coalition “as being dominated by elite women from 
the south who were not directly affected by the conflict” (Wijeyaratne 2008, 13). These 
tensions were exacerbated by “differences in capacity between women living in the south, 
who had more access to education and jobs compared with women living in the north who 
had been living in IDP camps” (Wijeyaratne 2008, 13). 
 
2.12 Conclusion 
 
Uganda’s war with the LRA has continued for over 20 years, and although there have been no 
armed engagements since the 2008 Juba Agreements, the Final Peace Agreement has not 
been signed; the LRA continues to exist and terrorise populations in the DRC and Central 
African Republic. The conflict has been characterised by extraordinary violence against 
civilians, primarily by the LRA, but also by UPDF forces. Northern Uganda, already 
disadvantaged relative to other parts of Uganda, has suffered enormous economic, social, and 
human losses through the conflict. Men, women, and children have all directly suffered from 
the war through the loss of family members, social ties, land, homesteads, and livestock. 
Women have been particularly targeted for sexual and gender-based violence, and are now 
continuing to be disadvantaged in struggles for land and other resources in the post-conflict 
recovery and rebuilding stage. Widows, child-mothers, and women returning from abduction 
are further disadvantaged. Communities in northern Uganda are struggling with a complex 
and dynamic array of legacies of the conflict, including severe damage to the social and 
cultural fabric; economic devastation; high rates of mental and physical illness; and the 
reintegration of former LRA combatants, most of whom were abducted and are therefore both 
victims and perpetrators. This report addresses Acholi women’s views and experiences of 
justice in this difficult milieu.  
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CHAPTER 3: UGANDAN WOMEN SPEAK TO JUSTICE 
 
 
Justice helps women to stand firm without any fear in their homes.9  
– Harriet10  
 
3.1 The research focus 
 
In examining the efficacy of transitional justice approaches for women, this research project 
asked women participants some broad questions about what constitutes justice, and how it is 
working for women within their communities. Understanding how women see justice (its 
role, and how they experience different justice processes) is important for informing the 
development of justice mechanisms and strategies that are responsive to women’s needs and 
priorities for justice. This is especially the case within the specific context of communities 
transitioning from conflict to post-conflict states, during the course of rebuilding 
communities. In northern Uganda, 86 women shared with this research project their 
experiences, understandings, and views of justice. 
 
This chapter presents the voices of women speaking directly to justice. It presents how the 
women in this research project have experienced, thought and felt about justice. Women’s 
voices alone are presented here, so that they are clearly heard and not muted by all the voices 
and views of others. The following chapters of this report situate the voices of women 
participants within broader discourses of justice, by drawing also on the views of key 
informants interviewed in this research, the opinions of other commentators, and the findings 
of other research studies. 
 
3.2 Gender in context in northern Uganda: A new kind of war 
 
The women we spoke with described an epidemic of domestic violence within a context of 
deeply embedded gender inequalities, and extraordinarily high levels of alcoholism and 
violence within communities. Women spoke of holding the status of “mere women,” of being 
viewed as “worthless,” and of being the “property of men.” The low status of women both 
heightens their vulnerability to violence, and severely curtails their capacity to realise justice 
after violence. Widows and formerly abducted young women, along with their children, 
occupy the lowest status positions of all. Many communities are struggling with conflict over 
land, and there is a deep and concerning rift between former Internally Displaced Persons 
(IDPs) and former abductees – a rift which may threaten northern Uganda’s future stability. 
Most women attribute the violence, division, and lack of effective justice mechanisms to the 
war, lasting trauma, and long years in IDP camps.  
 
3.3 “Camp life” 
 
At the height of the LRA conflict, 1.8 million people were internally displaced in northern 
Uganda. The vast majority were displaced to IDP camps, living in overcrowded and squalid 
conditions, and entirely dependent on aid for survival. Although almost all IDP camps are 
                                                
9 Interviewed February 6, 2014. 
10 All women respondents have been allocated psuedonyms. 
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now closed, with the majority of people returning to their original homes, the prolonged 
encampment and enforced dependency continue to have profound effects on communities.  
 
Women who lived in IDP camps spoke in unison about the devastating social effects of the 
camps. The war and camp life have left a lasting legacy of trauma, alcohol abuse, and 
violence. Women told us of a dangerous mix of major increases in the levels of violence and 
drinking, coupled with severely ruptured social structures – the same structures which once 
would have been called upon to stop the violence, and restore familial and community 
relationships.  
 
Annabel explained that, prior to the war, “life was very good, we were free, everything was 
there in plenty, we had an abundance of food. It was so peaceful. You would not hear of land 
disputes, we wouldn’t ever hear about HIV/AIDS. … When the war started, it started coming 
in with so many things.” She went on to say that her community is now riddled with 
alcoholism, land conflict, and domestic violence. Annabel described a perfect storm of 
resource pressures, trauma, and social breakdown; she explained that many of the elders who 
used to provide guidance and stability for communities were killed during the war, and that 
“very many kids lost their parents, so the children have been left on their own to do a lot of 
things.” This young generation have little respect for the elders, and little knowledge of 
traditional ways of life. She added that the few elders remaining “who can clearly maybe 
settle a matter between two people regarding land or family matters, this person does not use 
the truth and all this is really causing so many problems among the people in society.”11  
 
In every community visited in northern Uganda during this research project, women told us 
of the enormous damage that has been done to the social fabric of Acholi communities as a 
result of the war, and prolonged, forced encampment. Florence said that “life became 
meaningless. The confinement in camps was undevelopmental.”12 The policy of encampment 
has also had lasting effects on Acholi families and communities. Many women, such as Faith, 
see a direct link between encampment and the problems communities are facing today:  
 
Camp life was generally a little strange from our normal way of life because there 
were a lot of things that were happening, a lot of loss of morals. … There is a great 
link between the experiences of camp life and the problems the people are facing up 
to today. Before people came to live in the camps, life was very different, life was 
different and people were thinking in a different way. But once people were in camps, 
confined in the camps, they started behaving in the camp way.13  
 
Women talked to us about their forced dependency on food aid for survival, and the 
psychological and social effects of being cut off from any productive activity. Sophie 
believed that this forced dependency continues to affect people today, thereby hindering their 
recovery: 
 
Since people are back home, people need to be taught how to work hard and 
empowered to be self reliant, to desist the dependant syndrome which was in the 
camps.14  
 
                                                
11 Interviewed June 18, 2014. 
12 Interviewed January 22, 2014. 
13 Interviewed June 17, 2014. 
14 Interviewed February 10, 2014. 
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3.4 All work and no power 
 
Due to the inability to continue their livelihood activities, and the enforced dependency on 
aid for all their needs, most men began drinking alcohol in the camps – a practice which 
many have continued after returning home. Women in all places visited spoke of the men in 
their communities and families drinking from the morning, and throughout the day and 
evening. The women explained that the high levels of alcoholism have led to men refusing to 
work in the fields, leaving all the labour to the women. Men continue, however, to exercise 
exclusive control over the income generated by women’s labour.  
 
Joyce explained that Acholi women have taken on most of the responsibilities in the 
household, but do not have decision-making power over household income or resources: 
 
Women face so many difficulties. They have to work tirelessly hard to provide for 
their families. You see these women here digging (points to women working in the 
field near us)? You will find their husbands at the trading centre drinking. The 
children are sent home for school fees or books or pens. It is the women to look for 
this and help the child. Even food in the house. Women are the bread winners in the 
home. The women work tirelessly hard. (But the husband) is the one who decides. 
Because all are his property. Everything in the house belongs to him, it’s his to make 
decisions over. So even if you do some casual work, he will ask “So, you went to dig 
in so-and-so’s garden. How much did you earn?” And you have to share. You feel 
painful about it. It hurts, but what can you do? You’re in his house and so you have to 
bear.15  
 
Pauline put it more bluntly, stating that “the men grab the money which we struggle to 
earn.”16 Rosemary was similarly direct:  
 
I dig and work tirelessly, but during the harvest period I do not have any say on the 
yields. My husband even stopped me from group savings. The men ensure that women 
are economically disempowered.17  
 
The problem of women doing all the work, only for men to take the proceeds and spend it on 
alcohol, was repeated at every research site. Sally linked the problem to women’s low status 
in the community, which makes it difficult for them to get any community-based solution to 
the widespread problem: 
 
Our husbands sell the harvests and foodstuff in the house and drink all the money. 
Women do not have a voice to speak out in the community.18  
 
Hannah linked the origins of this problem to the period spent in camps: 
 
In the camps, men’s behaviour really changed. Some men would steal the little supply 
(food aid) to sell. Such money they would use to buy alcohol. This kind of behaviour 
has continued up to now. Men have left all their responsibilities. Today women carry 
all the burden to look after the children and provide for their families. Women 
                                                
15 Interviewed June 24, 2014. 
16 Interviewed January 22, 2014. 
17 Interviewed February 13, 2014. 
18 Interviewed March 13, 2014. 
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struggle to cultivate and grow crops, while the men steal, sell and drink the foodstuff 
produced.19  
 
Women in northern Uganda have been left with an enormous burden of responsibility, 
without the commensurate economic and decision-making power to meet these 
responsibilities. Many men are not only not working alongside women in the fields, but are 
also commandeering the produce and selling it to buy alcohol, which all too often fuels 
violence. 
 
3.5 Domestic violence: Another war… 
 
Men’s excessive drinking was invariably associated with violence, directed both at other 
community members, and (more often) at women. For many northern Ugandan women, the 
end of the LRA war has not brought peace, as Evelyn explained: 
 
Having basic needs alone when one is still experiencing a lot of violence does not 
qualify as peace. For instance, having a drunken husband, being beaten hostilely, 
preventing me from freely associating with my fellow women.20  
 
Jennifer likely experiences violence more frequently now than she did during the war. When 
asked to describe a typical day, she responded, “I go to the garden early and he goes 
drinking. When I return he beats me. Every day.”21 For many women, the extent of domestic 
violence is such that the war is effectively continuing in their personal lives. Jane expressed a 
clear continuum of violence in her life:  
 
Well, when the calm was restored … now people came back home, and now another 
violence has started … from the husbands. So some peace came and we went back 
home, but again, the men started another violence.22  
 
The extent of domestic violence in northern Uganda cannot be overstated. Most women 
traced the origins of this violence to the war, and to life in IDP camps. Angela explained that 
“[p]eople are now very violent. Men are so hostile and behave in a way like it was during the 
war.”23 Although the LRA war has ended, many women continue to live with extraordinary 
and life-threatening levels of violence on a daily basis. 
 
Women told us of extraordinarily high rates of domestic violence. Domestic violence is so 
widespread that when asked about her feelings of safety, Ada replied “I feel safe because my 
husband died in 2001 and I don’t plan to take another man, so I don’t have to fear.”24 
Dorine’s husband survived the war and she explains that “when he comes back drunk and 
starts to cause problems, as the lady, as his wife you must run for your life. You have to run 
and hide somewhere in the bush.” The level of domestic violence is so high in her area that 
she often meets other women hiding in the bush at night: “we give support and share ideas 
among ourselves. It’s all a result of the war.”25  
                                                
19 Interviewed March 13, 2014. 
20 Interviewed January 31, 2014. 
21 Interviewed June 17, 2014. 
22 Interviewed September 25, 2013. 
23 Interviewed March 13, 2014. 
24 Interviewed June 17, 2014. 
25 Interviewed June 21, 2014. 
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Leaving a violent marriage is often not possible for women in northern Uganda. The local 
economy and culture centre on the cultivation of land. There are ongoing disputes about land 
in most communities visited, some of which have resulted in violence and sometimes death. 
Women are particularly affected by land conflicts, as they traditionally realise only secondary 
rights to land, firstly through their relationship with their fathers, and later their husbands and 
sons. Women with no surviving male relative willing and able to defend her access to land 
are seldom able to realise any land rights they might have in law. This has a significant 
impact on the most vulnerable women in communities – most notably, widows and women 
who were abducted as girls, and who have subsequently been either orphaned or estranged 
from their families.  
 
Beth explained how vulnerable people are most targeted in land disputes in her area: 
  
The land grabbing is mostly happening in families that lost all their parents and 
elders in the war and thus, the grabbers take advantage of their vulnerability and 
little knowledge regarding their land to deprive them of the same. The grabbers also 
have a high financial ability and they use this to influence the leaders, even the 
Residence District Commanders (RDC).26  
 
The competition for land is particularly impacting single mothers (who either became 
pregnant during an abduction, or became a child mother in the camps), as well as women 
wanting to leave violent marriages and return to their parents’ homes. Beth explained that, 
previously, women could return to their parents’ home if they needed to, but that “today, 
children are not welcome in their mother’s family because (the families) think they should 
live in their father’s family where they can inherit land in order to avoid future land 
misunderstandings.”27  
 
Widows are also an extremely vulnerable group within society, and many are being forced 
off their husband’s land. Harriet, a widow, told us:  
 
Since women are regarded as “mere women” they are disinherited of their land, such 
land is grabbed from them and sometimes it is trespassed upon to force the woman to 
abandon her land and return to her parents” home. The widows are also disinherited 
of their household property and the children are sometimes taken away from them, 
this has happened to me. There is a lot of land grabbing, this is coupled with threats 
and violence. For instance, three of my huts were burnt down as a result of land 
conflict to make me vacate the land for the grabbers.28  
 
Hope, widowed during the war and now caring for orphaned grandchildren, described the 
land conflicts as “like another war in itself. Your neighbour that … before the war you have 
been living very happily together, and doing things together. This very neighbour, because of 
this land conflict – will pick a spear to kill you.  This war is so painful. This conflict is so 
painful.” 29  She spoke of a widow who, just days before we met, had been physically 
assaulted and tied to a tree in an attempt to force her off her land. 
 
                                                
26 Interviewed February 7, 2014. 
27 Interviewed February 7, 2014. 
28 Interviewed February 6, 2014. 
29 Interviewed June 25, 2014. 
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Alice was also widowed during the war, and said that in her community, “it is facing very 
many widows in this area, even myself. They had started very badly to grab land from me. 
They say I’m just a woman, a mere woman with no land.” Alice was “lucky my father in law 
was on my side and he came and spoke very strongly.”30 Her father-in-law, however, is quite 
old, and she fears for her fate when he is no longer able to defend her rights. 
 
Young women returning from abduction, particularly those whose fathers have died, very 
often found themselves unable to access land, thus forcing them into marriage or into 
precarious, low-paid, and often exploitative work as the only way to survive. Grace returned 
from abduction with one child, to discover her parents had both died. With few other options, 
she married upon return, but her husband and his family are abusive towards her and her 
child. She eventually had to send her daughter to live with an aunt: 
 
[A]s the child’s mother, I could not resist the pain anymore that was being caused by 
the ill treatment my child was getting so … It would sometimes make me think very 
highly about going back to the bush, but somehow I just said that to save the 
situation, to save my child from all this, let me just take this child to live with my 
Auntie.31  
 
Francine returned from abduction with one child. Her parents accepted her back, but her 
brothers have been pressuring her to leave, fearing that her child will “in the future, bring 
land shortage problems.” She is worried about her and her child’s futures: 
 
Well, if there is no … if my parents are no more and these [brothers] begin to demand 
or chase me to get rid of me, then I will have to go back to the LC and try. If the 
matter cannot be resolved I will have to leave and go, I don’t know, maybe to the 
trading centre. I don’t know. 32 
 
3.6 A deep rift  
 
In all of the communities visited during this research, there is a significant and troubling rift 
between former abductees and their children, and those who were forced into IDP camps. 
While some work to assist in the reintegration of former abductees has been conducted, 
longer-term reconciliation and mediation work is not happening except on a very small scale, 
in isolated pockets. Women who were not abducted told us of the difficulty of integrating 
former abductees back into the communities. They described former abductees as being 
“haunted,” as not having learned how to live in the community, and as being psychologically 
scarred or even “insane.” They told us that former abductees were quick to anger, and that, 
when angry, were dangerous and extremely violent. Beth explained that  
 
[t]here are a number of returnees, we welcomed them and try to understand them. 
However, they have a temper and they can maim anyone at any time using any deadly 
weapon they come across once they pick a quarrel. The children born in the bush also 
behave in the same way. Once they are upset … they are capable of doing anything 
because what they went through in the bush, nobody has ever experienced. The 
community were told to be very patient with them and try to understand them, 
                                                
30 Interviewed June 23, 2014. 
31 Interviewed June 19, 2014. 
32 Interviewed June 28, 2014. 
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however, their behaviour is sometimes very alarming. … There are some who have 
been haunted to a point of permanent insanity and others to a point of death.33  
 
The women who spoke of integrating returnees expressed some ambivalence about accepting 
them back; they recognised on the one hand that they had been victims of an injustice, yet on 
the other viewed them as capable of great violence, not trusting their presence in the 
community. Josephine’s comment captures this duality: 
 
Those other girls when they begin to quarrel they fight using pangas and deadly 
weapons and when they start, they never want to be stopped. This has continuously 
been a big threat to the local community members. The communities accepted them 
and treat them in a very understanding manner, we understand that it was not their 
making that they behave that way but the bush has made them what they are today.34  
 
Pauline, whose son was abducted and whom she still hopes will one day return, described the 
return of another former abductee: 
 
I know of only one child who was abducted in 1993 and returned in 2004. When he 
returned he stayed in Gulu reception centre. We performed some rituals to welcome 
him back in the community. The relationship between the child and the local 
community is not good, the community discriminates him, he cannot easily socialise 
with the community.35  
 
Many women thought that formerly abducted people should be allowed to return, but that 
they needed much greater support and education to help them reintegrate back into the 
community successfully. They also believed that stronger mechanisms needed to be in place 
to protect other people from violence. Beth recommended that  
 
[t]he returnees should be placed in a home or school where they are counselled and 
trained on how to cope with life. They should be engaged in group work. Religious 
groups should also be invited to engage with them spiritually. Those who engage in 
violent behaviour should be imprisoned so they can learn from jail. A law should also 
be put in place to safeguard their stay within the communities in order to tame down 
their actions.36  
 
Women who have returned from abduction spoke expansively about their reintegration back 
into communities. While some have successfully managed the transition and feel moderately 
accepted, many more spoke of daily discrimination, name-calling, insults, and exclusion. 
This discrimination is particularly heightened for those women who returned with children 
born “in the bush,” Grace said that the “insults” and “abuse” from her husband’s family 
became so bad that she sent her child to live with another relative. Her husband’s family said 
“that us who were abducted and stayed in the bush are illiterate, we never studied and that 
we have bush mentality.”37 Helen said that, when collecting water, she and other returnees 
must wait until everyone else has collected their water. She said her “reception was very bad 
in the community,” and that “they call us names and that ‘you who have returned from the 
                                                
33 Interviewed February 27, 2014. 
34 Interviewed February 11, 2014. 
35 Interviewed January 22, 2014. 
36 Interviewed February 7, 2014. 
37 Interviewed June 19, 2014. 
 
 
 35 
bush with the rebels, you are mentally disturbed.’” She has often been told that she should go 
“back to the bush from where you have come.”38  
 
Joyce explained that the children of returnees face the same discrimination. She returned with 
a son, has since married, and had a further two children. Her husband refuses to pay the 
school fees for her son born in captivity: “I feel pained because, in my thinking they [the 
children] should all get equal treatment.” The exclusion affects her son, who is “living a 
lonely life because he cannot interact freely with these children [his younger siblings] – when 
they come back from school, there’s nothing he can share.”39  
 
Joyce went on to explain that, in addition to overt name-calling or unequal treatment, she is 
frequently reminded of her marginal status: 
 
When I am working in my garden and I spend some time working longer hours and 
they are tired, they will say “Ah, for us people, we are retiring. You people are used 
to such a life, we cannot compete with you.” Or when we are walking together and it 
reaches some point they will say “Let those ones go at that pace.” Which “those 
ones?” I ask myself.40  
 
It is not unusual for such comments to escalate into a fight. Jacqueline expressed the anger 
she feels when she is called names:  
 
I keep thinking of how the whole trouble started and I get hurt because I am fined [for 
fighting] and yet I was provoked to behave the way I did. Because what do you expect 
from a person who is discriminated against, yet it was not our wish to get abducted. 
You see with us, when we are very angry we can do anything to anybody. Because if I 
am to start to fight with you, I will fight so bad. I will fight just the way we were doing 
it in the bush. If there is anything sharp that can kill somebody, I will just pick that 
something and use it on them … at that time I am capable of doing anything.”41 
 
Her friend Veronica agreed, saying that “[w]hen we are very angry, at this point nobody can 
advise me, I cannot listen to them at that time.” She said the name calling and being accused 
of having a “bush mentality … hurts us the most.”42 
 
This rift between former abductees and their communities needs urgent attention. Where 
programs have been put in place offering counselling to former abductees, educating the 
community about abductee experiences and calling upon people not to call returnees names, 
both former abductee and former IDP women reported significantly better relationships 
within the community. Notably, they reported far fewer incidents of physical violence.  
 
3.7 The future generation 
 
Women in every interview expressed a strong desire for their children to have consistent, 
uninterrupted access to education. This was cited almost universally as the most important 
                                                
38 Interviewed June 18, 2014. 
39 Interviewed June 24, 2014. 
40 Interviewed June 24, 2014. 
41 Interviewed June 18, 2014. 
42 Interviewed June 18, 2014. 
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contribution to justice, whether by women who had experienced abduction, or those who had 
experienced displacement into camps. Women want a better future for their children and see 
education as key to this. Eliza returned repeatedly during her interview to the issue of 
educating her children. She had successfully kept two children in school up to the end of 
primary school, but did not have enough money to pay for their exams to enable graduation: 
 
I’m really struggling so hard to see that my children have a bright future. … Now as I 
speak, I have two children in primary seven – they are candidates – they have to sit to 
go to the next level. … At school they want me to pay – 36,000 (USD10) for each one 
of them – I don’t have this money. I don’t know. … I really really want to struggle so 
hard. I think so much about these children. I want them, at least one of them should 
be able to go to the next level. I am struggling with these children, the school fees.43  
 
Hope, a 76-year-old widow, is now raising seven of her orphaned grandchildren, but finds the 
physical toll of working her land increasingly difficult. She said that she divides her money 
between food and school fees, but that this is becoming increasingly difficult, as she doesn’t 
“have the energy anymore, the strength”: 
 
I am not able to cultivate much, after every two days I must go hungry. I try to do 
casual labour but it is also very difficult.  Now with seven children, yesterday I got a 
report from school – that I must pay each five, five, five thousand for several children 
in order to do exams. I don’t have that money. <pause> I don’t know what to do. I’m 
short of what to do.44  
 
Sadly, in most communities visited, women were unable to pay school fees for their children; 
this meant that children could only sporadically attend school, and that mothers often had to 
choose which children to send to school, and which to keep at home. Faith is able to keep 
only one of her four children in school and explained that  
 
[t]his hurts me a lot, it hurts me a lot that sometimes I do not even sleep in the night 
because I keep thinking about them. It comes with a lot of pain. … I have not been 
able to look after them and pay their school fees as I should be doing as a parent.45 
 
3.8 Never again 
 
Women in northern Uganda have suffered enormously throughout the war. Women and girls 
have been abducted and enslaved; forced into squalid IDP camps; witnessed barbaric attacks 
by LRA cadres; endured beatings, rapes, and other humiliations; and suffered the loss of 
parents, children, and husbands. They have sustained economic devastation and are 
struggling to rebuild viable, safe, and dignified lives. LRA attacks have been ceased for 
several years, the north has been largely demilitarised, and most people have returned to their 
homes; however, a great number of women continue to feel insecure, fearing that this is 
merely a lull in the fighting, rather than the end of the conflict. Carla doesn’t want her 
children to go through a war, but she is worried that they will:  
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Sometimes I hear that the war is about to restart and they say it has already started in 
the Sudan and will only spread here very soon. I feel the war should not restart so we 
can have some peace and our children should not go through our experience.46  
 
Very many women shared with us their fears that the war will resume. They have not 
received any assurance of non-recurrence, the Final Peace Agreement remains unsigned, and 
Kony and the LRA still exist. Several women listen to the radio for news of the LRA’s 
whereabouts. Perhaps more than anything else, women in northern Uganda want an assurance 
that the war will not happen again: 
 
What I need to tell you is that – in your reports I know you are going to include all 
these three countries, and all of them have suffered violence during the conflicts. 
What I want to say is that, women at least should be given a chance to live peacefully, 
to have some peace. Women have gone through so much in conflict areas, they use 
women as a tool for satisfaction and women are dying, women are suffering, women 
are being washed away by water during these times. Women are suffering all these 
things in all parts of the world where there’s conflict, so my humble prayer is that this 
should stop. I have seen it with my own eyes and I appeal to the whole world to at 
least give women some peace.47  
 
3.9 Access to justice 
 
When women are faced with land grabbing, violence, or discrimination, they have a difficult 
time accessing justice. Formal criminal justice mechanisms such as police or courts are 
usually some distance from the communities in which many women live. The cost of 
travelling was noted by many women as prohibitive. There are also costs associated with 
filing a court case, or even lodging a complaint with police.  
 
Women reported that, in the instances in which they do seek justice, they are more likely to 
access someone in the community – most commonly a male relative, an LC1 (a local 
administrative position), or a clan chief (a traditional position). While local justice 
mechanisms are physically more accessible, they have also been affected by the social, 
emotional, and economic devastation of the war. Many women complained of being asked 
either for bribes or transport costs, in order to have their complaint heard; they also observed 
that the other party usually had greater capacity to pay.  
 
One woman told a harrowing story of the difficulties in accessing justice:  
 
The biggest challenge we face (in accessing justice) is financial constraints because 
the responsible institutions and persons succumb to bribes which leads to loss or 
abandonment of our case files. If the matter is not resolved it culminates in more 
troubles in the home. The police ask for money to transport them to catch the 
perpetrators, this ranges from 10,000–15,000 Ugandan Shillings, and sometimes even 
more.  
 
Sexual violence cases are given little or no attention. For instance, my daughter was 
defiled at the age of 14. When I tried to open a case file they advised me that it was 
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not helpful as she was already pregnant. She started living with the man, however 
their stay became so bitter. She had three children (with him), with so many threats of 
violence to her life. She decided to come back to me. I welcomed her back. … The 
father of her children (came and) took off with her. He stayed with her in the bush for 
three days, tying her to a tree during the day and raping her in the night. I reported 
the matter to the police who asked me to get transport so they can search for him. I 
hired a motorcyclist who charged me UGX300,000 (USD89) in vain. The case has 
since died a natural death.48  
 
After telling the story of her unsuccessful efforts to help her daughter, the woman surmised 
that “this kind of situation leaves us in a dilemma on whether justice is meant for us 
women.”49  
 
The socio-political status of women is a major obstacle for women seeking both formal and 
traditional forms of justice. Irene was granted a house when she returned from abduction, but 
was forced out of her home by a relative of a local leader. She described that she has 
 
tried so hard to seek justice with the local leaders and local courts but in vain. Those 
people have a lot of money and they use their financial power to dispossess the poor 
and underprivileged like me. In my house case, the LC wanted me to first become his 
“wife” which I refused. Thereafter, my case was given no attention. I feel so cheated. 
I know I was wrongly disadvantaged.50  
 
This economic, geographical, and socio-political distance as a barrier to accessing justice was 
repeated a great many times, whether in matters regarding domestic violence, sexual assault, 
or land disputes. Fawsia saw that women’s low status was at the heart of her difficulties in 
accessing justice:  
 
Women are always shut down in local courts, they do not give them the space to speak 
out. When they try to speak out, men call them disrespectful.51  
 
Josamary believed her lack of success in resolving a land dispute was due to sexism in the 
justice system. She said simply, “My case is overlooked because I am a woman.”52 Phoebe 
felt similarly disadvantaged, following her attempts to access justice in regards to violence 
from her husband. She explained that  
 
[w]hen I called a clan meeting they all supported my husband’s side. I have now 
resorted to keeping quiet.53  
 
The effects of being unable to access justice very often lead women to “keeping quiet” and 
submitting to their secondary status. While there is extensive fatalism and passivity among 
many women in northern Uganda, there are also women who refuse to accept the denial of 
justice to women, and who are determined to improve their own lives as well as the lives of 
other women. As Harriet defiantly said:  
                                                
48 Interviewed February 7, 2014. 
49 Interviewed February 7, 2014. 
50 Interviewed January 21, 2014. 
51 Interviewed March 20, 2014. 
52 Interviewed February 6, 2014. 
53 Interviewed March 20, 2014. 
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Every time women try to fight for justice they are insulted, despised, accused of bias 
and impartiality. However, I pay no attention to such reactions.54  
 
3.10 Claiming power 
 
The agency and defiance of Harriet and a small but significant number of other women is a 
source of hope and potential for transformation in post-conflict northern Uganda. The 
Women’s Advocacy Network in Gulu is an inspiring example of women organising to 
provide each other with support, as well as gradually developing their confidence, 
knowledge, and skills. The group was started by seven former abductees who were facing 
discrimination and stigmatisation from their community upon returning from the bush. It has 
now grown into a network of twelve groups in communities across the north. Importantly, 
these groups include both former IDP and former abductee women. The women provide 
emotional and social support to one another, run livelihood programs to enable members to 
earn an income, and mediate family and community conflicts, including domestic violence, 
reintegration and reconciliation problems, and land disputes. The Network has also been 
instrumental in successfully lobbying for a motion supporting gender sensitive reparations for 
survivors of the GoU–LRA war. The motion received unanimous support in the Ugandan 
Parliament in April 2014.  
 
Through their practical, psycho-social, and political activities, the women of the Women’s 
Advocacy Network are building a deep sense of empowerment. Julia, a member of the 
Network, calmly but firmly stated that “I do not allow for any violence to happen to me 
again.”55 Other women of the Network expressed similar confidence in their right to live free 
from violence. Joyce, facing discrimination from her community and violence from her 
husband, quietly said “I think women should have rights,” and explained that women in her 
community are getting organised to fight for their rights. She thinks big changes are “not so 
far” away.56 Dorine, a former IDP woman whose husband is often drunk and violent, also 
reported that the women in her community are planning how to bring the alcoholism and 
violence in their homes to an end: “As women we are trying to see a way, we are discussing 
the matter among ourselves and then we shall see how to go ahead.” Dorine has already 
raised the matter publicly in her role as Vice Local Councillor 1, and explains that she has 
some level of respect in the community: “They listen to me. Sometimes I even call the men 
and talk to them and they listen to me.” She expressed her determination to rebuild a peaceful 
life: “I will continue to fight this battle against alcohol because I have seen this year is not as 
bad as last year. So I will continue.”57  
 
 
  
                                                
54 Interviewed February 6, 2014.  
55 Interviewed June 27, 2014. 
56 Interviewed June 24, 2014. 
57 Interviewed June 21, 2014.  
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CHAPTER 4: LEGACIES OF CAMP LIFE  
 
 
Life became meaningless. The confinement in camps was undevelopmental.58  
– Florence 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
“Camp life” emerged strongly as a major theme in this research. A majority of the women 
who participated in this research had lived for several years in Internally Displaced Persons’ 
(IDP) camps, and spoke extensively about both “camp life” and the effects that the prolonged 
encampment continues to have today. Many women traced a direct causal line between 
encampment and the social breakdown, alcoholism, violence, land conflict, and poverty with 
which most Acholi communities are now struggling. As Faith explained: 
 
Yes, indeed there is a great link between the experiences of camp life and the 
problems the people are facing up to today. Because before people came to the camps 
life was very different, life was different and people were thinking differently but once 
people were in the camps, confined in the camps, they started behaving in the camp 
way, doing things in a direction that was never done before … doing a lot of things 
that you know are not befitting and it is from that that you find that there is a lot of 
family breakdown, a lot of divorce, there is a lot of HIV/AIDS rate, there is a lot … 
just because of that life we were exposed to in the camps.59 
 
A marked feature of the conflict in northern Uganda was the mass forced displacement of 
people into IDP camps; “[a]t the conflict's peak in 2005, there were 1.84 million IDPs living 
in 251 camps across 11 districts of northern Uganda” (UNHCR 2012). In the Acholi Sub-
Region, 1.1 million people were displaced into approximately 150 IDP camps (UNHCR and 
AVSI 2010, 5). Large-scale encampment began in 1996 through the Ugandan government’s 
policy of forcing people into “protected villages,” often using violence (or threats of 
violence) to make people leave their homes.60 Most “protected villages” or IDP camps were 
centred near army barracks in larger towns or trading centres (UNHCR and AVSI 2010, 4).  
 
4.2 “Camp life” 
 
4.2.1 Conditions and experiences in camps 
 
All women who spoke about life in the camps described extreme deprivation, over-crowding, 
forced dependency, and a profound breakdown in social norms and relationships. There 
seemed to be little variation between camps or different areas. Although not asked where they 
were encamped, women spontaneously named ten different camps located across Acholiland. 
Twenty-five year old Mary, who spent several years in a camp in the Kitgum region, 
summarised a range of issues succinctly: 
 
                                                
58 Interviewed January 22, 2014. 
59 Interviewed June 17, 2014.  
60 For more on the violence and coercion used by Ugandan government forces to force the population into 
camps, see in particular Dolan (2009) and Branch (2007).  
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Life in the camp was difficult. There was nowhere to cultivate as one would do at 
home to get food. There were no health facilities, no water source because the camp 
was located in a trading centre. Camp life affected peoples’ lives. Girls got involved 
in risky sexual behaviour at an early age, there were early child pregnancies. Men 
got deeply addicted to alcohol. Women were entirely left to provide for the children 
and take them to school. Men became irresponsible; they are not bothered about 
meeting family needs. Sometimes in the camps we were given expired food like 
posho.61 
 
Joy, a 51-year-old woman who was forced into the Patongo camp near Pader, described a 
similar situation: 
 
Afterwards, we were all told by the government to relocate to Patongo camp, like 
prisoners of war, we were solely dependent on WFP relief. Life was very hard, we 
had to move amidst fear and danger to come and till land in the villages because the 
food supplied was never enough for our families. In the camps, there were no schools, 
no hospitals and the sanitation was very poor, the suffering was even worse than in 
the homes. Water was a big problem and is still a very big challenge in our homes. I 
used to feel so bad about the rebels and the conflict generally but now, I have tried to 
forget.62  
 
The conditions in camps in the Gulu area were the same, as Harriet, a 72-year-old widow, 
explained:  
 
During the war, life was very hard, people were sleeping in the bush in fear that they 
would be terrorised or abducted by the rebels, not until the government ordered that 
people relocate to the IDP camps. In the camps, there was exchange of bullets, all the 
time people were living in fear. There was no food, the WFP would give us food but 
such food was a bare minimum. The whole family had to share one hut. The children 
began to lead very reckless lives that most of the youth today are living [HIV] 
positively.63  
 
Women spoke of an all-encompassing insecurity; loss of dignity; loss of autonomy; and loss 
of feelings of control and purpose during camp life. Several organisations and researchers 
were highly critical of Uganda’s IDP camps. Murru, in “Uganda: Between Tragic Past and an 
Uncertain Future” (1998), referred to them as “concentration camps” (quoted in Dolan 2009, 
109); others variously described them as “virtual prison[s]” (MSF 2004, 15), “dangerous” 
(Okello and Hovil 2007, 439), and “social torture” (Dolan 2009). Women participating in this 
research told of a range of harms suffered through enforced displacement in camps, 
including: 
 
• the process through which people were forced into camps; 
• the inability to engage in any productive or meaningful activity, and the forced 
dependency on food aid; 
• shortages of food, firewood, and water; 
• over-crowding; 
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62 Interviewed January 31, 2014. 
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• poor sanitation; 
• profound insecurity resulting from violence between camp residents, from soldiers, 
and from LRA attacks; 
• poor health services; 
• poor or no education services for children; 
• breakdown in social structures, family structures, and social norms, particularly 
around conflict resolution and sexual relations; 
• high rates of alcoholism among men and boys; 
• high levels of sexual violence against women and children; 
• high rates of child pregnancies, and an increase in prostitution; 
• high rates of disease, including HIV/AIDS, malaria, cholera, two lango, 64  and 
Ebola; and 
• high levels of fear, trauma, and death. 
 
Rather than being zones of protection, northern Uganda’s IDP camps were dangerous and 
degrading places in which survival was a daily struggle. The Ugandan Human Rights 
Commission and UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights highlighted “the 
violence, impoverishment and humiliation that occurred as a result of forced displacement” 
(UHRC and UNOHCHR 2011, xv). Most women in this study, despite having returned home 
up to six or eight years earlier, spoke strongly about the conditions in the camps, and the 
profound impact encampment continues to have on their lives. 
 
4.2.2 Food shortages, poor sanitation, and high mortality 
 
Little planning had been made for provisioning the IDP camps, leading to life-threatening 
shortages of food, water, and sanitation. Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) reported that food 
relief was delivered once every two or three months, was usually sufficient for two or three 
weeks, and often attracted rebel attacks, causing people to be fearful of storing any food in 
their huts (MSF 2004, 6). Food insecurity was such that MSF established a therapeutic 
feeding centre in Lira to reduce the death rate due to malnutrition (MSF 2004, 12). The 
World Food Program (WFP) ran a number of therapeutic feeding centres in the Gulu district 
as early as 2002 (Dolan 2009, 124). 
 
In a 2005 joint study, the Ugandan Ministry of Health and the World Health Organisation 
reported that in the first half of that year, at the peak of encampment, almost 1000 people 
died per week from preventable causes. AIDS, malaria, malnutrition, and diarrhoea were the 
biggest killers, followed by violence (MoH and WHO 2005, ii).  
 
People were cramped into such close quarters that huts were often built one meter or less 
apart, and many people would sleep in a single hut (Ogwal 2004). The overcrowding created 
a fertile environment for the spread of disease, and was exacerbated by the woefully 
inadequate sanitation infrastructure. For example, Odek IDP camp housed 8,000 people and 
had three pit latrines (Dolan 2009, 112). Caroline (aged 38) remembered the overcrowding of 
the camps, the poor sanitation, and the diseases that resulted: 
 
                                                
64 Two lango is “a local illness concept encompassing oral thrush, malnutrition and diarrhoea” (MoH and WHO 
2005, ii).  
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There was no space to construct more than one hut for a single family therefore the 
entire family lived in one hut, there was no privacy. There was also no space for 
building latrines so people would defecate in the open, some even near the water 
sources/wells. Life in the camps was difficult, there was too much congestion. … 
[Now] there are diseases like nodding disease and HIV/AIDS.65  
 
4.2.3 Violence and a lack of security 
 
Although ostensibly for the protection and safety of people in northern Uganda, security in 
the camps was extremely poor. The camps became very violent places, subject to fighting 
among IDPs, raids by the LRA, and beatings and sexual violence from soldiers charged with 
the people’s protection. Pauline expressed her despair that even with all the deprivations of 
the camp, they were still not safe from attacks:  
 
If the UN did not supply any relief we would starve and we were always on the run for 
our dear lives. There were no health services, we did not have any source of income, 
the men were never supportive and they left all the care burdens to the women. Much 
as all this happened when we were confined in the camps, we were still attacked by 
the rebels.66  
 
Many women participating in this research told of surviving rebel attacks on their camp. 
Linda broke down in tears as she recounted the day rebels locked her husband and daughter, 
along with many other displaced people, in a hut in Amyel camp and set it on fire, killing all 
those inside.67 Alice recalled multiple rebel attacks on her camp: “There was fighting all the 
time, all the time gunshots. My hut was attacked and bullets were shot … immediately I ran, 
and my hut was put on fire.”68  Chris Dolan, from the Refugee Law Project at Makere 
University, reported in his extensive study of IDP camps in northern Uganda that the army 
barracks were placed in the centre of IDP camps, with displaced people spanning a 
considerable distance all around, prompting some to speculate that the UPDF were using 
displaced people as human shields (Dolan 2009, 108, 112). 
 
People in camps feared the Ugandan government soldiers as much as the LRA. Rosemary 
explained that “in the camps the soldiers mistreated civilians. They tortured us and sexually 
abused girls and women.”69 One mother explained that young girls would often “elope” with 
soldiers “in order to have these material things,” and that it was difficult for mothers to 
prevent their daughters from going with the soldiers, as “the soldier, remember, they have the 
gun. They [can] shoot and kill you.”70 MSF reported in 2004 that beatings by government 
soldiers were a “regular phenomenon” and that it was common practice for soldiers to take 
displaced women and girls to their barracks at night time and rape them (MSF 2004, 9). A 
joint investigation by UNICEF and the Government of Uganda in 2005 found that 60 percent 
of women and girls in Pabbo IDP camp near Gulu had experienced sexual assault, with the 
highest incidence among girls aged between 13 and 17 years old (UNICEF and GoU 2005, 
iii); the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF) were named first among the list of 
perpetrators. The report further went on to state that “despite the awareness of [Sexual and 
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67 Interviewed June 17, 2014. 
68 Interviewed June 23, 2014. 
69 Interviewed February 13, 2014. 
70 Interviewed June 17, 2014.  
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Gender Based Violence] (SGBV), no specific government programmes have been put in 
place to address the problem” (UNICEF and GoU 2005, iv).  
 
The dire situation in the camps prompted the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC), Jan 
Egeland, to describe the humanitarian crisis in northern Uganda in 2003 as the “biggest 
forgotten, neglected humanitarian emergency in the world today” (Mukwana and Ridderbos 
2008, 21).  
 
Despite the clear injustices done in forcibly displacing almost the entire Acholi population 
into camps; the life threatening (and all too often fatal) conditions of the camps; and the 
ongoing effects of this mass displacement, encampment has not caught the attention of justice 
leaders, and is not targeted for a justice response. 
 
A number of commentators have questioned whether the forcing of northern Ugandan 
civilians into IDP camps by the Government of Uganda, and the subsequent treatment of 
people in those camps, might constitute a crime against humanity (Branch 2007; Dolan 2009; 
HRW 2005; Lawino 2012; Okello and Hovil 2007). The International Criminal Court (ICC), 
however, has issued indictments only against LRA leaders. The ICC has been criticised by a 
range of actors for its investigations in northern Uganda, and its reluctance to prosecute 
possible crimes committed by government authorities (Branch 2007; Glasius 2009, 519; JRP 
2013, 5; Lawino 2012; UNOHCHR 2007, 51–52).71  Phil Clark was particularly critical, 
stating that “the ICC has based its case selection in Uganda in part on the gravity of crimes 
committed but also on a desire to avoid prosecuting government officials, upon whom it relies 
heavily for security and evidence during ongoing conflict” (Clark 2010, 43). The ICC initially 
explained its decision to issue indictments against LRA leaders, and not the UPDF, in the 
following manner: “Crimes committed by the LRA were much more numerous and of much 
higher gravity than alleged crimes committed by the UPDF” (Moreno-Ocampo 2005, 2–3). 
More recently, the ICC has refrained from discussions of the gravity of crimes, arguing 
instead that alleged UPDF crimes fall outside the ICC’s temporal jurisdiction (IRIN 2010). 
While UPDF actions committed during the initial process of forced encampment in 1996 did 
indeed occur prior to July 1, 2002 (when the ICC commenced), the period of encampment and 
much of the suffering reported by respondents in this research continued well after this date. 
 
4.2.4 Trauma 
 
These harms all converged to create high levels of fear, trauma, and death among IDPs. 
Anna, from the Agago region, explained very simply and directly that “it was traumatizing, 
living in the camps.”72 Alice, after recounting witnessing multiple traumatic deaths in the 
camp, explained that camps had “that smell that was there … that smell, even now … it 
comes straight over us.” Still troubled by memories and sensory recollections, Alice’s coping 
                                                
71 As recently as February 27, 2015, a delegation of ten Members of Parliament from Acholi, Teso, West Nile, 
and Lango sub-regions met with ICC Chief Prosecutor Bensouda, requesting that the ICC investigate alleged 
atrocities committed by the UPDF (Walusimbi 2015). The Justice and Reconciliation Project conducted 
research into community views of ICC involvement in northern Uganda in the Lango and Acholi sub-regions, 
and reported that “we encountered great frustration and disappointment at the ICC’s apparent disinterest in 
crimes committed by the Ugandan military. Some discussants mentioned violent acts by the Ugandan People’s 
Defence Force (UPDF) in their own communities” (JRP 2013, 5). In April 2012, the retired Bishop of Kitgum 
Diocese, the Rt. Rev. Macleord Baker Ochola II, publicly accused the Government of Uganda of attempting a 
genocide against the Acholi people, and has criticised the ICC for failing to launch any proceedings against 
Government agents (Lawino 2012). 
72 Interviewed January 30, 2014. 
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strategy is “just to persevere and try to console myself that this was in the past ... I should 
rest and let go of these hurts and feelings.”73 
 
An extensive survey of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and depression, conducted in 
November 2006 among 1220 people living in 28 IDP camps across Gulu and Amuru districts, 
found the incidence of PTSD and depression to be “amongst the highest [levels] recorded 
globally” (Roberts et al. 2008, 44). The researchers found that 60 percent of women (45 
percent of men) met the symptom criteria for PTSD, and that 78 percent of women (51 
percent of men) met the criteria for depression (Roberts et al. 2008, 41). The overwhelming 
majority of respondents in the Roberts study had been exposed to traumatic events, with 
almost two-thirds of respondent having experienced eight or more of the traumatic events on 
the survey. Importantly, “over half of the traumatic experiences had occurred whilst the 
participants were living in a camp,” and “93 percent did not feel safe in the camp” (Roberts et 
al. 2008, 4). These results largely accorded with similar studies; a 2005 study of 2585 people 
in IDP camps in northern Uganda found that 74.3 percent of respondents met the diagnostic 
criteria for PTSD, while 44.5 percent met the criteria for depression (Pham et al. 2007, 549). 
This study also found higher prevalence for both conditions among women than men (83.3 
percent for PTSD and 53.4 percent for depression) (Pham et al. 2007, 549). 
 
Assistance with psychosocial needs in northern Uganda is inadequate across the entire 
population, and the little counselling and psychological support offered to northern Ugandan 
women has been targeted at women returning from abduction and captivity in the LRA. Very 
few, if any, women have received counselling or other supports to help them recover from the 
trauma experienced in IDP camps. The Advisory Consortium on Conflict Sensitivity (ACCS) 
(2013, 36) reported that “[i]ndividuals are still living with the trauma of forced displacement, 
sexual violence, torture, and physical wounds and mutilations that need to be addressed.” 
Importantly, the report makes a direct link between unhealed trauma from displacement (and 
abduction), and the future success of reconciliation: 
 
Without the needed physical and psychological repair, it will remain difficult for affected 
individuals and communities to perceive that justice has been done and to meaningfully 
engage in a broader process of social rehabilitation, reconciliation or development. (36) 
 
The ACCS findings accord with findings in this research which indicate ongoing trauma, 
grief, and resentment among formerly displaced women and their communities, thereby 
impairing the ability of communities to successfully reintegrate returned abductees. Most 
former abductees interviewed in this research complained of being “constantly reminded” 
that they are “from the bush,” and of being called “rebel,” “killer,” or the possessor of “a 
bush mentality.” The traumatisation of displacement and the lasting effects of the broad 
range of experiences during the war – including “camp life,” LRA attacks, and violence from 
the UPDF – needs to be acknowledged. There is a need for trauma healing assistance for all 
women in northern Uganda, whether formerly displaced or abducted. 
 
4.2.5 Social breakdown 
 
There is no doubt that “camp life” has caused profound harm to the social fabric of Acholi 
communities. Time and again, women told us that “camps changed people’s mentality,” 
“people lost a sense of humanity,” “girls engaged in very risky behaviours,” “men started 
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misbehaving towards us,” and “life became meaningless” in the camps. Women described a 
spiralling disintegration of social norms: people were forced to live in over-crowded huts; the 
necessities for survival (food, water, and sanitation) were scarce; and people were cut off 
from any opportunity to maintain their livelihoods. As a result, alternate economies emerged 
as ways for people to meet their survival needs. Young men began to steal and to form gangs 
which used violence to extract food, sex, and other goods and services from fellow IDPs. 
Women and girls engaged in survival sex with men who could offer a small payment or a 
degree of protection. UPDF soldiers had the greatest access to food, money, and the means of 
protection (UHRC and UNOHCHR 2011, 52). Women also had to take great risks to their 
safety to go outside the camp in search of food or firewood, an activity which not 
infrequently resulted in attacks by rebels or beatings by soldiers (Dolan 2009).  
 
Meanwhile, Acholi men in the camps, having lost much status as well as productive roles, 
quickly took to drinking. Those who drank typically took out their trauma, frustration, and 
anger on their wives in the evening. Camp rules required that all people were back in their 
huts by 7.30 p.m. or 8.00 p.m.; not only did this leave women vulnerable to attacks from a 
drunk husband, but it rendered people unable to continue important cultural traditions, such 
as participating in Wang oo, a family gathering around the fire and a key practice in passing 
on cultural traditions to children.  
 
The Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative and the Archdiocese of Gulu released a report 
in 2001, explaining the devastating cultural and social effects of the camps, and warning 
against the future implications if left to continue in this way: 
 
As one moves through any of the displaced camps, one of the most depressing sights is to see 
scores of unattended children everywhere, idle youth loitering about and men drinking 
alcohol. This is just the surface of a deeper problem that most people, especially elders, feel 
as something very painful: the collapse of the good cultural values that people used to feel 
proud of. A whole generation is growing up in a moral and cultural vacuum, and considering 
that children under the age of 15 account for more than 55 percent of the total population in 
the IDP camps in Acholi this is a very serious situation. 
 
The main means of transmitting the Acholi traditional culture to the younger generations is 
the evening family gathering at the fireplace, referred to in the Acholi language as Wang oo. 
Army-enforced regulations in most camps state that everybody is expected to be indoors or at 
least next to their huts by 7:30 p.m. Those who break this rule are routinely beaten. The 
consequence is that since there is no more Wang oo, children – adults often complain – are 
not taught good cultural values. (19) 
 
Children were getting neither traditional nor formal education in the camps. The Archdiocese 
reported just four classrooms for 1050 students in Acholibur IDP camp (ARLPI and JPCGA 
2001, 19) – only slightly larger class sizes than the Acholiland IDP camp average of 160 
students per class in 1999 (UNOCHA 1999, 30). The Uganda Human Rights Commission 
and UN Office of the High Commission for Human Rights also noted the devastating social 
and cultural impacts on the culture of the Acholi, particularly those who were children during 
encampment. Specifically, they noted the loss of both formal and cultural educational 
opportunities resulting from the regimes of camp life (UHRC and UNOHCHR 2011, 54–54). 
 
As Margaret explained:  
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The way I see it, the problems we faced in the camps and what is happening now is 
because of congesting people together. Many people did not know each other so 
people started knowing each other and they started seeing different negative ways of 
life. Because of that kind of behaviour, even your young child could be defiled. And it 
is the reason diseases spread among people. Because of congesting people together in 
the camps. 
 
It has made men’s drinking rates to skyrocket because although they would drink in 
the past, it would be from their own harvest but nowadays they just drink aimlessly. It 
has made men to waste household resources because before going to the camps, they 
did not know these white man’s drinks that were brought. 
 
The reason boo kec (thugs) are many is because of congesting people in the camp. 
Some people who return from the bush pretend to be armed so they become robbers. 
 
My thought is that now that people have returned home, they should not return to the 
camp because camp spoilt our girls, it spoilt our boys. Things like disco and video 
that people did not know has made our children to get spoilt. It has increased 
violence, and prostitution is widespread. We should never return to the camp. It has 
arrested the future of our children. They are not productive.74  
 
Margaret’s views were echoed by other women with whom we spoke. Josephine explained 
that the current generation of young people, both those who were abducted and those who 
lived in camps, have had little guidance on living in Acholi society: 
 
The children who were abducted grew up in anti-social environments and therefore 
they never got to learn how to work hard, even those who grew up in the period of 
war never went through the training that we went through of how to engage in the 
community – loss of social norms.75 
 
Annabel said that she sees the next generation as being in trouble. Many have “lost their 
parents” and so “the children have now been left on their own to do a lot of things.”76 She 
also identified that the elders who previously would have been called upon to correct anti-
social behaviour have either died or lost their integrity, and do not “use the truth, and all this 
is really causing so many problems among the people in the society.”77  
 
Many women rued the loss of trust and social bonds that existed before the period of 
encampment. Ruth explained life before the camps in the following way: 
 
We were united, we cultivated our gardens as a group … collective digging known as 
Wang Kweri. People would do collective digging for an individual/family and the 
members would not be paid but served with a meal and drink in appreciation. Family 
members were living together. There were several friends who would come to one’s 
rescue. Life was much more meaningful. After camp life people have changed, people 
are so disgruntled, people have become so individualistic.78 
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Ruth’s description of life before the camps closely matches the descriptions of collaboration 
between neighbouring Acholi households during planting and harvesting seasons. Adelman 
(2009, 31) reports that  
 
[f]armers’ groups are critical institutions in both Lango and Acholi culture. While they were 
formed for an economic purpose, the features of these groups making them good economic 
institutions – namely, daily contact, trust between members and reciprocity – make them 
useful in other ways as well.  
 
It is difficult to overstate the importance of the damage done to social, cultural, family, and 
economic relations through the policy of encampment. Multiple groups and organisations 
warned about the breakdown in social norms and the ties that bound Acholi communities 
together from very early in the period of encampment (ARLPI and JPCGA 2001; Gersony 
1997; UNOCHA 1999). As early as 1999, the UN Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs reported on the multi-agency Northern Uganda Psycho-Social Needs 
Assessment conducted in IDP camps in 1998, emphasising findings of  
 
negative social trends of magnitudes previously unknown to the affected areas. These 
problems include social and cultural breakdown e.g. increased crime rate, consumption of 
alcohol and drug abuse, loss of respect and values, as well as breakdown of family structure 
e.g. separation, orphanhood and increased domestic violence. (UNOCHA 1999, 30–31) 
 
However, it seems that such warnings did not lead to changed practices in camp management 
or regulations governing social life in camps. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 
(IDMC) reported in 2008 that  
 
[o]ver 800,000 IDPs have been traumatized by terrorist attacks and have remained physically 
and mentally idle in camps for over five years. Nearly all traditional community and family 
mechanisms for ensuring cohesiveness and stability in society have broken down. Children 
have lost years of schooling, preventing them equal access to employment and future 
opportunities for participating in the national political system and economy. (139) 
 
While the Government of Uganda promised a range of programs to assist in the return of 
displaced people – including economic and psychosocial support – very little assistance was 
delivered by either Ugandan authorities or the international community. Subsequently, all 
communities visited in this research reported a toxic mix of family and social breakdown, 
including men and boys lost to alcoholism and crime, violence, corruption, trauma, and poverty.  
 
4.3 Lasting legacies  
 
There was a total mess in the camps. … People lost a sense of humanity.79 
– Beth  
 
Although almost all IDP camps are now closed and most people have returned to their homes 
(IDMC 2008), the legacies of “camp life” continue to shape people’s lives. Time and again, 
women told us that “camp life changed people,” and is a large causal factor in the high levels 
of trauma, alcoholism, and violence in their communities today. Camp life led to extensive 
breakdown of social norms – norms which previously guided behaviour in a wide range of 
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social relations, including conflict resolution, sexual relations, parenting, marital relations, 
land allocation, resource distribution, economic activities, and decision-making. This is in 
keeping with findings by the Ugandan Human Rights Commission and the UN Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, which stated that encampment and “being cut off 
from their agricultural lands and traditional homesteads had a devastating economic, 
livelihood, social and cultural effect on people” (UHRC and UNOHCHR 2011, 51). 
 
The loss of elders, traumatisation of surviving elders and leaders, and the breakdown in social 
norms, are having a doubly harmful effect in that large numbers of people are engaging in 
behaviours that previously would have been rare; this is compounded by the fact that the 
mechanisms to deal with transgressions have been profoundly damaged. While this 
phenomenon is impacting on the lives of women in multiple ways, three were raised in 
almost every interview: widespread alcoholism; land conflict; and high levels of violence 
resulting from both. 
 
4.3.1 Alcoholism 
 
One of the most commonly reported issues by women participating in this research was that 
men had started drinking alcohol excessively in the camps, and have continued the practice 
after returning home. As Annabel summarised: 
 
Men drink a lot and this was as a result of their stay in the camps, and they have 
continued with this. They continuously drink and they don’t do anything productive 
and they don’t do anything to help their families – this is what they do, the best they 
can do is drinking.80  
 
While accurate baseline figures for alcohol consumption in northern Uganda are not 
available, several studies have reported high rates of excessive alcohol consumption, 
including by women, but more commonly by men (Annan and Brier 2010; Kizza et al. 2012; 
Okello and Hovil 2007). A 2008 study into war-affected young women found that 43 percent 
surveyed reported brewing alcohol as their primary economic activity, and that brewing 
alcohol “dominates all agriculture and herding activities combined” (Annan et al. 2008, 13). 
During fieldwork for this report conducted in 2014, the researchers observed that many men 
in villages were visibly highly intoxicated by mid-morning in most of the villages visited. 
One NGO worker based in Amuru commented on this during the Validation Workshop in 
June 2015: “In the villages, for example where I work in Amuru, you’ll get men actually 
even at this time (10.00am), they are already drunk.” Two other NGO workers based in Pader 
responded, “Eh, this is late!”81 Annan and Brier (2010, 155) reported similar observations 
during their fieldwork in 2010, stating that “[a]lcohol abuse seemed ubiquitous, with public 
drinking seen early in the morning and public intoxication common.”  
 
Excessive alcohol consumption has, and continues to have, several negative effects on 
northern Ugandan communities, including 
 
• being a key driver in both domestic and inter-personal violence; 
• causing a profound reduction in the productivity of men; and  
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• being a major contributor to ongoing (and possibly intergenerational) poverty, 
particularly as money that would otherwise be spent on food for the family and on 
children’s education is instead being spent on alcohol. 
 
4.3.1.1 Reduced productivity, legacies of dependency and poverty 
 
Women see excessive alcohol consumption, along with years of enforced dependency on 
food aid, as the major causal factors in men abrogating their work duties. Dorine (aged 53 
years) explained that her husband started drinking during their ten years in a camp, and now 
does little else: “He started the habit from the camp. All from camp life, because from the 
camps, you wake up, you must start drinking. No work, nothing.” 82  Furthermore, she 
elaborated, that “all the men in this area do equally like this.” Faith similarly said that “you 
find very early in the morning the husband or a man is already drunk. They are not going to 
the garden, they are not doing anything productive, they are already drunk in their homes.”83  
 
Hannah, a 45-year-old woman, explained that “people were stopped from cultivating” in the 
camps, and made to “depend on food supply from WFP.” This made children, families, and 
the community “miserable.” She continued: 
 
In the camps, men’s behaviour really changed, some men would defile girl children, 
others would steal the little (food) supply and sell, such money they would use to buy 
alcohol. This kind of behaviour has continued up to now. Men have left all their 
responsibilities. Today women carry all the burden to look after the children and 
provide for their families. There are so many cases that have been registered at the 
District and Sub-county offices regarding neglect of responsibilities. ... Women 
struggle to cultivate and grow crops while the men steal, sell and drink the foodstuff 
produced.84  
 
Amelia similarly attributed the lack of productivity, high alcohol consumption, and lack of 
commitment to family responsibilities to the enforced dependency and lack of opportunity for 
productive work in the camps:  
 
For example, my husband … When we were in the camps, because of the relief that 
we were being supplied with, we produced so many children. Now that we have 
returned home, we cannot look after these children very well. The men are not 
supportive at all. … They are drinking so much. Some are violent. But mine used not 
to be very violent except his habits of being a womaniser. [Now] he comes as a visitor 
home. … [Before the camp] we would dig together, we would do things together. 
When we went to the camp, it was just terrible. Camp life made the habit intensify and 
given the fact we were being given relief, so he thought everything was fine for us, he 
could just continue with his life the way he chose to.85  
 
Scholars and practitioners working in the field of internal displacement have long argued that 
“while camps may be useful in the initial reception phase, … long-term encampment should 
be avoided, since it leads to hopelessness, inactivity and dependency” (Castles and Van Hear 
2005, 31; Black 1998; Malkki 1995). A Brookings Institute study into the economic impacts 
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of IDP camps surmised that “encampment is not good for economic self-reliance” (Tajgman 
2010, 450). Long-term encampment is known to create lasting negative individual, social, 
and economic effects, and indeed, this orthodoxy has borne out in northern Uganda. 
 
While only a few key informants spoke in depth about the effects of the camps on present day 
life in northern Uganda, those key informants based in the north confirmed that the incidence 
of heavy alcohol use among men since returning from camps is very high. They also 
explained a causal link between the trauma of the conflict and the prolonged dependency and 
enforced idleness during encampment:  
 
In reflection to the IDP camps where food was given to people for free, you do not 
have anything to do, the only thing you can do is to go for leisure, a woman is 
supposed to cook and there’s nothing that you can do. So some of these men become 
addicted [to alcohol] and when they returned back to their original land they could 
not do anything because they were addicted to alcohol, they have to continue drinking 
and leave their women to do domestic and agricultural work. Then another thing 
could be that something of them resort to drinking because of either health issues or 
trauma of the war or even HIV. So the only thing maybe they can do is go for drinking 
alcohol.86  
 
One key informant made a very similar observation, adding that NGO’s practices of working 
with women rather than men in the camps compounded the problem, and further displaced 
men from any meaningful and productive roles: 
 
[There was] a reversal of roles because men as traditional breadwinners lost their 
places in that regard because they were confined in the IDP camps, food was being 
distributed to them, they could not farm their gardens so they could not play their 
traditional breadwinning roles, so that reverted to the women. And actually why it 
reverted to the women, the World Food Program and NGOs preferred working with 
the women.87  
 
Key informants also said that, however little psychosocial help has been offered to women, 
there has been even less targeted at men. As one key informant explained: “People didn’t 
know that they also needed some bit of rehabilitation. People neglected them and that is why 
the drinking is just continuous.” 88  While trauma (as northern-based key informants 
explained) is likely an important element in understanding the very high levels of alcohol 
consumption by men in northern Uganda, the extended periods in IDP camps, enforced 
dependency, and limited opportunities for productive activities, has resulted in excessive 
alcohol consumption, and significantly lowered productivity by effectively taking a large 
number of men out of the work force. NGO orthodoxy, which dictates that working through 
women is a more secure way of ensuring aid reaches children and other vulnerable groups 
within a target population, appears to have had unintended effects on post-conflict behaviours 
and gender relations, and is working against present day poverty reduction efforts.  
 
In addition to the profound impacts alcohol consumption has had, and continues having, on 
productivity, it also distorts how household incomes are spent, and is a key driver in 
exacerbating poverty; in too many instances, it ensures poverty continues into the next 
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generation. Many women said that they were struggling to find enough money to buy food 
and pay school fees for their children, and that often, a key cause of this was husbands’ 
taking of household funds to buy alcohol, resulting in children being sent home from school 
due to unpaid fees. Margaret explained that men’s drinking “has made men to waste 
household resources.”89 Santina, whose husband is a Local Councillor in the Gulu district, 
identified this, along with alcohol-related violence, as one of the main concerns that her 
husband has to deal with in his leadership role: 
 
When it comes to harvesting the crops from the garden, most of the men when these 
crops have been harvested will just pick or steal and sell and drink the money off.90  
 
The District Police Commander in Pader described the same dynamic in the communities 
with which he works, saying that “the man sells (the harvest) but does not give the proceeds 
to cater for buying food and all that is needed in the home. The women are not given 
anything. As a result the man drinks all the money and becomes very violent.”91 He went on 
to say that poverty eradication and education of children are two of the most urgent issues 
facing the Pader District, and are essential for improving the lives of women and all people in 
the district. 
 
One key informant saw drinking, poverty, despair, and inadequate education of children as 
cyclical. She explained that “the children of the poor and those in the grassroots do not get 
the opportunity to benefit from scholarships,” before going on to ask that this research project 
advocate for scholarships for students with talent and drive, but no funds to continue their 
education. “Such children should be helped,” she explained, because “at the end they would 
make a very big change in the communities and to their parents who are living in the 
communities.” However, at the moment,  
 
most of them (parents) have taken to drinking and they are not providing the basics 
for these children. Some women too in the communities are, because of the different 
problems they are going through, the different burdens, the difficulty they are going 
through to make ends meet for their families, they are worrying, they are hurting so 
much that they have taken to drinking also to make them forget some of these 
problems which is also creating more problems in the community.92  
 
The high rate of excessive alcohol consumption is a major issue in a cycle of violence, 
poverty, trauma, and despair, and is shaping the next generation through children having 
disrupted and incomplete educations. Excessive drinking however, remains largely 
unaddressed by both the Government of Uganda and NGOs delivering services in the area. 
Worudet, a Ugandan NGO based in Pader, told us of some work it has conducted with men 
addressing violence, drinking, productivity, and shared-household decision making, which 
they believe has been highly effective. This work, however, is small scale and subject to 
changing funding priorities. A number of studies have demonstrated the efficacy of 
psychosocial and psychiatric interventions targeting Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, 
depression and anxiety in northern Uganda, with three separate programs each reporting a 
halving of symptoms following treatment (Baingana and Mangen 2011; Nakimuli-Mpungu et 
al. 2013; Sonderegger et al. 2011). Although they currently form a limited evidence base, 
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these studies indicate that high quality, appropriately modified psychosocial and psychiatric 
services could assist war affected individuals and communities in their recovery; this would 
likely include secondary improvements to productivity, poverty-reduction, and violence 
reduction. 
 
4.3.1.2 Alcohol and domestic violence 
 
In addition to lost productivity, excessive drinking is a major driver in alarming rates of 
domestic violence in post-conflict northern Uganda. A great many women in this study 
reported that their husbands or partners are violent towards them, particularly when he had 
been drinking. As Jennifer starkly put it, “I go to the garden early and he goes drinking. 
When I return he beats me. Every day.”93 Pauline said that the problem is widespread and 
directly attributable to alcohol: “The men are alcoholic and every time they get drunk they 
become abusive. Apart from alcoholism, there is no substantive cause of domestic 
violence.”94  
 
The level of domestic violence is so high that several women described it as a continuation of 
the war. Evelyn said:  
 
Having basic needs alone when one is still experiencing a lot of violence does not 
qualify as peace. For instance, having a drunken husband [and] being beaten 
hostilely.95  
 
Jane also drew comparisons between the violence of the war and the domestic violence of 
post-war life, stating that “peace came and we went back home, but again, men started 
another violence.”96  
 
The link between alcohol consumption and domestic violence is widely accepted globally 
(Brookhoff et al. 1997; Foran and O’Leary 2008; Koenig et al. 2003; Leonard 2001). While 
there are few studies specifically addressing alcohol and domestic violence in northern 
Uganda, those that do exist support the testimonies of the women in this study; namely, that 
alcohol use is “rampant” and is a major cause of widespread domestic violence. Okello and 
Hovil (2007, 442), in their study of gender based violence in IDP camps, noted men’s 
excessive levels of alcoholism, and argued that this “provides a context for GBV that is 
critical to understanding [the phenomenon].” Saile et al. (2013, 17) reported that 80 percent 
of women in their sample had experienced domestic violence in the preceding twelve months. 
Annan and Brier (2010, 6) reported that “alcohol was stated as a problem in every case of 
intimate partner violence” that they encountered in their research. An inquiry conducted by 
the Uganda Law Reform Commission in 2008 reported that 92 percent of 6,000 respondents 
across Uganda claimed that domestic violence was occurring in their communities, with the 
highest incidence found in northern Uganda (IRIN 2008). 
 
International Alert surveyed 775 people (404 women, 371 men) in the Acholi sub-region 
about a range of issues, including Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV) and alcohol, in 
2011, 2012, and 2013. The survey found that SGBV has increased dramatically in Acholi 
communities. In 2011, 41.1 percent of respondents reported that SGBV was present in their 
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communities; this figure had risen to 99.7 percent in 2013 (IA 2013, 42). Thirty-nine percent 
of respondents identified alcohol and drug use as the leading cause of SGBV, with poverty 
the second major cause, and “lack of respect” the third (IA 2013, 41). An important finding 
was that 0.1 percent of respondents said that tradition condoned SGBV, and no-one said that 
it was “normal/legitimate” (IA 2013, 41). 
 
Much of this violence goes largely unaddressed and unpunished, a phenomenon that Liza 
said is creating a culture of impunity, and is enabling further and greater violence: 
 
What is causing so much unwarranted killings in the community is the fact that those 
who kill in the community are jailed for a very short period of time and released, they 
return to the very same community and this encourages the other members in the 
community to also do the same. They say so and so also killed his wife and he has 
been set free. So it encourages them to also do the same. This affects us women the 
most because the men are killing us so rampantly. This makes us women so worried 
and we live in fear because a small issue can lead to death, we are not so certain 
what will happen next when the man gets drunk. These things used not to happen 
before the war. During the war people were exposed to seeing these behaviours and 
killings.97  
 
Many of the social and cultural norms which would previously have prohibited much of the 
violence have been severely disrupted by encampment and conflict. Neither formal legal nor 
traditional justice systems are effectively responding to violence in communities – violence 
which, women told us, has risen significantly since returning from the camps. The result is a 
cycle of escalating violence and further social breakdown. Women of all ages, irrespective of 
whether they were abducted or displaced into a camp, expressed a strong preference for 
family and clan mechanisms for responding to domestic violence, but were more willing to 
engage police and formal mechanisms when the violence was outside the immediate family. 
As Evelyn explained: 
 
If gender based violence occurs, the case is reported and resolved within the family 
chaired by the family head. If he fails to resolve the matter, it is reported to the clan 
head then finally to the clan chief. They handle such matters like house fights, 
disagreements, cases in which the husband drinks all the family income. … The LCs 
handle cases involving minor theft, quarrels and disputes among neighbours. … 
However if the matter involves serious wounding then it is reported to the police.98  
 
Overwhelmingly, women said they wanted to stay in the relationship, and other women in the 
community believed that women should remain in their marriages. However, women also 
wanted the violence and exclusive control over household resources to stop:  
 
When it’s a case of gender based violence, on reporting the matter, the girl is always 
advised to forgive. Sometimes the women can advise her to remain resilient for some 
time and give room for the man to adjust because this eventually helps to strengthen 
their family relationship. However, if it persists then she is advised to report the 
matter to the local clan leaders who may order for his arrest and detention in cells.99  
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While this research reveals excessive alcohol consumption and domestic violence to be 
crucial issues affecting Acholi communities post-encampment, they are issues which affect 
both former IDPs and people who have returned from abduction. Access to justice, and 
women’s experiences of justice regarding violence (both between neighbours and within 
families), is addressed further in Chapters 7 and 8. 
 
4.3.2 Land conflict  
 
The importance of land for one’s livelihood in northern Uganda cannot be overstated. 
Acholiland remains a predominantly agrarian economy, making access to control of land a 
key element of people’s capacity to generate and sustain livelihoods (Burke and Egaru 2011). 
Since the return of people from IDP camps, land has become a central focus for new, 
sometimes deadly, conflict. Several studies looking at land conflicts in northern Uganda have 
been conducted in recent years (Burke and Egaru 2011; Burke and Kobusingye 2014; 
Rugadya 2008; Asiimwe 2001). While the full extent of land conflicts is not known, Burke 
and Egaru (2011, iii, 5) reported that over 12,000 land disputes are dealt with by Local 
Councils I and II (LCI and LCII) annually, that land disputes account for 94 percent of 
matters heard by LCII executive court committees, and that 70 percent of matters dealt with 
by traditional leaders in Acholiland are of the same nature. Furthermore, they report that 
respondents in their study believe that land conflicts are increasing. The issue of land 
conflicts was raised by women participating in this study in most communities visited, 
indicating that it remains a significant issue facing communities. 
 
Rugadya (2008), Burke and Egaru (2011), and Burke and Kobusingye (2014) identify 
multiple factors fuelling the land conflicts, including  
 
• inconsistencies between customary and free-hold tenure;  
• inconsistencies between formal and traditional justice systems;  
• widespread poverty and widespread loss of resources/assets (including the loss of 
livestock, resulting in a heavier reliance on agriculture);  
• breakdown of social systems and changed family structures during the period of 
encampment;  
• foreign interest and investment in oil and large-scale cash crop farming; and  
• corruption in many systems designed to allocate land and resolve disputes about land. 
 
Amidst this complex and dynamic environment, the large-scale displacement of communities 
from the land has created ideal conditions for disputes over land:  
 
The tremendous demographic distortions and the dramatic reduction in the number of elders 
custodians of cultural norms, rules and principles responsible for mental records of land 
ownership and boundaries -- were overwhelmed by the scramble for land as people returned 
to their homes and villages from the IDP camps with the end of the protracted civil conflict 
around 2006. (Burke and Egaru 2011, 3) 
 
4.3.2.1 Causes of land conflicts 
 
Christine, a 62-year-old widow from Atiak, explained how displacement had upset pre-
conflict land tenure agreements, and is now causing conflict over land: 
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From the time we returned, there were some people who were given land before the 
war and they had settled on this land for a very long time. After the camps people are 
returning home and they want to return to where they were before the war and that 
other family say “no no no no you cannot come here anymore. You have to look for 
land somewhere else. This land was given to you sometime back by our forefathers 
but now we want it back.”100  
 
Beth, from a village in the Pader district, described a more deliberate and predatory nature to 
the land conflicts in her area, saying that “land grabbing is mostly happening in families that 
lost all their parents and elders in the war and thus the grabbers take advantage of their 
vulnerability and little knowledge regarding their land.”101 Many of these “grabbers … have 
a high financial ability and they use this to influence the leaders, even the Residence District 
Commissioners (RDC).”102 
 
Many women told us of specific examples where neighbours and even family members had 
used serious violence against one another over land disputes. In the worst instances, such 
violence resulted in death. Christine and Hope, interviewed together, told us anxiously of a 
current dispute in their community in which a widow had been tied to a tree and beaten, in an 
effort to drive her off her late husband’s land. The woman’s son had reported the incident to 
the police, but three days later, no police officers had attended. Christine warned that if the 
issue is not resolved “People will be killed.”103 Hope agreed, saying, “If the matter is not 
settled properly won’t it lead to death?” She poignantly added that land conflict is 
particularly painful because “it is from the land, the soil, that we get food.”104  
 
Women – especially widows, former abductees, and those whose parents died during the 
conflict – are particularly disadvantaged in struggles for land. Women’s secondary status in 
northern Uganda disadvantages them in the struggle for land; given that more than 50 percent 
of Uganda’s GDP is generated through agriculture, when women are denied access to land 
and denied control or ownership of land, they become more economically disadvantaged, and 
more socially and politically marginalised (Asiimwe 2001, 179). 
 
4.3.2.2 Tensions between customary and statutory law 
 
Most land in northern Uganda is held under customary tenure, and the concept of 
“ownership” is problematic. Customarily, land is “owned” by the clan. The elders of the clan 
allocate land to clan members, typically men, who may build their homestead on the land, 
and cultivate crops. A young man is allocated land when he gets married and he shares this 
land with his wife (or wives, in polygamous marriages). Women are rarely allocated secure 
tenure of land in their own selves through the clan, but have access to land through their male 
relatives – fathers, husbands, and sons (Asiimwe 2001, 175; Burke and Kobusingye 2014, 
21). Individually held freehold ownership of land is only recently being adopted in northern 
Uganda, and less than 1.2 percent of land in northern Uganda is held through a freehold title 
(Burke and Kobusingye 2014, 2).  
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Women’s rights to own property and land are protected in Ugandan statutory law through 
multiple instruments, most notably the Land Act 1998, and the 1995 Constitution (Asiimwe 
2001; Burke and Kobusingye 2014). There are conflicting views about women’s rights to 
land under Acholi custom, with most reporting women have little or no rights to land 
(Asiimwe 2001, 175). Burke and Kobusingye (2014, 21) argue, however, that women do 
have traditional rights to land, but that the clan responsible for meeting these rights is 
determined by her marital status. Some women interviewed in this research also reported 
their understanding that women do have customary claims to land, and some have been 
successful in asserting these claims. Regardless of land rights that women may theoretically 
hold in both statutory and customary law, there is wide agreement in the literature and in 
women’s testimony to this research that, in practice, women do not enjoy equal access to land 
under either system (Asiimwe 2001; Burke and Egaru 2011, 26; Kindi 2010).   
 
There is significant confusion in northern Uganda about whether customary or statutory law 
has authority over land matters. Burke and Kobusingye (2014, 16) identify “over 40 separate 
acts of legislation relevant to land rights and tenure security in Uganda.” Theoretically, 
statutory law has supremacy over customary law where the systems come into conflict; 
however, most people (women and men) access traditional and local land administration 
systems in practice (Rugadya 2008, 13; Asiimwe 2001, 176). The reality on the ground is that 
there is a significant degree of confusion about jurisdiction and supremacy, and little 
understanding both of what regulations govern tenure, and which systems and authorities are 
empowered to arbitrate disputes. Rugadya (2008, iv) warned that “[t]here is an institutional 
and policy gap that has increased tenure insecurity for the majority of people in Acholi and 
Lango regions and increased marginalization of vulnerable groups.” Indeed, Rugadya’s 
prediction of serious land conflicts and the disadvantaging of vulnerable sub-sections of the 
community (women, widows, former abductees, and younger people) came to pass, 
prompting Burke and Egaru (2011, 8) to observe that the confusing “situation is amenable to 
forum shopping with some disputants simultaneously appealing to LCI, LCII, Sub-county 
Courts, Chief Magistrates Courts , RDC, LCV, Land Officer, traditional leaders and CBO, 
District Land Board, MPs, police, religious leaders.” The lack of clarity governing land 
ownership and inheritance has combined with the damaged social fabric to further 
disadvantage women (in particular widows, child mothers, and formerly abducted women): 
 
The disorder that has characterized much of northern Uganda in recent decades has provided 
unscrupulous individuals with opportunities to take advantage of the lack of knowledge and 
appreciation of the norms, rules and procedures associated with customary tenure to cheat 
others, very often women. (Burke and Kobusingye 2014, 19) 	
4.3.2.3 Impacts on women 
 
While land conflicts affect many communities and impact all – men, women and children – 
they have particular effects on women. Women may have claims to land under both statutory 
and customary law, but they are struggling to realise those rights, particularly in light of the 
social devastation of the war, and newly perceived anxieties about land scarcity (Rugadya 
2008; Burke and Egaru 2011). Contemporary interpretations that women have no 
independent rights to customary land mean that women can often only realise land rights 
through their relationships with male relatives. This is particularly problematic for both 
unmarried mothers (both through sexual servitude in abduction, and those who became 
pregnant outside of marriage in an IDP camp) and widows. The reliance on damaged social 
relationships provides, at best, only tenuous land tenure; as Burke and Kobusingye describe: 
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Where the family or clan is strong and organized, the rights of each member of the clan 
including women and future generations are generally better protected. In instances where the 
clan or family is weak or fragmented women’s rights to land are often abused. When 
questioned on what they mean by the “strength” of the family or clan very few people 
referred to the physical size of the family. The majority of respondents referred to the 
financial resources at the family’s disposal and levels of education while others spoke of 
“love,” “unity” or “cohesion” within the family institution. Strong families or clans are also 
more likely to respect the rights of neighbouring clans, enjoy higher levels of social capital 
and are respected within the community. (2014, 18) 
 
Many widows, unwed mothers, and women with poor familial relationships reported to this 
project that they are struggling to realise any rights to land, and are consequently thrust into 
ever deeper poverty: 
 
It [land grabbing] is facing very many widows in this area, even myself. They had 
started issue very badly to grab land from me. I was lucky my father-in-law was on 
my side and he came and spoke very strongly. They say I’m just a woman – a mere 
woman with no land.105  
 
As land is the primary productive asset in northern Uganda, land rights have a direct link to 
one’s ability to produce sufficient food both for subsistence, and to generate an income. 
Access to land is a major determinant of poverty and economic well-being. Asiimwe notes 
that women provide 70 percent of Uganda’s subsistence agricultural labour force (and 60 
percent of labour for cash crops). However, the lack of land rights, including for married 
women, means women have “little control over household decision-making”; this includes 
decisions over what crops to plant, how to spend income earned from the land, and decisions 
about land transactions (Asiimwe 2001, 179). A large majority of women participating in this 
study complained of their lack of power in household decision-making, particularly women 
with husbands who drink alcohol. Santina explained that “when it comes to harvesting the 
crops from the garden, most of the men when these crops have been harvested will just pick 
or steal and sell and drink the money off.”106 Rosemary likewise said:  
 
Here the community think that a woman has no rights absolutely and the talk of 
women’s rights is just a fallacy, it’s a myth that can never come true. As for me, I dig 
and work tirelessly but during the harvest period I do not have any say on the yields. 
My husband has even stopped me from group savings. This is the kind of treatment 
that most women go through in this community. The men ensure that women are 
economically disempowered.107  
 
Land conflict affects both former abductee and former IDP women, with particularly negative 
impacts for widows and unwed mothers. While some women reported that they had been able 
to successfully resolve land disputes through traditional and local mechanisms, most had not. 
Only one woman had launched legal proceedings, and was awaiting an outcome. Most 
women had very limited understanding of their rights in law, and of the procedures for 
realising any rights. Many women trying to use traditional and local mechanisms for 
resolving land disputes complained that the male dominated forums discriminated against 
women in relation to land claims, and that they are “insulted,” “abused,” and “not taken 
                                                
105 Interviewed June 23, 2014. 
106 Interviewed June 23, 2014. 
107 Interviewed February 13, 2014. 
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seriously.” One woman said that when she refused to sleep with the Local Councillor, her 
case was dismissed; another said that her “case is overlooked because I am a woman.”108  
 
The traditional and formal justice systems – and women’s experiences of them – are 
discussed in detail in Chapter 7. Land conflicts are a major issue affecting the current and 
future stability and livelihoods of Acholi communities, and continue to further disadvantage 
those already most vulnerable within communities.  
 
4.4 Conclusion 
 
The women interviewed spoke extensively of the harms suffered in camps as a matter 
requiring justice. The policy of encampment was raised not only in regard to the violent and 
coercive means used to force people into camps, but also the consequent loss of property, 
people, and social bonds. During encampment, women were exposed to significantly 
increased rates of sexual and physical violence from husbands, community members, UPDF, 
and LRA members; this violence was also of increased severity. They endured life-
threatening hardship resulting from a lack of basic necessities, such as food, water, and 
sanitation. In its current form, the GoU’s draft Transitional Justice Policy (May 2013) only 
elliptically acknowledges the harms caused by displacement, stating at clause 34: 
 
These years of conflict have disrupted development efforts, destroyed formal and informal 
institutions and disintegrated the socio-economic fabric of communities. Consequently, 
various communities in post conflict Uganda have been faced with several challenges 
including: poverty and untold suffering as a result of limited livelihood options, negative 
perceptions about efforts at enhancing peace, recovery and reconciliation; and dissatisfaction 
with the formal justice system. (JLOS 2013, 15) 
 
While this inclusion demonstrates an understanding of the consequences of displacement, it 
does not acknowledge the systematic nature of mass forced encampment as policy, nor the 
role of the Government of Uganda and the UPDF as agents in the policy. Furthermore, clause 
4.1 of the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation (Juba Agreement) excludes State 
actors from “special justice processes” established under the Agreement, effectively assuring 
“guaranteed impunity for the senior military” (ICG 2008, 10).  
 
In a 2011 joint report, the Ugandan Human Rights Commission and the UN Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights specifically recommended that 
 
[t]he Government of Uganda, the Justice Law and Order Sector, and the Transitional Justice 
Working Group and its United Nations and Development Partners should: 
… Consider accountability for the full range of actors, … and accountability for 
forced displacement and the associated crimes and violations in the camps. (57) 
 
The marginalisation of forced encampment in Uganda’s transitional justice efforts, and the 
exclusion of State actors from transitional justice processes, is a significant justice gap, one 
which threatens to undermine the Government of Uganda’s stated intention of addressing 
“root causes” to the conflict in order to build lasting peace. While the GoU is making 
progress in addressing the high-stakes, delicate, and complex land conflicts in northern 
Uganda, corresponding efforts to address both past violence and current levels of alcohol 
consumption, trauma, and violence against women are lacking.  
                                                
108 Interviewed February 6, 2014. 
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CHAPTER 5: LEGACIES OF ABDUCTION  
 
 
I was abducted at 13 years. I returned after eight months. I was forced to carry huge luggage 
and trained to become a child soldier. The war disrupted my studies. I suffer from trauma 
and stresses because of what I experienced in the bush, like seeing people being killed. I also 
suffer from stigma because the community up to today call me names.109  
 – Gladys 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
A notable feature of the conflict between the GoU and LRA was the LRA strategy of 
abducting children into their ranks. An estimated 66,000 children and youth were abducted 
during the 20-year war, with most abductions occurring between 1995 and 2005 (Annan et al. 
2006, 16, 55).110 A 2006 survey of 10,747 people in northern Uganda found that a third of 
young men and one sixth of young women surveyed had been abducted for at least one day 
(Annan et al. 2006, vi). The LRA would regularly raid villages and IDP camps, looting food 
and other goods, terrorising and killing people, and abducting people (particularly children 
and adolescents). Several women who participated in this research project had experienced 
abduction, ranging in length from one day through to well over ten years. For some, they 
were forced to carry the looted goods back to the rebels’ camp, and were then released; others 
managed to escape, often during the confusion of an encounter with Uganda People’s 
Defence Force (UPDF) forces. Others were kept as forced recruits into the LRA and trained 
as combatants, used as forced labour (cooks, porters, and nannies), or given to Commanders 
and other senior LRA members as “wives.”  
 
Most surviving abductees have now returned to their communities or to regional centres in 
northern Uganda, and while the overwhelming majority of both former IDPs and former 
abductees told us that they want reconciliation and to live together in harmony, the process of 
reintegration and reconciliation is extremely complex (Baines and Rosenoff Gauvin 2014; 
Ladisch 2015). The ICTJ released a study in October 2015 in which the organisation 
interviewed 249 formerly abducted women, their children, community members, and local 
and religious leaders. The report noted that reintegration programs were not designed to 
respond to the specific needs of women and girls returning with children, and that 
subsequently, they “have been left without official recognition or support from the state to 
overcome the consequences of abuses while also facing stigma, rejection, and blame in their 
communities” (Ladisch 2015, 2). This chapter outlines some of the experiences women 
endured both during their abduction, and importantly, since returning home, as told to us by 
women participants. Returned women, particularly those with children and those whose 
                                                
109 Interviewed January 23, 2014. 
110 Precise figures of abductions are not known, and there is significant variation in estimates. UNICEF, for 
example, estimates 25,000 children were abducted (UNICEF 2007, 99), calculating this figure based on the 
numbers of returned abductees passing through reception centres, such as Gusco, World Vision, and CCF. 
Human Rights Watch calculated between 52,000 and 75,0000 children were abducted (HRW 2005). The higher 
figure proposed by the SWAY report incorporates the UNICEF figures, and also notes that significant numbers 
of people did not pass through these centres. There were several women in this research project who did not 
pass through a reception centre, including those who were abducted for a short period; those who returned 
before the reception centres were established; and those who refused to go to a reception centre, instead 
returning directly to their village.  
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parents have died, are struggling with trauma, discrimination, poverty, and stigma, and are 
finding it difficult to rebuild a place for themselves within a damaged social fabric. 
 
5.2 Experiences of abduction 
 
The process of abduction itself was extremely traumatic, invariably occurring as part of a 
violent attack. Abductees were forced to carry looted goods and food back to the LRA camps, 
sometimes in the vicinity of the village or IDP camp, but sometimes several days’ walk 
across the border into South Sudan. Those who could not manage the march back to the rebel 
camp were typically beaten and killed. As Santina explained:  
 
You see when you are given this loot, if you start to feel tired, they would ask, “Do 
you want to rest?” If you say yes, they would say, “Let’s go there and allow you to 
rest.” They would escort you and kill you from there. So you have to find all ways to 
ensure that you take the loot to its final destination, to ensure that you carry the loot 
to the final destination. If the head is tired, you change it and put it at the back, so by 
the time they release you to go back, you have pain all over and you start nursing the 
pain and wounds. If you are lucky, they send you back.111  
 
The march was described by participants as physically arduous, carrying very heavy loads 
across difficult terrain, for long distances, and in constant fear of being killed. Celia 
recounted her experience: 
 
I was 12 years when I was abducted. I was made to carry a very heavy load, I could 
not move any step because of the weight of the load on my head, at my back, 
saucepans and then in my hands … I had to move with such luggage and cross a 
seasonal river. They beat me and blamed me for losing some luggage in the river. 
When I asked for water, they denied me, one of the rebels suggested that I be killed 
since I could not move. I moved on, but my foot got swollen, I could not lift my hands 
up, we kept walking over dead bodies ... We finally reached Sudan at their base, we 
were immediately sent to fetch water. This time I was feeling a lot of pain especially 
in my hands, they again said they would kill me, this time I surrendered, they hit me 
with a machine gun. I said, “Kill me, if you want to kill me.”112  
 
Those who survived the journey to the rebel camp were often forced to witness (and not 
infrequently, participate in) extreme acts of violence involving transgressions of deeply held 
moral principles, such as killing a family member or eating human flesh.113 The victims of 
such violence may have been accused of breaching one of the rules of the LRA, such as 
attempting to escape, refusing to carry out an order, or showing “weakness” through crying 
(Veale and Stavrou 2007, 282; Bevan 2007, 352–353). Such ritualistic violence was thought 
to both induct the newly abducted young person into the consequences of disobedience, as 
well as instilling in them deep shame; this served to sever their connections with their 
                                                
111 Interviewed June 23, 2014. 
112 Interviewed January 21, 2014. 
113 Several participants in this research told us of transgressing profound taboos, such as this woman’s account: 
“They turned me into rebel soldier. Every time they killed, we would be told to eat while sitting on the dead 
bodies” (interviewed March 19, 2014). We have decided to omit further details of the actions some abductees 
were forced to participate in, and instead concentrate on the effects such actions have had (and continue to have) 
on former abductees. The Justice and Reconciliation Project, based in Gulu, has published a detailed account of 
one girl’s experience, titled Alice’s Story (2006). 
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families and communities, making a return home feel impossible (Bevan 2007, 344). Very 
often, this tactic had the desired effect; Sophie was abducted when she was six years old and 
reported that “anyone who tried to escape was cut into pieces in our presence to scare us. 
This made me stay calm and I was made part of the rebels.”114  
 
Abductees that survived the initial process of abduction were then exposed to multiple 
episodes of violence throughout their time with the LRA. Women and girls abducted into the 
LRA performed both “domestic” and combatant roles. A 2007 survey of young women in 
northern Uganda found that two thirds of girls abducted by the LRA for more than two weeks 
reported their primary role was in support, rather than direct combat. However, most girls 
were trained in the use of a weapon, and 11 percent reported that combat was their primary 
function in the LRA (Annan et al. 2011, 882). The authors noted, however, that “this figure 
likely underestimates the number of females who fought” (Annan et al. 2011, 882). 
“Domestic” roles included carrying luggage, preparing food, looking after young children 
and babies (some of whom were born “in the bush’), and being given as “wives”115 to senior 
Commanders or longer term members of the LRA who had performed well in battle.  
 
5.2.1 Forced marriage   
 
Studies have reported that the LRA preferred to abduct and keep young girls – either 
prepubescent, or in very early adolescence (Annan et al. 2009; Beber and Blattman 2013; 
Vindevogel et al. 2012). There are several reasons for this preference, including a concern 
that older girls were more likely to carry sexually transmitted diseases, and that younger girls 
(and boys) were “more easily indoctrinated,” and therefore less likely to escape (Annan et al. 
2009, 7). When Claire, who was abducted when she was eleven years old, recounted her 
experience of being “made a wife to one of the rebel leaders,” she emphasised her “very 
tender age,” and added that it was common for “young girls” to be “made wives to elderly 
rebels – almost our fathers’ age mates. And any of the girls who refused would be killed.”116  
 
Girls who refused to marry the man to whom they were given were beaten to death in front of 
the other new recruits, or tortured as a warning to other girls (UHRC and UNOHCHR 2011, 
39). Irene explained that “I had no choice but submit to whatever they said and accept one of 
them as my husband.”117 Lillian did refuse the man to whom she was given, and after being 
beaten for her refusal, was given a very limited (but nevertheless rare) degree of “choice”: 
 
During the LRA war I was very little, an adolescent about 12 years, when I was 
abducted. I was given to one of the rebels older than my father as his “wife.” I 
refused. They gave me 150 lashes of the cane. After all these canes, they still wanted 
to give me more canes, I was put under gun point … I ran for my dear life to their 
                                                
114 Interviewed February 10, 2014. 
115 We note here some difficulty in the use of language. Although the word “wife” is used, the relationship 
described by the women is better understood as one of sexual and domestic servitude. Such marriages were not 
entered into freely, and participants in this research did not continue in the relationship after return from 
abduction; this was the case even when the opportunity was available; when the consequences of refusing the 
relationship meant single motherhood; when refusing risked further disadvantage in accessing land; and in 
situations of difficulty entering a new relationship. We have chosen to use the words “wife,” “husband,” and 
“marriage” because this is the language that women participants in this research most commonly used. The 
words appear in inverted commas to indicate their atypical meaning, and to differentiate them from other marital 
relations entered into outside of abduction, with greater consent. 
116 Interviewed March 20, 2014. 
117 Interviewed January 21, 2014. 
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leader Joseph Kony who ordered that they stop treating me that way, that if any of 
them wanted me to be their wife, they should lure me into the relationship and if I am 
convinced, I shall take on the man who convinces me. Indeed, I accepted one of the 
young rebels as my “husband” due to the fear that if I did not, one of those old ones 
would force me to elope with him. They were very disappointed with my decision and 
warned me not to go for any help from them if my choice of husband failed to offer me 
the necessary support.118  
 
While most women that we spoke to used the euphemism of “wife,” no one that we met had 
continued in the relationship after returning from the bush (including in situations where the 
“husband” wanted to continue the relationship). Annan et al. (2009, 10), in an extensive study 
of 1,300 women and men returning from abduction, reported that “fewer than five percent of 
all forced wives stayed with their LRA husband upon return from captivity.” The same report 
also noted the systematic use of “slavery and sexual and physical violence within ‘forced 
marriage’” (Annan et al. 2009, 10). A number of women in this research used the language of 
“sexual slavery,” “rape,” and “sexual abuse” to describe their experiences:  
 
While in abduction, we experienced sexual slavery, forced to become a rebel’s wife 
and on attempting to reject, some girls were beaten to death.119  
 
Regardless of the language used, all women emphasised their lack of choice in entering into 
the relationship. 
 
5.2.2 Combatants 
 
Many abductees were compelled to perpetrate violence against others, including close 
relatives and friends (Bevan 2007). As Sarah recounted with continuing shock, “Sometimes 
they give you … uh … even your real mother, to kill, you kill your real mother or your 
relative. And if you don’t kill, you’re the one going to be killed by them.”120 Many formerly 
abducted women who participated in this research told of being forced to commit atrocities 
against their will and under threat of death, as well as being forced to witness a great many 
killings. Celia explained apologetically to the interviewer that 
 
the war was very intense, I was also forced to participate in the killing, they tied 
people on trees and I was told to hit them to death.  Anyone who did not follow their 
instructions was killed, indeed I had no choice but killed, not because I wanted it that 
way but because it was the only way I had to keep alive.121  
 
Girls were trained as fighters from very young ages. Olive told of how, when she was 
abducted, she “was so young I was still [being] carried”; she was trained as a combatant 
before reaching puberty, at which point she was given to a Commander as his “wife.”122 
Abducted girls had no more choice about participating in combat than they did in “marriage.”  
 
Eleanor expressed bad feelings about her actions during the war. She said  
 
                                                
118 Interviewed January 21, 2014. 
119 Interviewed January 23, 2014. 
120 Interviewed September 24, 2013. 
121 Interviewed January 21, 2014. 
122 Interviewed June 19, 2014. 
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they forced me also to go to train to be a soldier. So for me it’s not good. All the time 
I just keep on thinking … And to go also to take things from the people ... Forcing you 
to go and take things from the people is also not good because you make the people 
be annoyed and yet we took things, we were hungry, we wanted that thing to help us. 
So it is not easy.123  
 
While Eleanor felt bad about the things she did, she was also clear that she was forced to 
fight and steal, and that she did not “go freely to join the rebels.” Among the most frequently 
repeated phrases from formerly abducted women were that being abducted “was not my 
wish,” that “I did not choose.” Regardless of the lack of free will exhibited, several women 
told us that they were still “haunted” by the spirits of those they killed, and traumatised from 
witnessing other atrocities and acts of extreme violence. 
 
While all women spoke of their experiences in the LRA as traumatic and as something that 
happened to them against their will, a small number of women, particularly those who spent 
longer periods in abduction, formed close bonds with other abductees and became adjusted to 
life “in the bush.” Jacqueline, who returned home in 2007 after more than three years with 
the LRA, explained that some aspects of life “in the bush” were easier than living in the 
community: 
 
[L]ife out here is very difficult compared to the kind of life we were leading in the 
bush. Because in the bush, everything … you want food, you just go and loot. You 
want medicine, you just go and loot. You want clothes, you just go and loot and get 
these things. But now, we have returned home, if you want clothes you have to buy. 
You are sick, you have to buy the drugs. You need food, you have to struggle so hard. 
So if somebody is to compare this kind of life.124 
 
The conflict in northern Uganda presents complex challenges for justice, reconciliation, and 
peace. Most combatants were forcibly recruited into the LRA through abduction, making 
distinctions between “victim” and “perpetrator” difficult to draw; this distinction is further 
obfuscated given the ages at which many were abducted (ASF and JRP 2013, 8).125 Much has 
been written about the violence and terror to which abductees were exposed, both in the 
initial stages of abduction, and throughout their time “in the bush.” 126  While the LRA 
continues to exist, and is active in Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Central 
African Republic (CAR), communities in northern Uganda are currently wrestling with the 
legacies of the LRA war and the reintegration of “returnees” – many of whom are 
simultaneously their daughters and sons, and perpetrators of violence against their 
communities.  
 
5.3 Return home 
 
Women’s initial experiences of returning home ranged from happy reunions with family 
members, to grief at discovering parents, siblings, and friends had died; rejection as a rebel; 
being blamed for attacks on the community; and ambivalence about their return.  
                                                
123 Interviewed September 24, 2013. 
124 Interviewed June 18, 2015. 
125 For further discussion of the difficult distinction between “victim” and “perpetrator” in the case of child 
abductees, see the discussion of Dominic Ongwen in Chapter 8.  
126 See, e.g., Baines (2007), HRW (2005), and Vinci (2005). 
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Lydia described her overwhelming joy at being reunited with her mother: “My mother highly 
welcomed me. They were all so happy that I had returned and I was carried the whole time. I 
was so happy.”127 Few women whom we spoke with told of unmitigated happiness and 
welcome upon their returns. More commonly, women spoke of mixed emotions as they were 
reunited with some family members, while also learning of the deaths and disappearances of 
others. Helen “was happy to come and find my mother still alive,” but this happiness was 
countered by grief at discovering that “most of my relatives were killed in the war … my 
grandmother dead, my grandfather dead, my brother had been killed, my sister in law ….”128 
Some women had been rejected by their families upon their return, particularly if their father 
had died and their mother had remarried. Carmel felt very hurt by her mother’s rejection, and 
repeated several times over the course of the interview that “I really don’t understand it, I 
don’t understand….”129 
 
Some, like Camilla, returned to find no surviving family members: “When I returned I found 
my parents dead, only my brother was alive who was also later killed. I am the only survivor 
in my family.”130 Apart from the emotional impact of lost family and community members, 
whether one’s parents were alive or dead is a major determinant of a formerly abducted 
young woman’s ability to resettle in her community (Burke and Kobusingye 2014, 18). As 
one woman explained: 
 
For some of the girls who returned and found their parents and relatives alive and 
are in good marriages, they are OK. But the ones who returned and found their 
parents and relatives dead, their husbands are not supportive and their husband’s 
relatives are not supportive, they mistreat them. These women have no option but to 
endure since they have nowhere else to go.131  
 
In Acholi tradition, girls live with their parents until marriage. They do not have control over 
any productive resources, and can only access land through their fathers. At marriage, a bride 
price is paid by the groom’s family to her father; she then joins the matrimonial family, and 
gains access to productive resources through her husband (Burke and Kobusingye 2014, 21; 
Ladisch 2015, 16). For women who return to find their parents (their fathers, in particular) 
have died, marriage is often the only viable way to find both an economic and social location 
for themselves. Many returnee women in this research reported “unhappy” and violent 
marriages. Those with no surviving parents or another male relative willing and able to 
“speak up for” them have little choice but to remain in such relationships, and have little 
authority themselves to access justice or other assistance to improve their lives. The 
International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) similarly found that women returning 
from abduction are often  
 
caught between the pressure to get married in order to access land and resources and being 
stigmatized for their association with rebels and for having a child out of wedlock, many 
mothers have very limited options and risk being trapped in emotionally and physically 
abusive relationships. (Ladisch 2015, 16) 
 
                                                
127 Interviewed June 19, 2014. 
128 Interviewed June 18, 2014. 
129 Interviewed June 25, 2014. 
130 Interviewed January 23, 2014. 
131 Interviewed March 20, 2014. 
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A number of women in this research reported that they were entirely unable to return to live 
in their communities; this was particularly so for those women who had been held in 
abduction for many years, and those who came from places where massacres had been 
committed by the LRA. Julia spent eleven years in abduction; when she returned, she 
discovered that both her parents had been killed during the war, and that furthermore,  
 
my community members in my village, where I come from, think that the massive 
massacre that happened in my village, I had a hand in it. It was me probably that led 
people to that place, the rebels.132  
 
Julia explained that she and her children faced such intense stigmatisation and abuse from the 
community that she moved to a regional centre. She was particularly concerned for her 
children, explaining that 
 
I am a mother. Just like my parents worried so much, especially my mother, worried 
so much that time when I was abducted. I think that having returned with these 
children and the way the community looks at me in that area, maybe … I thought that 
if I don’t leave that place something could happen to my children. So before anything 
happens to my children I should better find a safe place for them. That’s why I moved 
to the town.133  
 
Eleanor also feared for her and her children’s safety, explaining that she was abducted along 
with twenty children from her village. She was the only one who returned, and faced both 
repeated questioning about what happened to the other children, and accusations from the 
children’s parents. Eleanor said that her community blamed her for the deaths of the others, 
and that the accusations reached the point where “at the end of the day you feel you are not 
safe.”134  
 
Eleanor and Julia enjoy the anonymity of living in town, and have formed close relationships 
with other women in similar situations nonetheless, being dislocated from their communities 
has had a material impact on their lives, as they must now live entirely within a cash 
economy. In addition to the cost of school and health fees (which women living in villages 
are also having difficulty meeting), women who now live in regional centres must also find 
ways to earn enough money to buy all food for the household, and pay rent for their homes.  
 
5.3.1 Return with children 
 
While returning from the bush has presented challenges for all women, returning with 
children born in captivity presented additional, often lasting, difficulties (UNHRC and 
UNOHCHR 2011, 46; Ladisch 2015). Many women spoke of trying to care for children as a 
“burden,” both economic and social. Children present immediate and ongoing financial 
burdens for their mothers – they need food, accommodation, clothing, health care, and 
education – but they also present additional challenges for social reintegration. Given 
Acholiland’s patriarchal social and economic structure, and its attendant patriarchal and 
patrilineal land tenure system, women get their social and economic needs met through their 
relationships with male relatives (Burke and Kobusingye 2014, 18); in order to have access to 
                                                
132 Interviewed June 27, 2014. 
133 Interviewed June 27, 2014. 
134 Interviewed September 24, 2013. 
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productive resources (most commonly land) to be able to meet the financial costs of raising a 
child, most women must enter into a relationship with a man.  
 
All participant women who returned from abduction with a child spoke of tensions, 
difficulties, and verbal and physical abuse in their new families, arising from having a child 
“from the bush,” Olive explained that “these children are a stumbling block in our way. Even 
when we get a husband, or a man in our lives, these men don’t want these children in those 
homes.” She explained that, while she and other returned women face an economic burden 
from the children, “it’s not only about the money,” but also social acceptance, and the ability 
to build a “harmonious” life in the home.135 All women who returned with children reported 
serious discrimination and animosity directed at their children born in captivity. This creates 
very difficult situations for the women, and very often, she must choose between a limited 
range of unappealing “solutions.” Grace had sent her child away to live with a relative, as she 
was unable to protect her daughter from abuse by her husband’s family: 
 
[A]s the child’s mother, I could not resist the pain anymore that was being caused by 
the ill treatment my child was getting so … It would sometimes make me think very 
highly about going back to the bush, but somehow I just said that to save the 
situation, to save my child from all this, let me just take this child to live with my 
Auntie.136  
 
Other women kept their children with them, and continue to experience abuse. Phoebe 
explained the treatment her children receive from her husband’s family: 
 
They say helping my children is worthless. They pick black ants and put in their 
clothes so they can bite them. When I called for a clan meeting, they all supported my 
husband’s side. I have now resorted to keeping quiet.137  
 
Phoebe has tried to leave the marriage, but her family received a dowry for her marriage, and 
would be required to repay it if she left her husband: 
 
When I try to move from this marriage, my relatives become so perplexed and urged 
me to be patient because they cannot pay back the bride price. They even went ahead 
to advise me that if I can afford to pay back the bride price then I should do that and 
move away. My male relatives can afford to pay it back but they simply do not want. 
It’s this bride price issue that makes women endure all the mistreatments they get 
from their (marital) homes.138  
 
Land conflicts and the perceived scarcity of land post-conflict are further constricting the 
options available to women returning with children, as their sons, in particular, are often 
perceived as competition for land traditionally handed down through the father’s clan 
(Ladisch 2015, 15). Francine returned from eight years in abduction with one child, now ten 
years old. Her parents accepted her back, but  
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my father had two wives, so my step brothers were not happy with me. And up to now, 
they’re still not happy with me being around. Because I came back with these children 
and they say these children will, in the future, bring land shortage problems.139  
 
While her father is still alive, Francine and her son have a measure of security; however, she 
remains worried because her father “is 80 years old and weak,” and “these brothers of mine, 
they are very aggressive.” She doubts the local leaders could enforce “anything against 
them.” She is worried about her future: 
 
Well, if there is no… if my parents are no more and these [brothers] begin to demand 
or chase me to get rid of me, then I will have to go back to the LC and try. If the 
matter cannot be resolved I will have to leave and go, I don’t know, maybe to the 
trading centre. I don’t know.140 
 
Christine and Hope, two women in their 60s and 70s, see many returnee women stuck in 
violent relationships, with no power to change things. They 
 
face so many problems in these homes; sometimes the men in the homes abuse them, 
are violent, are cruel to them. What can they do? You have produced one, two, three 
children – you have to persevere in that home.141  
 
The ICTJ found that many children born “in the bush” are growing up socially dislocated, 
with no identity or place in Acholi culture, and with potentially serious consequences for 
their future: 
 
For children who do not know their fathers, the fathers’ perceived association with rebels will 
nevertheless loom over them, obscuring their possibilities for advancement and integration in 
the community. Fathers, despite their absence, pass on their identity as LRA combatants, but 
the child does not get any potential benefit of clan membership, land access, or belonging that 
would come with knowing his or her father’s full identity. … For many children, not knowing 
their father leads to a situation where they cannot access land and thus are not able to earn an 
income. As a result, they cannot pay their school fees or courses in skills training, leaving 
them with very limited opportunities for the future. (Ladisch 2015, 17) 
 
Children born in abduction are dislocated from traditional social structures, particularly in a 
post-conflict society in which many people are traumatised, social norms have largely broken 
down, and conflicts over productive resources are widespread, many Acholi communities are 
struggling to accommodate these children. The ACCS warns that “[n]ew constituencies with 
specific and distinct protection and development needs have arisen from the war, including 
… those born in captivity in LRA hideouts. Communities are struggling to integrate this new 
reality into a decimated social fabric” (ACCS 2013, 37). Victoria explained some of the 
difficulties this has been causing:  
 
When you are abducted in the bush, and from there you get pregnant and come home, 
there’s nobody to support you, you don’t know where the father is. And that is the 
problem they’re getting. Because in the bush there, all the soldiers they have 
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nicknames, and it is very difficult here, especially in Uganda, back home here, to 
trace where the family of this man is.142  
 
Allen and Schomerus (2006, vii) anticipated that children born in the bush, outside of Acholi 
social and economic structures, could create tensions over inheritance and land in the future, 
stating that  
 
social attitudes to the children of “child mothers” may be affected by their lineage status. 
Without transfer of bride-price, the children are meant to be incorporated into the lineage of 
the mother. But this implies that they will have claims over her lineage’s land when the 
camps are broken up. Her brothers and their wives may resist this. At present it is difficult to 
assess the problem, partly because those “child mothers” who have been sent to IDP camps 
have not been there long. However, it may be a material factor in the reported abuse that is 
commonly directed at these children. 
 
Formerly abducted women and their children, along with young women who became 
pregnant outside of marriage in the camps, are the most directly affected by this rupture in 
patrilineal identity, and yet lack the authority to resolve the issue (Ladisch 2015, 14–17). 
Victoria explained that women who returned with children from the bush are 
 
trying to cope with all this. They are trying to get the community around them, to sit 
with them, to discuss with them. And when they come home they ask people around, 
“Do you know so-and-so, so-and-so?” and people say, “No we don’t know that 
person,” and they will tell you a different name.143  
 
When no paternal relatives claim the child, it is the woman who is left with the burden of 
caring for the child; this very often creates tensions within her own family and clan, who fear 
present and future competition for resources. Victoria is not alone in her search for her 
child’s paternal lineage; Baines and Rosenoff Gauvin (2014) documented a group of single 
mothers, most of whom were abducted, and who have come together to search for their 
children’s fathers’ families. The women’s motivations for their searches were partly 
economic (such as securing inheritance, and a physical place where their children can 
belong), but also ran far deeper (such as establishing a place within Acholi social, cultural, 
and ancestral systems, to ensure that their children have an identity and a sense of belonging). 
 
Women returning from abduction with children are a particularly vulnerable group. Their 
capacity to successfully reintegrate into society is largely dependent on the quality and nature 
of relationships with male relatives (Burke and Kobusingye 2014, 18–19). Those with fathers 
that survived the war, and are willing to stand up for them, have greater protection and access 
to the means of production than those without. Returned women with no male relative willing 
to offer them care and protection are too often left with little option but to enter marriages 
that are abusive and exploitative. The added burden of children to care for further constrains 
her options, and heightens her vulnerability to violence.  
 
5.3.2 Missed learning 
 
Many returnee women complained that being abducted meant that they missed out on both 
formal and informal education, and that they are now “behind” their peers. Women 
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expressed the significance of this missed learning as material, social, relative, and trans-
generational. Missed education has had a direct material effect on their current skills base, 
and their subsequent capacity to generate livelihoods, whether through farming practices, 
running small businesses, or working for an income (Ladisch 2015, 15). Many believed that, 
had they been able to complete their schooling, or to learn gradually from their parents and 
communities about farming and managing community relationships, they would be more able 
to meet basic needs and feel happier. Eleanor, who now lives in a regional centre and must 
therefore earn cash income, explained the economic impact of lost education:  
 
For us we come from captivity, we didn’t study. … Living now is not easy because we 
don’t study, we have children, we don’t have land, we are renting. If you don’t study 
you will not get a job. You will just go to wash the clothes for the people.144 
 
Helen has returned to live in her parents’ village and works on their land. She is also feeling 
the effects of lost learning: 
 
Also now, as I speak, I spent a lot of my time in the bush and this has affected my 
future and I cannot go back to school or do anything better for myself at the moment. 
It wasted a lot of my time and retarded my knowledge of how I can grow with the rest 
and learn how to do other things. Now that I am home I find that my mother has to 
start again all over to try and teach me things here and there that I should have done 
at an earlier stage.145  
 
Paska focused more on missing the cultural and social learning that her mother would have 
passed on to her. She attributes part of her difficulty reintegrating into the community to this 
lost learning: 
 
When I returned and came back home we were given the fact that I was taken when I 
was a little girl. I did not get so much mentoring or some kind of lessons from my 
parents because I also found when my mum for example had been killed so I did not 
have this parental figure in my life to guide me and to share how to do certain things 
in that community or how to go about life, so this made the situation very difficult. I 
found it very difficult to go back home.146  
 
The effects of missed education were also expressed as a relative notion, enhancing returnee 
women’s feelings that they were disadvantaged relative to their peers, and compounding their 
feelings of inequality and injustice. Eleanor said that she and other formerly abducted friends 
“are hurting, because when we see our friends have studied, we grew up together with them 
… Sometimes you sleep hungry with your child and life can be difficult. Your heart keeps 
hurting. You cannot have an easy life.”147 
 
Missed education was also talked about as generating internal feelings of lost hope and 
missed potential. Eliza’s grief at being denied a chance to fulfil her dreams was palpable as 
she told her story; her childhood aim was to become a doctor: “I was a very brilliant girl but 
the rebels came between me and my education.”148 Eliza said that her father was a teacher 
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“and he knew the importance of having his children study.” Her siblings were not abducted; 
her brother is now a priest, one sister is a teacher, and the other is a medical worker:  
 
They were never abducted, they were never – the one who is a teacher is my follower 
and the last born. … All these problems I’m facing is a result of this war. Because, if 
it were not for the war… My dad really, those days, wanted us to go to school. You 
never know, I might have been very far right now. All these problems I would not be 
facing.149 
 
Eliza has given up on any chance of obtaining an education for herself, but is focused on 
ensuring her children get a good education. However, she is struggling to pay fees to keep 
them in school:  
 
I’m really struggling so hard to see that my children have a bright future but as I, the 
way I look at it, the look of things, I seem to be defeated now. I’m getting defeated.150 
 
All women interviewed in this study, whether abducted or not, spoke passionately about the 
need for education as a core component of justice and healing. Women expressed a strong 
desire for their children to have a solid, uninterrupted education, identifying it as the single 
most important factor to give them a “brighter future.” Almost all women, however, reported 
that their children were not receiving this education, as they were being sent home from 
school due to unpaid fees. This issue is further explored in Chapter 7.  
 
5.3.3 Trauma 
 
Regardless of the degree of welcome they received upon returning home, all returnee women 
had survived traumatic experiences, and were affected by them in different ways (Bayer et al. 
2007; Nakimuli-Mpungu et al. 2013, 6). Most of the women we met demonstrated great 
resilience; nonetheless, their ability to go on with daily activities masked feelings of sadness, 
grief, confusion, anger, and of being “haunted” by the spirits of people they had killed. Irene 
was abducted in 1995, and although she did not give details about her experiences in 
abduction, she said that she remains “haunted by the spirits of those I killed in captivity … I 
am always ill and all my male children die.”151  
 
Carmel described what her sense of being haunted feels like: 
 
One thing I want to tell you … is that many times when we have returned from the 
bush there are things that come over us, our thinking … We see things, we are 
haunted. We’ve been haunted by what we saw happening. So when this feeling comes 
in my mind, all of a sudden, my body … I feel something holding me and then 
everything comes over the memories come just the way I used to do them when I was 
there.152  
 
She went on to explain that these “attacks” come regularly – every month or so – and that 
they also affect her children: 
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It affects them, it comes like … there’s an attack … diseases on the children – that 
when they are suffering from these … when they are sick, they don’t even respond to 
medication ... the white man’s medication. So these children keep shouting, some of 
them just move, they start to walk. … I want to live like any other person, I cannot. I 
cannot live normally like any other person because these problems keep setting in.153  
 
Both Carmel and Irene believe that traditional ceremonies would help them, but they are 
unable to afford to pay for such ceremonies. Irene said that she would “feel free from the 
spirits if a traditional ritual is performed on me to appease the gods to leave me alone”; she 
knew of some mass rituals organised by World Vision, and believed that the returnees who 
had participated “live more happily” than she does. Carmel had been given some herbs to 
help her cope and said that they helped a great deal, but when they ran out, she was unable to 
purchase more; consequently, the symptoms have returned.  
 
Esther, whose parents both survived the war, went through traditional cleansing rituals.154 
She explained that she “was traumatised when I had just returned. I would get scared on 
hearing any voice,” but that 
 
[r]ituals were performed to cleanse me. I was made to step on eggs, a goat was also 
sacrificed and its waste was smeared on me. This was performed to help me recover 
from the trauma and illusions that I would get. … If they had not performed this ritual 
on me, I would have killed people from home because the illusions would drive me to 
kill people the way I used to while in the bush.155  
 
Many women told us that they have difficulty sleeping; they are either unable to sleep at 
night, or have their sleep interrupted by nightmares. Valerie spent nine years “in the bush” 
and returned with two children. She described a mix of trauma, grief, and regret, and 
explained that, although she was not a combatant, she feels responsible for many deaths: 
“[M]uch as I never held a gun to fight, I was a part of those who massacred.”156  She suffers 
from nightmares and hypervigilance: “[E]very time I see people in army uniforms I get very 
nervous and restless, I lose control.” She is acutely aware of the effects that abduction has 
had on her life:  
 
The war affected my studies, I missed my teenage and youthful life. My children have 
different fathers. If they all had the same father, they would have had a better life, 
they would be able to go to school, have enough food, medication … but the man I 
have now cannot offer the children equal treatment, he favours his and cares less 
about the ones I returned with from the bush.157  
 
Almost everyone interviewed, whether formerly abducted or formerly displaced, talked of 
grief over lost hopes and dreams, and for lost family members and friends. Veronica was 
abducted as a very young child and is unsure of how long she spent in the bush (she estimates 
the length of her abduction to be fourteen years). She formed her closest relationships with 
fellow abductees, many of whom did not survive. She grieves for her lost friends, and feels 
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that the community does not “understand and sympathise … When I look back, very many of 
my friends died in the bush. They never made it back.”158  She recalled one incident in 
particular, in which she and some fellow rebels were sent to steal food when they 
encountered UPDF forces: 
 
When we went on this mission, my closest friend in the bush was shot, she was just 
next to me when she got shot. She was called Florence. I was disturbed but I never 
lost focus, I picked up her gun and ran.159  
 
There has been little space, either while in the bush or since returning, for women to express 
their grief and to rebuild trust. These multiple and repeated losses, particularly so early in 
life, have had a profound effect on Veronica and many other young women. More commonly, 
women told us that this manifests as sadness, anxiety or fear, but some young women told us 
of “uncontrollable anger.” Jacqueline said that  
 
when we are very angry, at this point nobody can advise me. Sometimes it’s too much 
even if someone talks to me, I cannot listen to them at that time. … I listen to my 
parents, but there are times when I do not feel like listening to them. That time when it 
gets so bad and when I am very hurt, I cannot listen to them at that time. … You see 
when I have just been where there is a lot of noise or when I have just been listening 
to so much noise, I do not want to listen to any more noise, I just need to be left 
alone.160  
 
Jacqueline explained how her anger sometimes reaches a point where she feels she has no 
control. Jacqueline describes what is probably a post-traumatic flashback – a traumatic 
memory in which the person feels as though they are back in the traumatic experience; such 
flashbacks are often accompanied by smells, sounds, images, and bodily sensations 
associated with the traumatic experience (Herman 1997, 37). In such instances, Jacqueline is 
overwhelmed with anger and memories, and feels out of control:  
 
You see, with us when we are very angry we can do anything to anybody, because if I 
am to start a fight with you, I will fight so bad, I will fight just the way we were doing 
it in the bush. This is the thing, if there is anything sharp that can kill somebody, I will 
just pick that something and use it on them, if it is a knife, anything, I will just pick 
and stab this person with it. At that time, I am capable of doing anything. I do 
anything. I do it just the way we were trained to do from the bush. So it’s after doing 
this that I begin thinking about a lot more other things that were happening in the 
past, memories from my bush experience.161 
 
Veronica nodded in agreement with Jacqueline’s statements, and added, “Yes, we do react in 
the same way. It’s the same for almost all of us.”162 Many returnee women reported feeling 
angry, particularly when they received “insults” or discrimination from the community. Most 
said they kept the anger inside, but many also reported several “fights” with other community 
members; Joyce clarified that “when we say ‘fight,’ it means ‘physical’.”163  
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Many women in northern Uganda, both former IDPs and former abductees, are living with 
significant levels of trauma, grief, and pain, and there are very few services and other 
supports available to help people recover emotionally and psychologically from their wartime 
experiences (Sonderegger et al. 2011, 237). Some formerly abducted women returned 
through reception centres, 164  where they received counselling prior to returning to their 
communities. Some women spoke highly of this counselling and found their time in the 
reception centres to be positive, “very warm” and “kind.” The counselling provided, 
however, was not therapeutic counselling designed to reduce trauma, grief or distress; rather, 
it was aimed at advising the women on how to behave when they returned to their 
communities.  
 
Paska described the counselling she received in Gusco: 
 
There was a big house, a hall, where we were all be taken and they would teach us 
how to behave when we went back to the communities that we should not behave the 
way we had been in the bush. That we should live very well with the community and 
also that we should try and forget; that home is better than living the other side in the 
bush.165  
 
She said there was no counselling that allowed her and fellow returnees to express their 
feelings: “There is nothing very serious … [W]e were not given the opportunity or there were 
no sessions of sharing our experience about the bush. There wasn’t.” She said that the 
returnees in the centre, however, would sometimes talk to each other in the evenings, away 
from staff, about their experiences in the bush and their fears about returning. She has 
maintained friendships with other returnees that she met in Gusco, and they continue to 
support one another today. 
 
Nicola came through World Vision, and said, “we were given a warm reception, we were 
given clothes. … [T]hey gave us good food and clothes.” When asked about counselling, she 
replied:  
 
Yes, there was a counsellor, for instance there was a counsellor who would come and 
speak to us after every 3 days, talking to each person independently, telling us how we 
should behave, how we should settle back into the communities.166  
 
An extensive research project involving participant observation, interviews, and focus group 
discussions with staff and former abductees,167  also questioned the therapeutic value of 
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services provided under the rubric of “counselling” (Allen and Schomerus 2006). The report 
highlights that 
 
[t]he team also found that the term “psychosocial” is used in a very loose way. Little or no 
psychological assistance is provided, and none of those observed giving counseling to FAPs 
[formerly abducted persons] were trained therapists. Counseling is interpreted as teaching 
FAPs how to behave. (vii) 
 
The report provides in-depth descriptions of counselling services provided in different 
centres, as well as an extensive critique of those services, highlighting that therapeutic 
counselling was not being provided in any centres: 
 
The term “psychosocial” has become a catchphrase amongst agencies working in northern 
Uganda (not just the reception centers) for just about anything to do with assistance that is 
additional to giving FAPs food. It appears to have become a prerequisite for funding 
proposals to mention it. A misleading aspect of its use is that it implies that psychotherapeutic 
care is being made available. This is not the case. (Allen and Schomerus 2006, 50) 
 
The resilience of women who survived the war, whether formerly abducted or forced into 
camps, is remarkable. Nonetheless, a small number of women described feelings, thoughts, 
and behaviours which are indicative of profound trauma, and many more women talked of 
pervasive feelings of sadness, grief, and anxiety. Several women said that “professional 
counselling” would help them and their communities recover, particularly by helping reduce 
conflicts within the communities, and improving communities’ capacity to deal with conflicts 
when they do arise. This assertion is supported in the literature, with Betancourt and 
Williams (2008, 40) finding that post-war trauma disorders “cause intense suffering and 
dysfunction resulting in effects far beyond the individual, which underscores their public 
health significance.” 
 
5.3.4 “Back-biting” and discrimination 
 
All returnee women in every research site said that one of their biggest difficulties was 
coping with “back-biting” and discrimination from the community. Returnee women are 
frequently addressed as “you who have returned from the bush,” and accused of having a 
“bush mentality,” of being “mentally disturbed,” and “illiterate.” Clara said this problem is 
widespread throughout her community: 
 
We have all experienced the same problem and you find that many of us who 
returned, they discriminate against us. We are called names ... they utter so many 
words against us, they refer to us as “mentally disturbed persons,” “you do not 
understand,” “you are returnees from the bush” ... So this is the kind of ridicule we 
get. It does not occur to one person only but to each one of us who have returned from 
the bush.168  
 
Helen explained that  
 
[w]hen I returned, of course the reception was very bad at the community at the time. 
They would call us names and warn us that “you, who have returned from the bush, 
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with the rebels – you are mentally disturbed. You have mental disorders. Take them 
back to the bush from where you have come from.”169  
 
When asked why she thought the community responded in this way, she said that “this was to 
make life very difficult for us basically.” Helen went on to say that it is not only name-
calling, but the requirement that returnees be deferential to other community members, that 
constituted discrimination faced exclusively by returnee women. She gave the example that 
“even when we go to the spring to fetch water we have to stand and wait for everybody else 
to fetch their water and when we try to tell them to allow us to also fetch they would start the 
same statements.” 170  Helen experiences this discrimination and name-calling as 
dehumanising:  
 
I continue to live with the pain and the hurting of that reception. But I am also human 
and I was supposed to feel free in the society.171  
 
Nancy, likewise, said that she continues to be called names. She said, “The community has 
not accepted me, they abuse me and call us ‘Olumolum,’ meaning ‘rebels’.” 172  Sarah 
described it as “hatred from the community.”173 Angela has been back from abduction for 
more than ten years, and complained that “they still abuse us and call us names.”174 Grace 
said that she is “not happy” because “there are so many insults that I have to endure. The 
insults from his relatives and my husband as well; that us who were abducted and stayed in 
the bush are illiterate, we never studied and that we have bush mentality.”175  
 
Women told us that the children they returned with faced the same name-calling, 
discrimination, and marginalisation as they did. Claire explained some of the treatment her 
two children received at school:  
 
My children are all the time provoked and reminded of the rebel in them. They are 
stigmatised. I endeavour to counsel my children. Many times they ask me questions 
that fellow children at school ask them, they are taunted; whether they are really 
children of rebels and whether they are born mentally sick and whether they will also 
grow up and turn into brutal adults like they say their father who is a rebel, “Mummy, 
shall we be as violent as our father or for us shall we be good, calm and free from the 
violent manners that people say shall become of us?”176  
 
Claire said that, sometimes, “[w]hen they disagree or quarrel or fight at school, the other 
children’s parents follow them home to quarrel” with her about her children. The other 
children’s parents tell her that “they do not want children of rebels to keep disturbing their 
normal children.” Claire, already upset at the discrimination she faces herself, said that the 
treatment of her children is particularly painful, and that “sometimes I breakdown and cry 
because my innocent children are being mocked because of their parents’ record.”177 
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Olive returned from eight years in captivity with a six-month old son. She said that giving 
birth was her motivation to escape when she did, as she did not want her son to grow up in 
such a violent environment: “When I had that baby, we both first died and then rose again. I 
said no, this child comes first and he is my future.” She was determined that her son would 
have a “normal” life, and would know nothing of “bush life.” Her son is now 10 years old, 
and 
 
he did not even know that he was born from the bush. We lived like nothing happened. 
But one day he sat me down and said, “Mama, David told me that I have no father 
and yet I know that this is my father. He said that that is not your father. You are from 
the bush.”178  
 
Olive said, “Right away my heart dropped.” She explained that  
 
[t]he child who said that thing is my half-brother’s son. I thought maybe grudge from 
being a half-sister. Or maybe he thought that one day this child could obtain their 
land. … I think the little boy was told what to say during their games in the sand. I 
think the child heard them as they talked and he was told what to say. I was in a lot of 
pain. 
 
Olive felt powerless to do anything:  
 
I realized that … because I used to ignore people talking behind my back, they had 
found their way through my child. I wanted to get back at them but I said no if I do 
something bad, they will say “bush mentality.” … I brought out the issue to the 
family. Family referred me to the clan. Clan gathered us and counselled us but there 
is no change.179  
 
Many returned women told us that they want to protect their children from insults and 
exclusion, but felt powerless to do anything about it. Many advise their children to stay quiet 
and try not to react. Some of the children are now reaching adolescence, and are feeling the 
effects of marginalisation. One woman said her fourteen year old nephew has begun to react 
to the name-calling by asking his mother to return to the bush: “Mama, let’s go. People are 
disturbing us, let us go back to the bush. Let us go to Baba.”180  
 
5.3.4.1 Effects of name-calling  
 
Name-calling and discrimination have various effects on returned women. All women said 
that it makes them feel excluded and marginalised in society. For some, it triggers traumatic 
memories, and for many, it silences them, as they feel any complaint they make will be 
disregarded as the words of “evil spirits,” or a product of their “bush mentality.” For some 
women and their children, it triggers both doubts about their return to the community, and 
thoughts of re-joining the rebels.  
 
Grace explained how name-calling brings back traumatic memories, and makes her feel 
afraid: 
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I have a fear because every time I am moving and people are back biting me, or they 
are pinpointing me saying I am a returnee, a former abductee, this brings fear in me. 
Because when they say these things and they are talking behind my back, this makes 
me remember what I was subjected to do when I was in the bush, and when I think 
about these things, it brings fear in me.181  
 
One young woman said that when she hears people saying, “the evil spirits you have come 
with from the bush,” she feels “hurt deep down,” and that it prolongs her recovery from 
trauma: “You cannot heal. You can only get relief for a short time.”182 She became quite 
agitated, repeating, “At home there is discrimination … You are the one to struggle … there is 
discrimination on people who have returned from the bush. There is a lot of discrimination!” 
 
Joyce, who has settled reasonably well back into her community, still faces subtle reminders 
of her marginality: 
 
It’s very difficult to get people’s thinking changed from that I returned from the bush. 
Even with all these lessons and sharing, they don’t forget that I returned from the 
bush. That thinking, that mentality stays with them. Of course, they mention some 
things that are not good, that are provocative. For example, when I am working in my 
garden and I spend some time working longer hours and they are tired, they will say, 
“Ah, for us people, we are retiring. You people are used to such a life, we cannot 
compete with you.” Honestly! What life are we used to?! Even when we are walking 
together and it reaches some point they will say, “Let those ones go at that pace.” 
Which “those ones?” I ask myself.183  
 
Many women said that the name-calling makes them feel silenced, that if they complain 
about anything or any other person in the community, their view will be disregarded. Eleanor 
said that “you don’t even talk about anything from the community. If you talk, they will say, 
‘That one is Kony.’”184  Camilla reported a similar dynamic in her community: 
 
There is a lot of oppression from some members of the community for instance we are 
shutdown every time we try to say something – “those are evil spirits.” They call us 
lawless people of little or no benefit to the society. This kind of treatment makes us 
feel out of place, it’s as though we intended to go to join the rebels in the bush.185  
 
Similarly, Jacqueline said that, as a returnee, “[w]e cannot do much because we do not have 
the ability, we do not have the voice.”186 Olive said that the leaders in her community, in 
recognition of the problem, encouraged returnees to report those who called them names, but 
that she has not done so, for fear of becoming known as a trouble-maker: 
 
Some time back they said when you hear someone talking bad about people who have 
returned from the bush, you should report them but think about it, you hear something 
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– you report, tomorrow the same thing. Those same authorities in the sub-county will 
start saying you are a trouble causer.187  
 
Women cope with the abuse in a number of ways. The most common is to keep quiet and try 
to contain their emotions. Grace’s parents both died in the war, and her brother lives in a 
different village as a chronic alcoholic. With no family support, she feels powerless to 
challenge the insults. Instead,  
 
I just look on, because it is true I came from the bush, I lived there, and I returned 
from the bush. I do not have any authority or capacity to do anything. So I just look at 
them, I just look at things because there is nothing I can do.188  
 
Nicola said that, when she is called names, she remembers “the teachings that we got from 
the reception centre; that when somebody does bad or hurts you, forgive, do not retaliate 
against this person.”189  Her friend Olive agreed: 
 
It’s the same, because what I know is that many times the best thing is to forgive, to 
try and forgive always because if you let this pain accumulate or keep on 
accumulating within your heart then at the end of the day it turns into something so 
bad that I may not even be able to look after my child much as I want to. But if I keep 
on accumulating this pain then I cannot be able to give them the best that I want to 
give them.190  
 
Despite women’s efforts to be “quiet” and “very cooperative,” “the stain of being associated 
with a rebel group never goes away” (Ladisch 2015, 16); as Valerie explained:  
 
[T]he community keep reminding me that I am from the bush, I am insane, I do not 
reason normally. My children are segregated and are called ‘children of Kony’.”191  
 
Although she feels remorseful about her role in the LRA, Valerie also thinks the community 
“should not discriminate against us, they should forgive us.”192  
 
During the validation workshop, a group of returned and never-abducted women discussed 
the issue of name-calling and discrimination. The group agreed that forgiveness is the best 
response, but they also agreed that “forgiveness is a gift,” and that it “is not easy.” Maryanne 
said that she tries to forgive those that insult her, but that  
 
sometimes the insult is painful, you may not resist talking back but at least sometimes 
you can cool that anger. Even myself when I get angry I let go something but I can’t 
do it everyday. At least one day I’ll not be able to hold it.193  
 
Joyce said that she usually manages to not respond when community members call her 
names, but that “words hurt,” and “if you don’t have any other redress, then you must 
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fight.”194 Joyce explained that she normally speaks to friends about her pain and frustration at 
being called names or reminded of her time in the bush, but that when this is not possible, 
“this is when I continue to think about it and it’s continuous. Then I want to continue and 
pick a quarrel.”195 Veronica, Jacqueline, and Cilla all related a similar pattern, whereby they 
are called names by community members, and, without any forum in which they can get 
redress, they physically attack the other person. Cilla said, “if there is anything around me I 
will just pick anything my hands land on and hit this person.”196 Jacqueline agreed: “What do 
you expect from a person who is discriminated against, yet it was not our wish that we get 
abducted?”197  
 
All formerly abducted women told us that they experience at least some level of name-calling 
or back-biting from their communities, and that this name-calling makes them feel hurt, sad, 
and marginalised. The majority of women respond by staying quiet and drawing on the 
advice they were given in the reception centres – namely, talking to others who had also been 
abducted, or praying for relief. However, it was not uncommon for women, both those who 
were formerly abducted, and those who have never been abducted, to report regular physical 
fights between former abductees and the rest of the community. These fights usually begin 
with name-calling, and quickly escalate. Joyce explained that the community must intervene 
rapidly to avoid serious injury: “If they don’t come fast, sometimes the ears are cut, are 
bitten off. The cheeks are bitten. … Many times it is the returnees who will inflict the most 
injury. They fight with so much anger.”198 Olive expressed the depth of pain that name-
calling can create: 
 
You are an enemy, they stigmatize you. “Oh you lived there,” where … it brings back 
past memories. You get suicide thoughts to end your life or want to commit a grievous 
offense so that if that action will fix it, so be it. That is our problem.199 
 
Veronica expressed similar pain and frustration, and described how name-calling can escalate 
into serious violence:  
 
Veronica: When somebody calls us names and do all these other bad things and 
then you try to get into confrontation with this person, the whole 
community in that area will come against you, this one person. This 
extends even to our marital relations. For example, if I have a 
disagreement with my husband/boyfriend in the house and I try to 
settle it out with him, it becomes the whole community’s business. They 
will start to throw such words like “You see? You are the people who 
went ahead and settled with murderers, killers and this is the kind of 
thing you get!” So it becomes everybody’s business. And it is not 
business to have it resolved in the right way, but business to attack you 
that one person. This is the thing that hurts us the most. Personally, 
this is the very reason why I was jailed in <location> because when it 
gets too much and I cannot take it anymore, I fight badly, I fight to a 
point between life and death, I fight to kill. 
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Interviewer:  Has this happened, have you been in a fight before? 
Veronica: Yes I have been in a fight and this is why I have been jailed in 
<location>, because when I fight, I fight to kill!200 
 
Of equal concern were the comments of a small number of women, who told us that the level 
of discrimination in communities sometimes makes them consider returning to the LRA, 
where they felt accepted. Grace said that the treatment from her husband’s family and the 
community “would sometimes make me think very highly about going back to the bush.”201 
Sophie Akayo from Worudet confirmed that she has heard similar sentiments among some 
returnees in the Pader region. She had recently spoken with a young man who returned two 
years ago, after seventeen years in abduction, who “said he is very scared and he is ready to 
go back.”202 Several returnees said that, when they first returned, they found reintegration 
difficult, and not infrequently had thoughts about returning to the LRA; however, they have 
now settled sufficiently back into the community, so that they no longer have such thoughts. 
As Paska described:  
 
I found life very difficult when I returned to the home that I even wished maybe if it 
was possible and if Kony returned and abducted me and I would go back to the bush 
because life was very hard. But with such things my uncle kept talking to me and in 
the end I would come to feel relief and kept the thoughts going down.203  
 
A key informant said that the issue of stigmatisation in communities is a major issue, with 
serious implications for the future: 
 
It is a problem that in the future in a year or ... we cannot accurately predict the 
future, but it is a problem that will affect the future generation as they grow. Nobody 
has any concrete solutions on how this should be addressed. The best people do is to 
have their own local solutions, for example here at JRP we conduct a lot of outreach 
and a lot of community sensitisation with the hope that this will help to reduce the 
stigma, the name-calling. It will definitely affect the future. … It is a problem that 
could create drastic results, maybe stigmatised persons will remain bitter that their 
needs were never met, were never attended to and maybe we could have the next 
generation of people who will maybe cause instability in northern Uganda.204  
 
Several formerly abducted women said that there had been concerted efforts to disseminate 
information about the Amnesty Act, to encourage abductees to return home, and to improve 
support for their initial reception, but that follow-up of both psychosocial support and 
reconciliation work had been insufficient (ACCS 2013, 32). Anita passed through Gusco, 
where she was advised to “forgive and forget,” but now that she is back home, “there’s 
nothing completely. You’re just there and there’s nobody to follow you. You’re just there and 
you just continue your life. But it’s hard work you know.”205  
 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
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Women who have returned from abduction are facing enormous challenges “integrating into 
the community and becoming self-sufficient citizens who live with dignity” (Ladisch 2015, 
2). While most show considerable resilience and determination with regards to handling both 
past trauma and present challenges, many formerly abducted women have not received 
adequate support to help them reintegrate and build safe, dignified, and sustainable lives. 
Neither the Amnesty process nor reception centres took account of gender-specific needs in 
their design or delivery, and, since returning to communities from IDP camps, formerly 
abducted women are continuing to be disadvantaged in accessing the limited post-conflict 
support and justice mechanisms available (Ladisch 2015, 2; Burke and Kobusingye 2014, 
19). Formerly abducted women and their children are also socially dislocated, and 
experiencing significant discrimination and stigmatisation. The result is the creation of a 
small but significant section of society profoundly disadvantaged and excluded in many 
ways, with possible implications for the future peace and stability of the region. The 
following chapter addresses the rift developing in communities between those who were 
formerly internally displaced and those who have returned from abduction.  
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CHAPTER 6: RIFT AND CONCILIATION 
 
6.1 A deep rift 
 
A deep and troubling rift is developing in the communities visited during this research, with a 
clear division emerging between formerly abducted people and those who were not abducted. 
Both formerly abducted women and former Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) spoke of the 
“division between returnees and camps.”206 There is increasing evidence of this appearing in 
more recent empirical work in northern Uganda. The Advisory Consortium on Conflict 
Sensitivity (ACCS) consulted representatives from local government, civil society, and 
cultural and religious institutions in eight sub-regions in northern Uganda; they reported that 
respondents  
 
emphasised the deeply held sense of injustice amongst their communities due to a lack of 
reconciliation and reparation efforts following the devastating effects of the wars in the North. 
… They described palpable tensions between “victims and perpetrators living side by side in 
the absence of reparations” that are hampering peace and stability in many communities. 
(2013, 33) 
 
International Alert reported that Acholi confidence in sustained peace and security has 
declined in each of the three annual surveys it has conducted, from 79.2 percent in 2011 to 
68.1 percent in 2013 (IA 2013, 23). The International Centre for Transitional Justice, 
examining the reintegration of women who returned from abduction with children, described 
the complex and concerning ways in which stigmatisation against formerly abducted women 
and their children is creating profound intergenerational exclusion. This is resulting in a new 
generation of young people who have no recognised place in the Acholi clan structure and, 
for some children born in captivity in what is now South Sudan, no Ugandan registration of 
birth or other evidence of citizenship (Ladisch 2015, 16). The report notes that an increasing 
number of children born in captivity are rejected by their stepfathers and maternal family. 
Consequently, they are becoming homeless, living on the streets of regional centres; they “are 
treated as social outcasts whose basic rights are routinely violated” (Ladisch 2015, 18). 
 
The ACCS noted that the demobilisation process in northern Uganda has focused 
predominantly on the provision of formal Amnesty, and that “[l]ittle support has been given 
to facilitate integration following the issuance of certificates of amnesty, leaving victims and 
perpetrators to face each other” (ACCS 2013, 34). Women in this study spoke of a number of 
community-based and NGO initiatives to help communities reconcile. Many women also 
noted that NGO-supported programs concluded some years ago, and that there has been little, 
if any, follow-up with communities; the delicate task of reconciliation has largely been left to 
conflict-affected communities themselves. Nadia explained that her community has reached 
out to religious leaders for support after the conclusion of two NGO-led reintegration 
programs: 
 
Religious leaders have also tried to deliver some of them (reconciliation programs). 
Gusco and World Vision also tried to support them [but] withdrew their 
interventions. They no longer operate in this area.207  
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Women in all the communities visited during this research project spoke of tensions and a 
growing rift between formerly displaced people and those who have returned from abduction. 
One of the legacies of the 20-year conflict is the “tremendous” damage to the social fabric of 
Acholi communities (Burke and Egaru 2011, 3). The economic destruction, alcoholism, 
violence, loss of respect for elders and traditional structures, fracturing of families and 
communities, loss of loved ones, and conflict over productive resources and property have all 
resulted in many communities becoming deeply divided. In several communities visited, 
women spoke of jealousies and distrust, particularly focused around two issues: the lack of 
transparency in the distribution of livestock (and other forms of assistance) after the return 
home, and the perception of favourable treatment in dispute resolution processes, particularly 
around land issues.208 These divisions are all important and require attention; however, the 
particular division between those who were abducted and those who were not is particularly 
concerning. This abducted–displaced division is important not only because it was raised 
time and again during fieldwork in every village visited, but also because it contains a 
qualitative difference – one’s experience of the conflict is at risk of becoming definitional in 
social identity formation, by demarcating “who” someone is and to which group they belong. 
The experience of abduction by, and membership of, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) is 
coming to represent a line of inclusion and exclusion for many communities. There is a risk 
that such identities could become points of mobilisation in the future.  
 
A clear “us” and “them” was embedded in many women’s language as they spoke. When 
asked about her use of “us,” Veronica replied, “Us who returned from the bush. When I say 
‘us,’ I mean ‘us who have returned from the bush’.”209 Similarly, Joyce tried to explain the 
subtle divisions that mark her daily life in the community: 
 
For example, when I am working in my garden and I spend some time working longer 
hours and they are tired, they will say, “Ah, for us people, we are retiring. You people 
are used to such a life, we cannot compete with you.” Honestly! What life are we used 
to?! Even when we are walking together and it reaches some point they will say “Let 
those ones go at that pace.” Which “those ones” I ask myself.210  
 
An ICTJ report reveals a similar use of language, indicating that the experience of abduction 
may be transforming into an identity. In explaining his exclusion from both his paternal and 
maternal clans, a fifteen-year-old boy told the ICTJ:  
 
Some of us know where our fathers come from and yet our paternal relatives do not want us 
and have refused to give us land. Because of my identity as a child from the bush, others also 
look at me as a land grabber. (Ladisch 2015, 18; emphasis added) 
 
In addition to the different identities embedded within language used by respondents, many 
women spoke openly about the rift in their communities. Rose described “conflicts and 
disunity among the community members,”211 while Esther said she wants the community to 
“be counselled because the war caused a rift among the community members. No-one can 
come up with good advice to the other, people are against each other.”212 The issue of the 
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rift was confirmed by both formerly abducted and formerly displaced women in the 
Validation Workshop held in June 2015; Agatha, who was not abducted, said that “it is 
happening there at our place in a bad way.”213 Women from several different villages in 
different districts, both formerly abducted and not abducted, all immediately agreed. 
 
While all women who spoke of this division agreed that it was happening, opinions as to why 
a rift was forming were largely divided depending on whether the interviewed woman was 
abducted or not. Former abductees stated very clearly that the rift is a result of the community 
calling them names, stigmatising them and their children, discriminating against them, and 
treating them “unequally” and “unfairly.” Veronica complained that “we returned, we [are] 
not treated the same way with the rest of the women. ... It’s a big problem. They think we 
have mental problems.”214 Her friend Jacqueline agreed, adding that, when she fights back 
against the name calling or insults,  
 
sometimes they report these cases to the leaders and sometimes they fine us. 
Thereafter of course I keep thinking of how the whole trouble started and I get hurt 
because I am fined, yet I was just provoked to behave the way I did because, what do 
you expect from a person who is discriminated yet it was not our wish that we get 
abducted.215 
 
Edith gave an impassioned speech to explain what she sees as the main causes of this divide: 
 
For me I see that for us who have returned from the bush … The reason they say 
people who have returned from the bush are violent [is] because the people at home 
do not handle us politely. So for us who were abducted as children, who grew up from 
there we should be handled carefully. There are some people who when they drink 
alcohol, they insult and stigmatize you badly. It brings that anger and provokes one to 
talk about “the head from the bush.” So we request the people who remained at home 
to treat us politely and equally so that we live in peace amongst people.216  
 
Women who were not abducted however, were more likely to see former abductees and their 
“bad behaviour” and readiness to anger as the primary cause. Santina, whose son was 
abducted, places the blame for name-calling squarely on the conduct of the returnees. Her 
son, she said, “behaves well” and is accepted by the community, but  
 
[t]he others are called names because of the way they behave with the community 
members. They provoke the community that is why they call them names. Once you 
enter into exchange of words with such a person, they will tell you, “I will show you 
how to live life, what life is if you do not stop ...” Immediately, this person will take a 
panga and threaten or aim it at you saying, “You do not know what we have been 
through, I will show you what I am capable of.”217  
 
Agatha held a similar view, although her words implicitly acknowledged both the trauma that 
some returnees are struggling with, and the provocative nature of some non-abducted 
community members’ actions and words, saying that “there is one problem that I see. When 
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you insult this person, their head flashes back to the experience in the bush.” 218  She 
continued on to explain that many of the returnees have learned “bush ways” of doing things, 
some of which do not sit easily with local Acholi customs. She gave the example of a boy 
standing up while he was eating, rather than sitting. Agatha described a cycle in which the 
community tries to offer instruction or guidance to the returnees, only to be met with an often 
threatening, and sometimes violent, reactions. In response, the community has become 
increasingly fearful of formerly abducted people, and does not trust that they will not 
suddenly become violent:  
 
When they do something wrong and you try to correct them, they become violent. You 
say this is wrong and in response they say, “I will show you my head that I returned 
with from the bush. Do you know how much suffering I went through in the bush?” So 
you become fearful. When they say that, you fear that “head from the bush,” you 
become afraid to discuss or counsel them so that they can correct their wrongs. You 
become fearful. … Handling these people is difficult but we pray that if God can 
change hearts, some mercy … Because handling them is difficult.219 
 
The concern that former abductees and their children are quick to anger and are capable of 
great violence if they are provoked, was widespread across many communities visited. Many 
women expressed an ambivalence in relating their fears about returnees, acknowledging the 
trauma that former abductees have experienced, but maintaining that their behaviour is 
frightening. Josephine explained that 
 
[t]hose girls, when they begin to quarrel, they fight using pangas and deadly weapons 
and when they start, they never want to be stopped. This has continuously been a big 
threat to the local community members. The communities accepted them and treat 
them in a very understanding manner, we understand that it was not their making that 
they behave that way, but the bush has made them what they are today.220 
 
Nadia’s explanation was similar: 
 
Some people still suffer the trauma of having witnessed their relatives killed in their 
presence. Some returnees have developed a mental disorder, when they start to fight, 
they fight to a point of killing the other party. For instance there was a scenario 
where one tied up his friend and got an axe to hit him saying he wanted to show him 
how they trained them to fight from the bush. There are a number of returnees, we 
welcomed them and try to understand them, however, they have a temper and they 
can maim anyone at anytime using any deadly weapon they come across once they 
pick up a quarrel. The children born from the bush also behave in the same way. 
Once they are upset, their parents try to calm them down, but in the process, the other 
party must run and hide from his sight. They say that they are capable of doing 
anything because what they went through in the bush, nobody has ever experienced. 
The community were told to be very patient with them and try to understand them, 
however, their behaviour is sometimes very alarming.221  
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6.1.1 Scarcity of resources, and jealousy 
 
There was some agreement however, that the issue was being inflamed by both alcohol and 
jealousy, with the latter provoked by a lack of transparency in the distribution of limited 
material aid, with each side believing the other was receiving favourable treatment. There 
have been a number of programs which provide material assistance to people living in 
communities affected by the war, including a “reinsertion package” that some formerly 
abducted people received through the Amnesty process. This package, funded by the World 
Bank through the Multi-country Demobilisation and Reintegration Program (MDRP), 
provided basic household items such as pots and blankets, as well as a single cash payment of 
UGX263,000 (USD70) (World Bank 2011, 219; Allen and Schomerus 2006, 11). While not 
all people who received Amnesty also received a reinsertion package, the packages were 
nonetheless “a cause of resentment among people who had not been ‘abducted’ who 
perceived ‘that people are being rewarded for having been with the LRA’” (Allen and 
Schomerus 2006, 11 and 8). The ICTJ reported that this resentment continues today, with 
former IDPs perceiving returnees to be benefiting from their abduction (Ladisch 2015, 23). 
This resentment is likely fuelled by the fact that much of the assistance promised by the 
Government of Uganda to help formerly displaced people return home was not delivered 
(RLP 2012, 23).  
 
The Government of Uganda has also provided some assistance to individual households 
through the Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF), and to communities through the 
Peace, Recovery and Development Program (PRDP). NUSAF has provided material 
assistance, including seeds, tools, and livestock, but has also generated frustration and 
jealousy in communities because “it often gave just one or two animals to a group of people 
with the idea of sharing its offspring” (RLP 2013, 42). While International Alert (2013, 96) 
reported that respondents in its survey of 3,972 people in NUSAF and PRDP areas 
commended both programs, they also noted complaints that both programs “benefit only a 
few people.” Whether through a lack of transparency or explanation about how distribution 
decisions are made, these distributions have exacerbated tensions and jealousies in 
communities in northern Uganda.  
 
Eleanor spent several years in abduction and received a reinsertion package upon receiving 
Amnesty.222 She was grateful for the package, but recognised that the lack of compensation 
for those who suffered in camps was also a problem. She identified it as one factor, among 
many, that complicated her return: 
 
For me, the way I think, it should be given to everybody but those [who] were in the 
frontline should be given more than people who remained at home. Because the 
people who remained at home also went to the IDP camps and suffered. If there is 
reparation, they should see the people who were in the real fight and as well as those 
who suffered at home, because if they give only us it does not look good.223  
 
Mary was unsure about which programs were operating in her community, but she said that 
“some NGOs, I do not remember their names, gave resettlement packages – pangas, hand 
hoes, and seeds” to people returning home from the camps. Mary was critical of the program, 
as it 
                                                
222 The Amnesty Act (2000) Cap. (294) is discussed further in Chapter 8. 
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was not sufficient because only a few people benefitted. Reparations should be given 
to all the members because those who missed were very unhappy, they grumbled and 
developed grudges against those who got. This has brought division among the people 
who received and those who missed.224  
 
She went on to note that some returnees, particularly women who returned with children, 
were given “clothes and food and counselling services” – items and services which she 
thought the whole community needed. 
 
Josephine, from a different district, had observed a similar pattern in her community. She 
explained that 
 
[s]ome NGOs came up with programs to cater for the returnees and their parents, they 
were grouped and support given to them. … This was to ensure that they feel a sense of 
justice by repairing the loss that existed. Of course the community looked at them with 
envy. [They] hold them in contempt, they sarcastically say that the abduction of their 
children has today brought them wealth. This program came to an end.225  
 
While particularly vulnerable groups need to be targeted for specific support to assist in their 
recovery from the conflict and to ensure their access to justice, it is important that service 
providers (whether government or NGO) are conscious of the risks associated with targeted 
programs, including the potential to inflame existing tensions within communities.  
 
6.1.2 An intimate conflict 
 
The rift is further complicated by the intimacy of suffering; these are not merely abstract 
views on the course of the conflict; who suffered more and who is to blame. Several women 
related stories of neighbours, abducted children or unknown others informing the LRA of 
where particular individuals were hiding:  
 
When I was in the bush somebody told the rebels where I was sleeping in the bushes, 
because the people have other places in the bush apart from home … just to go and 
sleep somewhere in the bush in fear of the rebels, but, uh, somebody told the rebels 
where I was sleeping.226 
 
Josephine explained how the enforced intimacy of living alongside someone who led the 
LRA to their homes causes tensions between the two affected families, and impacts on the 
whole society:  
 
Sometimes these abductees were forced to show them where they would find people to 
abduct or where they can get foodstuff to loot. Sometimes, the other members recognise 
them and when death occurs, there is a rift that begins to be created within the two 
families creating a lot of unrest in society.227  
 
 
                                                
224 Interviewed March 19, 2014. 
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226 Interviewed September 24, 2013. 
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She continued, relating how she herself was struggling this issue:  
 
My cousin was abducted and told to bring them [LRA] to where they would find 
people. They came home and got two men, these men were killed in a very brutal 
manner, in front of us and their immediate family, their brains all scattered in the 
compound ... It was a very disturbing experience.228   
 
Even where the suffering is not known to be directly attributable to a returned abductee, 
suspicion abounds and is undermining community members’ trust in one another. Rose 
explained,  
 
[t]he rebels sometimes killed or abducted members from one family and not the 
neighbours. Such families would hold grudges over the neighbour because they 
suspected that those whose children were not touched had collaborated with the 
rebels. Such families do not talk.229  
 
Eleanor and Jacqueline, from Gulu and Pader districts, both spoke of living with their 
respective communities’ suspicion. Eleanor said that, in her village, the parents of other 
children who were abducted, but have not returned, blamed her for their children’s fates: 
 
So me I came back, when I reached there, some other people who lost their children, 
they don’t see with a good heart. … They blame you for the death of their children or 
why they have not returned. That’s very hard. Yeah, because they see you are back 
and their children they are not back, they are not happy.230  
 
Jacqueline spoke of a pervasive belief among community members that the returnees were 
responsible for the killing of other members of her community, and that there was little she 
could do to change that view: 
 
People in the communities have different views, some have this perception that it was 
us, the returnees, who killed the people in this area. So we do not know what we can 
do. Maybe all we can do is to leave it to God and also our parents who have accepted 
us back.231  
 
Although not a longitudinal study, women’s testimony in this project indicated that this rift is 
becoming greater as time goes on, especially as sensitisation programs advising communities 
to welcome returnees home have largely closed.  Jacqueline explained that 
 
[w]hen we had just returned in the homes, the community members were told to treat 
us, give us a very warm reception, to help us get together and live in harmony with 
them and this was by the leaders. But these days there is no leader who bothers about 
it, there is nothing, everybody is quiet, and there is nothing being done about it.232  
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6.1.3 Future conflict risk 
 
While empirical evidence is still emerging, there are also concerning signs of a deep rift 
growing between communities and both formerly displaced individuals, and the children of 
formerly abducted persons. This rift becomes even more concerning when viewed in the 
context of ongoing land conflicts, weak justice mechanisms, weakened traditional leadership, 
low trust in governance and a declining confidence in the stability of peace (Burke and Egaru 
2011; IA 2013, 23; UHRC and UNOHCHR 2011, 51). Ladisch (2015, 23) notes that, in the 
absence of “state acknowledgement about what happened during the conflict and why,” 
communities are developing their own “decontextualised” narratives of the conflict. In this 
narrative, blame for the conflict, and for much of the subsequent harm, is placed on the LRA. 
“Without a broader, more official process to examine and provide historical clarification [of 
the conflict],” anger and resentment is being directed against returned abductees (Ladisch 
2015, 23). The ICTJ study further presents concerning evidence of a new generation (the 
children of abducted women and girls) who are facing profound rejection, and who are 
effectively shut out of society: 
 
The widely held perception that children born of sexual violence lack potential or a future 
stems in large part from the shadow of their father’s identity. For children who do not know 
their fathers, the fathers’ perceived association with rebels will nevertheless loom over them, 
obscuring their possibilities for advancement and integration in the community. Fathers, 
despite their absence, pass on their identity as LRA combatants, but the child does not get any 
potential benefit of clan membership, land access, or belonging that would come with 
knowing his or her father’s full identity. … For many children, not knowing their father leads 
to a situation where they cannot access land and thus are not able to earn an income. As a 
result, they cannot pay their school fees or courses in skills training, leaving them with very 
limited opportunities for the future. (Ladisch 2015, 17) 
 
The ACCS concludes its Northern Ugandan Conflict Analysis with a sobering reminder of 
the precarious nature of the current “peace” in northern Uganda: 
 
Many communities in the North remain trapped in conflict cycles that are supported by 
drivers and fed by grievances, pushing them towards what many respondents believe is an 
inevitable return to overt conflict. As grievances grow and drivers become more entrenched, 
the potential for trigger events already taking place in the North to lead to greater social 
unrest or increasingly organised forms of violence increases. In order to build sustainable 
peace in the North and pave the way for development it is necessary to address the three 
dimensions of the conflicts identified: the drivers, the legacies, and the grievances. (2013, 53) 
 
6.2 Desire for reconciliation 
 
While the rift is possibly deepening, there is also a strong desire for reconciliation among all 
women that we spoke with, whether formerly abducted or displaced. Women agreed, in 
principle at least, that a person is not responsible for being abducted, and should be forgiven 
and accepted back into the community. Women spoke of a strong desire to live together in 
harmony, and to heal both individually and collectively from the war. Women recognised that 
everyone had suffered during the war; several formerly abducted individuals acknowledged 
that life in the camps also entailed suffering, and that people who had spent years in the 
camps also needed help to recover, and to be given the opportunity to speak publicly of their 
experiences. Juliet, when asked if the views of people who lived in the camps were important 
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for reconciliation, replied, “Yes, they can also come up to say something and share their 
experiences of the war.”233 Edith was more explicit: 
 
For me I see that, if there is support, then mercy should be upon people who returned 
from the bush to receive it. Likewise, the people who lived in the camps – because 
they were many and went through various hardships. Nearly everybody suffered 
equally, whether you were in the bush or not because taking refuge in the bushes, 
killings from home were all the same. So people should be supported in any way that 
they can be.234 
 
Similarly, most women who were not abducted understood that being abducted was an 
injustice, and not a situation which was chosen by the abductees. Abductions in Acholiland 
were so widespread that few families were untouched by it, and many women understand that 
the returnees could be their own children; as Simone eloquently expressed, 
 
[t]he people who were abducted did not go to the bush at their will. So when they 
return or yours did not return, why look at it negatively? You should look at it 
positively because he/she is like your own child.235  
 
Pauline, whose son was abducted and has not yet returned, acknowledged that the abductees 
may have some basis for feeling unfairly discriminated against: 
 
I know of only one child who was abducted in 1993 and returned in 2004. When he 
returned he stayed in Gulu reception centre. We performed some rituals to welcome 
him back in the community. The relationship between the child and the local 
community is not good, the community discriminates him, he cannot easily socialise 
with the community, but this is also influenced by the fact that he is a quiet boy who 
keeps to himself.236 
 
No family has been untouched by the conflict, and the myriad ways in which they have been 
affected makes the post-conflict healing process more complex. However, the fact that most 
families have experiences of prolonged encampment, loss of loved ones in rebel attacks, and 
the abduction (and sometimes, return) of children, also provides a basis for building mutual 
understanding of the conflict, and the suffering of all parties involved. Despite this, this 
research project found very little sustained reconciliation work being done in Acholiland. 
While there are some NGOs and community groups doing excellent reconciliation and 
mediation work, this work remains ad hoc and small scale. Where reconciliation and 
mediation work is being done, however, it is proving to be effective. The following section 
will profile examples of reconciliation work being conducted in Acholiland by three different 
parties:  a community member trained by an International Non-Governmental Organisation 
(INGO); a collaboration between the Justice and Reconciliation Project and Women’s 
Advocacy Network; and Radio Mega.  
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6.2.1 INGO reconciliation 
 
Joyce participated in a mediation and reconciliation training program run by CARE, and said 
that it has benefited both her personally, and the community as a whole: 
 
From my experience with the other women facing problems, when they come to me 
and tell me their problems, I see my situation is not so very bad. It has had a positive 
impact in my life, this sharing.237 
 
When asked to describe the reconciliation processes that CARE facilitated, Joyce explained: 
 
In the meetings, village meetings, a former abductee or a former camp member would 
tell their story, then they would pick up from there and start to teach, send these 
messages of non-discrimination. They would tell them “these people also went 
through very difficult times as you have heard. Let’s not treat them this way, let’s not 
discriminate against them, let’s not call them names. You’ve just heard what they 
said, let’s not back-bite them.”238  
 
Having spent several years in abduction, only to return during the peak of encampment, 
Joyce has had experience of both situations. She said that, when she first returned, she 
experienced considerable discrimination and name-calling, but the reconciliation workshops 
helped those who were not abducted to understand what she had been through:  
 
I shared my experience in those community meetings. After telling my story they 
would ask the community, “Have you heard what Joyce is going through?” Some of 
the community members would feel very concerned and would immediately condemn 
the act, the calling of names and all this.239 
 
Joyce said that the opportunity to talk about her experiences, as well as seeing the 
community’s empathic response, “felt good. I felt there was a chance of me living like any 
other woman in the society without being discriminated against.” She and her community 
have now returned to their homes, and she continues to act as a mediator for the community 
when disputes arise. She added, however, that while the workshops had been very helpful, 
discrimination continues, and her sense of belonging and of being accepted remains marginal. 
 
6.2.2 Women’s Advocacy Network and Justice and Reconciliation Project 
 
Julia and Suzanne240 both spoke about their work with the Women’s Advocacy Network 
(WAN), an umbrella organisation of women’s groups whose goal is “[t]o seek reintegration, 
reconciliation, and justice for war-affected women” (WAN, n.d.). WAN runs a broad range 
of programs to assist returnee women in reintegrating back into their home communities, 
including reconciliation activities, conflict mediation, community education, economic 
development, and larger scale political advocacy for women’s experiences to be addressed 
within Uganda’s transitional justice framework.  
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Some women in WAN have received training in mediation skills and Julia explained that 
members of the network can invite a mediator in to help them if they are experiencing intra-
familial conflict, or conflict with clans and/or community members. She gave the example of 
a recent conflict that she had helped mediate, in which a young woman had returned from 
abduction but was being rejected by her family: “[her] father says his daughter has been 
through so much violence, she has become very violent, she has become a thief. So he cannot 
take her back to mix with his other children.” Julia then described the process of mediation; 
she and a small delegation, comprising “a legal officer who helps us, a policeman and also 
one of the clan elders,” travelled to the village and spoke with the returnee and her father. 
Julia said that the mediation “took us a lot of time because her father, at a certain point, even 
said the girl is not his daughter.” She and her team then invited other members of the 
community into the process: “[W]e called his brothers, relatives, and everybody in that area 
and they all said this was his daughter.” The community then advised him that “the best he 
can do is to try and forgive, try and reconsider his thoughts and each, him and the daughter, 
should forgive each other.” Julia explained that the process took a number of visits, and that, 
while she was uncertain about whether the father and daughter had forgiven each other “from 
deep down in [their] heart[s],” the mediation succeeded in allowing for a situation where, 
“before everyone else, [the daughter] said she had forgiven her brothers, she had forgiven 
her dad, she had forgiven everybody in the community who were mistreating her.” The father 
also made a show of public forgiveness and acceptance of his daughter.  
 
Julia explained that the involvement of the community was important as a way of binding the 
parties to their word: “The father of the girl understood that if he does anything to the girl 
then he will be in trouble.”241 The involvement of a legal officer, police officer, and a clan 
elder were also important in ensuring the message about the daughter’s right to live in the 
community, and the family’s obligations towards her, had the necessary authority. The 
daughter later called Julia and reported that her father and brothers had allocated her a piece 
of land to cultivate; WAN will follow up the family’s progress in three months’ time. 
 
In addition to specific conflict mediation, WAN has also had some success with healing and 
reconciliation through its small group work. Julia explained that the groups brought together 
both formerly abducted and formerly displaced women: “[A]s a group, we did not group 
people depending on what they had gone through. When we are sharing these thoughts and 
difficulties everybody is going through, we would do it openly.” She said that the sharing has 
“had a very big impact on ourselves and the community.” Suzanne explained the sense of 
reconciliation and healing that occurred through sharing: 
 
The beginning is always hard. Sometimes people are angry or have fought with each 
other. [Then] the original women come and help, also me, I am often there. Slowly 
people tell their stories. That story telling … people start to relax, start to interact. If 
something has really been paining you and you bring it out in the form of a story, it 
comes out a bit. People then start to help each other.242  
 
Suzanne explained that when people started returning from abduction, “people were focused 
on receiving them through reception centres, but no program was in place to cater for 
returnees in the longer term. What’s the effect of all these people returning?” She “fears for 
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the future generation, the bush children are rejected and stigmatised. They may one day rise 
up, especially if their mother dies.”  
 
Suzanne sees the need for ongoing reconciliation work as essential for northern Uganda’s 
future peace and stability. This work, she said, needs to happen “at the local ward level, at 
the village level,” and “women must be involved.” In her experience, whenever women are 
given the opportunity “to make a contribution to [their] community through mediation or 
through drama, then the community sees she brings something.” This realisation has 
gradually helped to raise formerly abducted women’s standings in their communities. 
 
6.2.3 Radio Mega 
 
Another important reconciliation project still running in northern Uganda is Radio Mega. 
Radio Mega broadcasts throughout Acholiland, into Teso and Langi Sub-Regions, and 
throughout South Sudan and eastern DRC, with a principle aim of facilitating peacebuilding. 
Radio Mega played a key role in disseminating information about the Amnesty Act (2000) to 
people still in abduction, encouraging rebels to return. It now focuses more on disseminating 
information to resettled communities, addressing some of the key issues and conflicts 
communities are currently facing. Some of its programs include Dwog cen paco (“Coming 
Back Home”), which addresses the reintegration of returnees; Lok Atyer Kamaleng (“Straight 
Talk”), which addresses sexual and reproductive health issues; and Wang-oo (“Fireplace”), 
which recreates “how the fireplace used to be, in the peaceful days, where important issues 
about society were discussed. This program is played at 8 p.m. every Thursday, and is 
dominated by advice from elders and lawyers on how to deal with land conflicts” (Otim 
2009). 
 
Several women spoke about the importance of Radio Mega, saying that there was a 
noticeable reduction in name-calling from community members following a reconciliation 
broadcast. A group of four formerly abducted women who all returned with children said that 
“sometimes when they are warned over the radio, they [name calling and insults] come down 
a bit.”243 They said that, for a time, the reintegration broadcasts stopped being effective and 
the community continued its name-calling; the sub-county leaders then broadcast a message 
that those caught discriminating against returnees would be sanctioned. One young man was 
arrested and fined, following a complaint from a formerly abducted woman. The women in 
the focus group said that they felt affirmed by the community and the authorities taking 
discrimination seriously. As Olive explained:  
 
At least [it] gives us hope that somebody is there, they are looking forward to our 
safety and [makes us feel] that we are still needed in the communities where we 
returned, because if it was not this, then feelings sometimes come that maybe we 
should return where we are from, but because it is happening this we, we have the 
strength, we have the hope and the courage to still continue living in these 
communities.244  
 
Anecdotally, women living in villages that did not receive broadcasts spoke of more regular 
and more intense violence than those within the broadcast range. Notably, Radio Mega was 
not broadcast in the village in which all women interviewed spoke of the deepest rift between 
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returnees and the rest of the community, pervaded by daily insults and frequent physical 
fights. 
 
Radio Mega is very much grounded in the Acholi community. It is listened to widely and 
avidly, and is seen as an accessible public forum in which “ordinary” people can speak. We 
met several women who had spoken on Radio Mega, including Claire: 
 
I was taken to testify on Radio Mega in Gulu. The purpose was to make the rebels 
who are still in the bush hear and also to notify my parents of my return. When I was 
asked to go on radio, I thought I was going to be taken to jail or killed. But upon 
arrival we were given a warm reception, encouraged and we got relaxed. After 
testifying I felt happy because I saw good houses, I saw the town and its beauty 
having lived most of my childhood life in the bush. The house was all white like I was 
going to heaven. If am asked to testify again, I will happily do so.245 
 
She said that speaking on the radio helped her “[feel] a sense of justice,” and that by 
testifying on the Radio, she “did not only get justice for myself but for others as well.”246 The 
Radio gave Claire an opportunity to participate in demobilisation efforts. 
 
Radio Mega was spoken about by many women across Acholiland as a trusted source of 
entertainment, news, and information, and the programs it runs are assisting communities in 
many ways. It holds great potential for any future reconciliation projects in consideration, and 
for keeping communities informed about national transitional justice developments. 
 
6.3 Conclusion 
 
While the efforts of individuals, NGOs, and civil society organisations towards reconciliation 
are important, it needs to be understood that these parties constitute only one layer of 
reconciliation, and should not detract from efforts to instigate macro-level reconciliation 
programs. Community-based reconciliation efforts address inter-personal and inter-familial 
relationships, but in the absence of formal, national-level reconciliation programs, there is a 
risk that the conflict will increasingly be understood as a “northern problem,” and enable the 
GoU to side-step its role in the conflict, as well as the massive human rights violations that 
were perpetrated by both sides during the war (Hansen 2009, 3). Failure to engage in a 
national process of reconciliation risks omitting the structural and historical “root causes” of 
the conflict, and undermining the stated goal of the draft National Transitional Justice Policy: 
“a peaceful and stable Uganda” (JLOS TJWG 2013, 3–4). 
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CHAPTER 7: JUSTICE 
 
 
Justice helps women to stand firm without any fear in their homes, it also helps to settle the 
matter once and for all.247  
 – Harriet 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
Seeking to identify women’s understandings and experiences of “justice” were core 
objectives of this research. While there were a range of views and experiences of justice, 
there was also significant coherence across the views of women interviewed. Justice is 
universally held as highly important, with a high level of agreement about the objectives and 
constitution of justice. Women also reported similar obstacles and difficulties in accessing 
justice. The war between the Government of Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army 
continued for twenty years and directly affected every individual, family, community, and 
social institution in Acholiland. Consequently, there are multiple and significant justice 
challenges facing the Ugandan government and the Acholi people today and into the future, 
including meeting socio-economic needs essential to a dignified and sustainable life for all; 
effectively responding to disputes (which sometimes erupt into violence, exacerbating the 
already weakened social fabric); ensuring safety and security; and responding to the many 
injustices and mass human rights violations of the past. The justice landscape in Acholiland is 
complex and challenging, requiring sustained, creative and sincere efforts. There are also pre-
existing strengths and examples of effective initiatives to draw upon in this task. 
 
The range of views that women expressed about what would constitute justice for them 
reflects in large part wider debates about “justice.” Justice can be approached from a socio-
economic vantage-point, drawing on ethics, philosophy, and political philosophy as “moral 
fairness,” and leading to concerns about social justice and the fair distribution of resources 
and opportunities (Sen 2009). It can also be approached as a response to a violation or injury, 
leading to concerns about restorative and retributive justice, as well as a subsequent array of 
possible mechanisms aimed at rehabilitating the offender, restoring the victim, and/or 
reinforcing the rule of law (Porter 2012). All of these conceptions of justice were expressed 
by women participating in this study, and all have important contributions to make in efforts 
to rebuild the rule of law, social relations, and the well-being of individuals in northern 
Uganda.  
 
In keeping with the feminist methodology of this study, we have taken women’s statements 
about justice as the starting point for discussing justice in northern Uganda, following the 20-
year conflict with the LRA. The definition of “justice,” therefore, is broad, and includes 
social, psychological, economic, and legal conceptions of justice. 
 
7.2 Importance of justice 
 
Justice is widely accepted as a “public good” – an essential part of stable, secure, and 
prosperous societies (World Bank 2011; Alexander 2003; Cox et al. 2012; Sen 2009). It is 
also acknowledged as important for individual well-being (Laplante and Theidon 2007; 
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Mercy Corps and USAID 2009; Bothmann 2015; Mertus 2000). Women in northern Uganda 
spoke about justice as important for both pragmatic and personal reasons – it has a 
preventative effect on future violence; it builds trust in society and in the legitimacy of 
governance structures (including political, legal, and traditional structures); it facilitates 
personal/individual healing and psychological recovery; and it assists in the restoration of 
relationships.  
 
7.2.1 Protection against violence (future armed conflict and criminal violence) 
 
Effective legal, social, and economic justice systems are critical to recovery after intra-State 
conflict. A World Bank study (2011, 2) into conflict, security, and development noted that 
“90 percent of the last decade’s civil wars occurred in countries that had already had a civil 
war in the last 30 years.” The report further cautioned that even where successive intra-State 
violent conflicts have been avoided, many post-conflict societies face heightened levels of 
violent crime, which adversely affects development and recovery. The report highlighted the 
importance of justice to stability, stating that  
 
[w]hen State institutions do not adequately protect citizens, guard against corruption, or 
provide access to justice; when markets do not provide job opportunities; or when 
communities have lost social cohesion – the likelihood of violent conflict increases. (xi–xii) 
 
Uganda has experienced “22 armed conflicts in as many years” (Dolan 2008, 2), and the 
communities of northern Uganda are currently experiencing heightened levels of criminal 
violence. Many systems are compromised by corruption (Winkler and Sondergaard 2008, 19; 
Nystrand 2014; World Bank 2011, 127);248 unemployment is extraordinarily high (Wielders 
and Amutjojo 2012, 10);249 and social cohesion is weak (Jallow and Englert 2011, 77). 
Restoring justice and legitimacy is essential for Uganda’s future stability and prosperity. 
 
A small but significant number of formerly abducted women expressed the importance of 
justice in helping them adjust to life back in their communities, to feel a sense of belonging, 
and to avoid thinking about re-joining the LRA. As Olive said: 
 
At least it [justice] gives us hope that somebody is there … and that we are still 
needed in the communities. … If not then maybe we should return [to the bush].250  
 
Justice is important both as a good in itself, and as prevention against the risk of future armed 
conflict. Justice is also essential in protecting against violence in society. Most communities 
across Acholiland are experiencing heightened levels of inter-personal and domestic 
violence. Many women saw the heightened violence as an effect of the long years of the war, 
and the breakdown in social structures which would have previously both prevented such 
violence and responded effectively to it when it did occur. Importantly, many women also 
saw that widespread, ongoing impunity for violence was having an enabling effect on yet 
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more violence. Women saw justice as crucial in stopping this ongoing violence, and 
preventing further violence.  
 
Liza explained that people had been exposed to significant violence during the war, “had 
witnessed much death, violence, killings,” and that “this changed their perception, changed 
their thinking.” 251  Violence has become normalised as a response to disagreements, 
interpersonal disputes, distressing emotions, and bad memories. “During the war people 
were exposed to seeing these behaviours and killings. … And killing somebody… death 
begins to look like it is a normal thing, it’s not anything that somebody tries to guard 
against.” Most of this violence, Liza explained, is directed against women: “This affects us 
the women most because the men are killing us so rampantly. This makes us women so 
worried and we live in fear because a small issue can lead to death, we are not so certain 
what will happen next when the man gets drunk.” She described that, 
 
those who kill in the community are jailed for a very short period of time and released 
they return to the very same community, and this encourages the other members in the 
community to also do the same. They say so and so also killed his wife and he has 
been set free. So it encourages them to also do the same.252 
 
This leniency not only fails to deliver justice for the murdered women, but also has the 
important effect of tacitly condoning and further normalising violence in the community.  
 
Justice, as described by Liza, is a crucial part of preventing ongoing violence, and resisting 
the normalisation of violence that has occurred due to the prolonged conflict with the LRA 
and the resultant high level of exposure to violence among the whole community. 
Additionally, ineffective justice responses to violence are eroding people’s trust in both 
formal and traditional systems. Annabel, who lives in a different village to Liza, told of an 
instance in which, having reported a young man who she described as “a serial killer” to the 
authorities who had arrested and released him several times, the community took matters into 
their own hands and killed him. Annabel agreed that this sort of vigilante justice is not 
desirable, but in the absence of effective protection against an individual’s violence, the 
community could see no other option, “so the best is to catch him and kill him, and that was 
resolved by the whole community.”253  
 
The ability of the State and traditional leaders to ensure justice is crucial in building 
community trust in those institutions and in building institutional standing as legitimate 
(Carrabine 2005, 898). There is much higher self-regulated compliance when authorities are 
seen as legitimate rather than simply powerful. Women in this study repeatedly expressed a 
view that there is no authority widely accepted as legitimate in their communities. The 
damage done to the social fabric of Acholi communities during the war has undermined 
women’s trust in both traditional leaders and the State to provide fair and transparent justice 
and leadership. Chris Dolan (2008, 3) described that “[i]n many places the combination of 
past experience and present reality has resulted in a State which has little trust in its citizens 
and a population which has even less faith in its government.” Addressing this trust deficit is 
a key challenge for both the Ugandan State and Acholi traditional leaders if violence is to be 
reduced, a necessary pre-condition for social, economic and political development (Cox et al. 
2012, 7). 
                                                
251 Interviewed June 17, 2014. 
252 Interviewed June 17, 2014. 
253 Interviewed June 18, 2014. 
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7.2.2 Justice for healing 
 
In addition to the pragmatic violence prevention and reduction effects of justice, women also 
talked about justice as having important healing effects, both for individuals and for 
relationships. For some women, such as Martha, an elderly widow and former IDP, justice 
“brings joy and happiness … and restores relationships.”254 Bernadette, who was successful 
in accessing formal justice systems in a land conflict, but who has not yet engaged in any 
justice processes following her husband’s death in a massacre, said that justice is “important 
because it helps relieve pain, bitterness and the sadness we experience in our lives.”255  
 
A group of formerly abducted women talked about feeling a sense of justice when their 
community leaders decided to take action against community members discriminating against 
returnees. Juliet said that this “gives us more hope and a hope to live on, move on every 
day.”256 While Gladys, who participated in Mato Oput upon her return from abduction said 
the experience “has made me believe that my family members still love me.”257  
 
There is strong evidence in academic literature that certain justice processes and mechanisms 
can assist individuals and communities to heal following the violence. Bothmann (2015, 46) 
notes that victim-centred justice processes can promote healing through public 
acknowledgement of the rights of not only the individual(s) participating in justice processes, 
but also of the rights of the peoples affected by the conflict. Julie Mertus (2000) argues that 
justice, broadly conceived, helps survivors reclaim their personhood and status as citizen-
subject within a society. Mertus argues that formal legal mechanisms, while necessary for 
rebuilding the institution of law and trust in social and political institutions, are insufficient 
mechanisms for the realisation of the affective benefits of justice and that less formal and less 
tightly prescribed processes are also needed. Peru’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
identified the importance of delivering justice for survivors in order to repair both individual 
psychological well-being and social relationships necessary for the health of the nation, 
stating that “psychosocial disorder[s] weigh like a serious mortgage on our future” (quoted in 
Laplante and Theidon 2007, 233). Laplante and Theidon (2007, 239) noted that survivors 
who participated in the TRC reported the experience “dissolve[d] feelings of isolation and 
even self blame,” and helped them to realise the abuses were “systematic and not their fault.” 
A 50-year-old woman described the process as healing, “I felt as if I healed a sickness. … I 
talked about my pain in front of the public like a person healed of an illness” (quoted in 
Laplante and Theidon 2007, 240). Although culturally and geographically distant, her words 
resonate with a comment from a survivor of LRA abduction upon the passing of a resolution 
in the Uganda parliament in support of reparations who said, “Today my healing has begun” 
(ICTJ 2014). 
 
Although issues of restoring social order and concerns about restoring interpersonal 
relationships and individual healing tend to be approached by quite separate systems in policy 
making and program delivery, for the women interviewed in this research, the values of 
social order, personal relationships and individual healing were intimately connected parts of 
a single whole.  
 
                                                
254 Interviewed January 30, 2014. 
255 Interviewed March 11, 2014. 
256 Interviewed June 19, 2014. 
257 Interviewed January 23, 2014. 
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7.3 Acholi principles of justice 
 
Women participating in this study reported a broad range of views about “justice”; however, 
two principles concerning the nature of justice were repeated almost universally – firstly, that 
justice is an ongoing process rather than an event, and secondly, that mediation and 
restorative modes of justice aimed at reconciliation and restoration of relationships are 
strongly preferred. Both these principles are evident in Annabel’s words:  
 
I would say the mediators, the local, the people that mediate these cases, the 
community members, are the best as far as resolving these conflicts and any matter 
within the community is concerned. Because for them they would not say the 
Government way of saying that “You are wrong or you are wrong,” no. They will just 
keep giving us lessons, just keep talking and talking and showing us the right thing. 
You know at the end of the day, that person who has wronged me or who is from the 
teachings from the lessons will come and say “I’m so sorry I did this kind of thing” 
and this brings a lot of reconciliation among the parties, among the community 
members. And even if there is maybe a fine or some payments that was made by the 
complainant at the beginning, through good will and through good faith the person 
who is on the wrong side will come up open and say, you know – I am going to refund 
you the money that you paid in to help this dispute. So I think the mediators are the 
best.258  
 
The high degree of agreement on foundational principles for a justice strategy to be seen as 
“just” (and therefore legitimate) among Acholi women provide important points of reference 
in designing any justice strategies to be implemented. The preference for restorative justice 
approaches expressed by participants in this research is supported by many other studies, and 
by the actions of Acholi leaders, particularly in their efforts to bring the conflict to an end 
through dialogue rather than military victory (Otim 2009; OP ICC 2005; Liu Institute for 
Global Issues et al. 2005; Quinn 2009). Acholi religious and cultural leaders campaigned 
consistently for Amnesty, dialogue, and reconciliation to be the official policy for bringing 
the conflict to an end (Liu Institute for Global Issues et al. 2005, 3; Latigo 2008; Otim 
2009).259 
 
An extensive nation-wide consultation with political, religious, public service, and civil 
society leaders found a strong preference for reconciliation to address a number of armed 
conflicts the country has experienced: “The majority of respondents pointed to the fact that a 
military campaign alone will not produce lasting peace. They also asserted that sustainable 
peace is more than the absence of armed conflict and the peace process must involve 
Ugandans from throughout the country” (Hansen 2009, 2). The report noted the social and 
cultural value of forgiveness and reconciliation, especially in the northern districts (Hansen 
2009, 6), but that national, formal reconciliation processes have never been undertaken. 
                                                
258 Interviewed June 18, 2014. 
259  Examples include the formation of the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative in 1997, which was 
instrumental in the legislation of the Amnesty Act (2000); organised several dialogues and rallies for peace; met 
with members of the LRA and the Government of Uganda; and sent a delegation to speak with the international 
community in the US, UK, Canada, and at the UN, to bring pressure to bear on both the LRA and the GoU to 
enter negotiations (Branch 2007; Otim 2009). In March 2005, a delegation of Acholi leaders visited the ICC in 
The Hague to discuss their concerns that ICC prosecutions could work against their traditional justice and 
reconciliation process – see ICC (2015). The Civil Society Organisations for Peace in Northern Uganda 
(CSOPNU) was a coalition of 50 Ugandan and international civil society organisations also calling for both the 
LRA and the GoU to seek an immediate end to hostilities and to engage in dialogue – see CSOPNU (2006). 
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These findings are in keeping with anthropological and other academic studies, which 
emphasise the centrality of forgiveness and the restoration of relationships to Acholi 
conceptions of justice (Liu Institute for Global Issues et al. 2005, 2; Porter 2012; Hovil and 
Lomo 2005; Quinn 2009). A 2007 study, conducted while the Juba peace talks were ongoing, 
reported that people in northern Uganda (including, but not limited to, the Acholi) 
overwhelmingly wanted both accountability and peace. Ninety-five percent of respondents 
wanted a written historical record of the events of the war,260 90 percent believed that peace 
could be achieved through dialogue with the LRA, 86 percent believed the LRA members 
should be pardoned, and 70 percent reported that they would be comfortable living with 
former LRA cadres in their communities (this figure was higher in Acholi regions) (Pham et 
al. 2007, 4–6). The same survey reported some ambivalence, however; 41 percent of 
respondents supported punishment and prosecution of LRA leaders, and 55 percent supported 
prosecution of UPDF members (Pham et al. 2007, 5).  
 
While such findings may initially seem contradictory, it is important to understand that 
Acholi processes of forgiveness, reconciliation, and restorative justice are multi-stage, 
comprehensive processes. As Annabel explained, for reconciliation and restoration, the 
parties must “keep talking and talking.”261 Anyeko and others (2012) reported that Acholi 
processes of achieving reconciliation involved multiple phases, and sometimes took several 
years before reconciliation was reached; only then can they be marked ceremonially. The 
process begins with forgiveness, which is seen as an expression by the wronged person or 
persons as a willingness to engage in dialogue. Mediators then facilitate a process of truth 
telling, during which the perpetrator(s) sincerely acknowledge their wrong-doing and 
apologise for their actions (and the consequences of those actions). The parties then agree to 
a means of compensation, which Anyeko et al. (2012, 117) reported could be symbolic, in the 
specific case of the LRA conflict due to widespread severe poverty. Finally, they would 
engage in a shared ceremony (often Mato Oput) to mark the reconciliation between the two 
parties.  
 
Many women spoke about the importance of mediation, reconciliation, “restoring 
relationships,” “truth telling,” “seeking forgiveness,” “compensation,” and “apologising” 
as necessary conditions for justice. That restoration and mediation processes of justice are so 
widely held as significant and meaningful by Acholi women is important to consider when 
thinking about transitional justice in Acholiland. It is also important not to idealise or reify 
traditional justice processes. Many women also spoke about the effects of the war on the 
capacity of traditional and local leaders to fairly and effectively lead justice processes. 
Annabel, who preferred mediation and traditional processes of reconciliation, also cautioned 
that “if you find an elder in a village who can clearly maybe settle a matter between two 
people regarding land or family members – this person does not also use the truth … is not 
truthful and all this is really causing so much problem among the people in the society.”262 
She also explained that many of the young people, having grown up in IDP camps, have not 
learned the traditional ways, and have little respect for the elders. This is borne out by other 
studies examining traditional justice systems in Acholiland. The UNDP reported that 
“traditional authority is weakening and the level of trust of people in traditional leaders is 
decreasing,” but that traditional systems remained highly relevant as “the majority of people 
                                                
260 A separate study conducted in 2011 also found over 90 percent support for a truth-telling process. “In 
particular, people want to know why this war happened, who is to be held accountable and what has happened 
to their loved ones who are missing” (Anyeko et al. 2012, 114). 
261 Interviewed June 18, 2014. 
262 Interviewed June 18, 2014. 
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in Acholiland still look to traditional justice mechanisms for various reasons, including the 
higher costs and longer duration of formal processes, and the stronger focus on restoration of 
relationships in traditional mechanisms” (Wielders and Amutjojo 2012, 9). Baines, who 
conducted an extensive study of Acholi traditional justice mechanisms and their potential 
efficacy for responding to the multiple and complex justice needs following the LRA war, 
concluded that while Mato Oput and other traditional processes may not be adequate “in its 
current form … the principles, values and symbolic meaning of Mato Oput were considered 
[by Acholi leaders] essential to rebuilding a devastated Acholiland, and should be carefully 
taken into consideration in the design of any future justice program in that region” (Liu 
Institute for Global Issues et al. 2005, iii). Many women interviewed in this research echoed 
these sentiments, preferring a locally-owned and accessible mediated resolution to conflicts, 
but backed up by enforceable law when such processes failed to deliver fairness, safety, and 
resolution. 
 
7.4 Social and economic justice 
 
The conflict in northern Uganda has caused massive harm to the physical, emotional, social, 
and economic well-being of the people. While accountability measures are critical forms of 
justice, they are insufficient in themselves. Criminal prosecutions, lustration, and even truth-
telling mechanisms will likely have only a limited effect in delivering a sense of justice to the 
women of northern Uganda. Laplante and Theidon propose that justice mechanisms which 
focus on criminal prosecutions and other retributive justice mechanisms may replicate class 
privilege: 
 
[A] preference for retributive justice may follow class lines and is a luxury afforded only to 
victim-survivors without economic hardship. Among the rural poor, demands for justice are 
overwhelmingly expressed in an economic idiom: the struggle to survive results in practical 
considerations such as the need for farm animals, suitable housing, or education for their 
children. (2007, 243) 
 
The Government of Uganda initiated the Peace, Recovery and Development Program263 
(PRDP) in 2007, which aimed to assist with post-conflict reconstruction, and to bring 
northern Uganda up to parity with other regions of Uganda in terms of infrastructure, 
services, education, and economic activity. The PRDP has delivered some important benefits 
to northern Uganda, particularly in terms of increased police services, and rebuilding 
infrastructure such as schools, health centres, roads, water, and sanitation facilities. The 
PRDP has also been criticised for some serious problems, including the embezzlement of 
USD14 million of PRDP funds (Nystrand 2014, 825). Of particular relevance is the very low 
priority accorded to women in the PRDP, prompting the UNDP to launch a project 
specifically aimed at building gender-sensitive policy and budget design capacity within 
several Government of Uganda agencies responsible for the PRDP. The UNDP reported that,  
 
[w]hile the PRDP focusses on areas that are critical to women’s human rights, all its priority 
interventions and expected outcomes accord low priority (if any) to gender and women’s 
concerns. Consequently, women have not benefited equally from the resources that have been 
allocated for the implementation of the PRDP. In fact available statistics on the socio-
economic status of women and men indicate that the gender gaps are widening. (2011b, 1) 
 
                                                
263 The PRDP is discussed in more detail in Chapter 8.  
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When asked about what would help them feel a sense of justice, most women responded with 
measures that would help them re-establish a sustainable economic base for themselves and 
their children, and supports to enable them to attain an acceptable level of physical and 
emotional health. In light of the widespread poverty throughout northern Uganda, a focus on 
criminal justice, to the exclusion of economic and social justice, is unlikely to meaningfully 
satisfy northern Ugandan women’s justice needs. Gender sensitive social and economic 
justice need to be centrally included in Uganda’s transitional justice programs.  
 
7.4.1 Health 
 
The conflict in northern Uganda has caused extensive damage to people’s psychological and 
physical health, with women consistently shown to be suffering worse health than men on 
almost all measures (Accorsi et al. 2005; Nakimuli-Mpungu et al. 2013; Liebling-Kalifani et 
al. 2008). Many women told us of long-term persistent health problems, including injuries 
sustained during the war, injuries sustained during child-birth, trauma, depression, infections 
and illnesses (including HIV/AIDS), and intrusive pain from war-related injuries or from 
prolonged physically demanding work. Pauline described a range of health problems 
common in her community:  
 
Women suffer from HIV/AIDS, [high blood] pressure, diabetes, TB, joint pain, STDs, 
skin irritations that I believe were as a result of the foods we were being fed on 
because the posho we fed on was very substandard and had maggots.264  
 
Nine years after her return from abduction, Grace continues to suffer from lower back pain 
after giving birth while in the bush. She explained that “when I gave birth to my child, I was 
very young and had complications … my lower backbone got disfigured, so I feel a lot of 
pain.”265 Nighty described how she “was made a sex slave, so many rebels abused me 
sexually during my entire stay of two months. When I returned, I was taken for medical check 
and unfortunately, I tested HIV positive and now am on Septrin drugs.”266  
 
These findings are consistent with numerous studies into the health needs of northern 
Ugandan women. Kinyanda et al. (2010, 28) reported that, of 813 women screened in two 
IDP camps, almost one-third had experienced at least one incident of sexual violence; of 
those, almost three quarters had “at least one gynaecological complaint” (72.4 percent) and at 
least one surgical complaint (75.6 percent), while 69.4 percent had “significant psychological 
distress scores.” The authors concluded that sexual violence was extensive, and that there is 
“a strong association between war related sexual violence and the later development of 
specific gynaecological complaints” (Kinyanda et al. 2010, 34). Similarly, Liebling-Kalifani 
et al. (2008, 178) documented extensive health problems facing women affected by the war 
in Kitgum, Gulu, and Teso, including a high prevalence of gynaecological injuries from 
sexual violence.  
 
Women’s health problems, however, are not limited only to those resulting from sexual 
violence. Liebling-Kalifani and colleagues also found that women had a higher incidence of 
PTSD and depression than men, and were two-and-a-half times more likely than men to 
                                                
264 Interviewed January 22, 2014. 
265 Interviewed June 19, 2014. 
266 Interviewed February 13, 2014. 
 
 
 104 
present with direct war-related injuries and disabilities. The authors reported the registration 
statistics of patients at Gulu Rehabilitation Unit in 1996: 
 
By 1996 the Gulu Rehabilitation Unit had registered a total of 628 children, 386 women and 
147 men as disabled by bullets, landmines, brutal attacks with machetes, burning and other 
forms of cruelty (Isis- WICCE, 2001b). Recurrent back pain was the most common complaint 
especially amongst women and was thought to be due to the strenuous activities they engage 
in. Other injuries included soft tissue injuries, neglected fractures, arthritis and osteomyelitis. 
Of the general surgical conditions, hernias were most common, as well as tumours and 
cancers and intestinal obstruction. (2008, 181–82) 
 
A study of admissions at Lacor Hospital (five kilometres from Gulu town centre) between 
1992 and 2002 showed that 79.8 percent of admissions were women and children. Carla 
described how both she and her sister sustained permanent impairments as a result of the war: 
 
My elder sister was shot in the head and she also lost her foot. She lost her 
concentration ability and is very short tempered and traumatised. My leg was cut with 
a panga and it is still swollen to date, I have to tie a rope around it because one of the 
veins was fractured. I cannot move for a very long distance because it pains to a point 
that I get bed ridden. I am partially disabled.267  
 
In addition to managing their own illnesses and injuries, women have also taken on an 
increased care burden for others. Florence, a 60-year-old widow, has taken on the care of her 
orphaned grandchildren, one of whom “is paralysed and I have no means of taking him to the 
hospital.”268 Sonia is now caring for her husband, who “became disabled as a result of the 
war.”269 The high level of illness and injury, coupled with the lack of social and health 
infrastructure, is having a compounding effect on women in northern Uganda. 
 
Having access to healthcare is critically important, particularly in a context in which 
livelihoods overwhelmingly require physical work, there is no public social security system, 
and social networks (which once would have provided care for the sick and disabled) are so 
profoundly damaged. Nighty, who was infected with HIV during a series of sexual assaults 
during her abduction, and whose husband was killed during the war, is very worried about 
her children’s future, and especially who will care for them when she is no longer alive. She 
explained the inter-linked importance of physical and mental health and education: 
 
I cannot heal from HIV/AIDS but if my children can have a good education, that is my 
only wish therefore if there is a way, my children should be given a bright future by 
ensuring that they study since my health deteriorates every day.270  
 
Nighty’s determination that her children receive an education compels her to continue 
working long hours in her garden to produce enough food, not only for the six of them to eat, 
but to produce a surplus for sale to enable her to pay school fees. Nighty explained that she is 
“weak,” has “chest pains,” and that her “health has deteriorated”; she further said that if 
she did not have to pay school fees, “then my rate of digging will also come down and I shall 
also live longer.”271  
                                                
267 Interviewed February 12, 2014. 
268 Interviewed January 22, 2014. 
269 Interviewed March 13, 2014. 
270 Interviewed February 13, 2014. 
271 Interviewed February 13, 2014. 
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Poor health and poverty have a mutually reinforcing effect on one another. Poor health limits 
women’s ability to work and earn an income, which in turn increases her vulnerability to 
poverty related illnesses, and reduces her ability to access health care: 
 
My head was affected badly, I can not carry any load on my head, my eye-sight is so 
poor, I cannot carry fire wood nor water on my head, I have to just lift using my 
hands in small amounts which makes life very difficult. I can not dig for a long 
time.272  
 
Many women participating in this study said that access to medical and psychosocial health 
services would greatly assist them to feel a sense of justice and to heal, quite literally, from 
the war. Esther, like Nighty, saw health as central to economic and social recovery: 
 
Justice is having good health. When one is healthy, they can cultivate and have plenty 
of food and sources of income to support the children.273  
 
Most women, particularly those not in a regional centre, reported being unable to access 
necessary medical services. The barriers to accessing health services are multiple. Not least is 
that the “health service infrastructure in northern Uganda remains thoroughly inadequate” 
(ACCS 2013, 42) for both physical and mental health needs (Nakimuli-Mpungu et al. 2013, 
2). There are simply not enough health services in northern Uganda to respond to the needs of 
the population. Uganda’s health services nationally are among the world’s worst. The World 
Health Organisation in 2009 ranked Uganda at 186 out of 191 countries (Kelly 2009). In its 
2012/13 annual report on performance, Uganda’s Ministry of Health (2013) recorded 
improvements in a number of fields, including TB detection and treatment of HIV/AIDS. It 
also reported, however, that a lack of skilled health workers was constraining the health 
sector’s ability to reach set targets, and that government spending on health has declined from 
9.6 percent of GDP in 2009/10, to 7.4 percent in 2012/13 (MoH 2013, xiv).  
 
Declining health spending notwithstanding, the percentage of the population living within 
five kilometres of a health centre increased from 49 percent in 2000 to 72 percent in 2005, 
and remained at that level in 2010 (MoH 2010, 16). In 2006, the UNOCHA reported that less 
than 30 percent of the population of northern Uganda lived within five kilometres of a health 
centre (UNOCHA 2006, 10). More recent figures for northern Uganda were not available; 
however, the available figures imply support for many women’s assertion that health services 
are simply not available to them, and that the distances required to travel to a health centre 
are prohibitive for most, particularly in light of the poverty in which most women participants 
in this research are living. 
 
Valerie spoke about her mother’s physical illnesses and her own post-traumatic responses, 
both of which go untreated because  
 
we don’t have a nearby health facility. I get nightmares, every time I see people in 
army uniforms, I get very nervous and restless, I lose self-control. … The only 
hospital that one can get medical attention from is very far away, takes one, two days 
to reach on foot.274  
                                                
272 Interviewed January 31, 2014. 
273 Interviewed March 19, 2014. 
274 Interviewed January 23, 2014. 
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Often, women told us that the only health service they could access was a village-level health 
centre (an HC1), which is rarely staffed with qualified medical personnel, and can offer only 
limited advice. Baingana and Mangen (2011, 293) describe an HC1 as “the first point of 
contact for patients ... There is frequently no physical infrastructure, but relies on outreach 
activities held under a tree, or in a community building.” Services are usually provided by 
community volunteers, many of whom have not had training for the role; a 2013 audit 
reported that only 55 percent of villages had a trained village health team (MoH 2013, 25). 
Women wanting slightly better health services must travel to a village that has an HCII (a 
small out-patient health centre), or to the sub-county or a regional centre for higher quality, 
in-patient care needs (Baingana and Mangen 2011).  
 
Many women complained that the health services available to them locally were ineffective, 
both in terms of the knowledge of the staff and the quality of medicine available. 
Furthermore, it was difficult to travel to better health services further away. As Evelyn 
explained: 
 
I have never received any substantive medical treatment, I have tried but I never get 
any improvement. The nearest health centre in this area is Geregere which is about 
four miles from here, then Patongo is six miles and the one in Omot is further. The 
drugs I am given in these health centres never improve my situation, I see no change. 
Sometimes I think that I probably never got any good medical attention or the drugs I 
took were expired.275 
 
Bicentina’s village has an HCII, but she said she is reluctant to attend there:  
 
We have Latanya Health Centre II. If one has a serious sickness, one does not have to 
go to Latanya but to Kitgum where there are highly qualified staffs. The health 
workers in Latanya are very unfriendly and hostile, only the in-charge works well 
with the community but the rest of the workers don’t help.276  
 
The Ministry of Health Annual Performance Review in 2013 reported significant failings in 
meeting its own set targets for service delivery and staffing of parish and sub-county level 
health centres. In addition to HCIIIs and IVs operating with only 58 percent of required staff, 
the absentee rate had increased from 46 percent in 2011 to 48 percent in 2013 (MoH 2013, 
25–26). The overall poor quality of health care available at village and parish level health 
centres was a common complaint, and is summed up by Hannah, who roundly condemned 
her local health centre: 
 
There are no services offered, the best they do is to make referrals to other health 
centres. The health centres lack equipment, they need to be restocked with drugs and 
equipment. The health centre staff should be monitored, they abscond duty. They 
leave work at midday instead of working the whole day. No one attends to patients 
after midday. Even women who are in Labour are not attended to.277  
 
                                                
275 Interviewed January 31, 2014 
276 Interviewed March 20, 2014. 
277 Interviewed March 13, 2014. 
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In addition to the geographical barriers to accessing health centres, several women said that 
they are often required to pay for medication, a cost which few can manage. Louisa, who has 
a chronic illness, explained that when she goes to the hospital,  
 
sometimes the drugs are not there, then they prescribe and ask you to buy at the 
chemist. If the money’s there, you can buy. If it’s not, you go back home. Most of the 
time, people here don’t have money.278  
 
Marlene was also given a prescription for her to meet the cost of filling privately. She could 
not afford it, and so continues to struggle with her ill-health. She has concluded that “[t]here 
is no treatment rendered in government facilities.” 279  The Government of Uganda has 
decreased its funding of health services as a proportion of GDP, and leaves most provision 
for individual households and the non-government sector. In 2010, the Government of 
Uganda financed only 15 percent of the health budget, in comparison to 35 percent from 
donors and 50 percent from private households (MoH 2010, 14). 
 
7.4.2 Mental health 
 
Women also spoke frequently about the lack of counselling and psychosocial assistance 
available, and identified this as an important need in their communities. Women recognised 
the level of trauma in their communities, and the impacts the trauma is having on social 
relationships: 
 
Counsellors are very important, they should be brought in the area because people 
are so traumatised, they will help relieve trauma.280  
 
Some women saw a link between unaddressed trauma and alcohol use, including one woman 
who linked trauma to her own drinking: 
 
I have not accessed any counselling except sometimes I take some alcohol to forget … 
it would be very helpful if counsellors are brought to help people cope with their 
problems.281 
 
Some women had received some counselling and spoke of its positive effects. Claire said, 
“The counselling they [an NGO in Kitgum] give is very helpful especially when one gets hurt 
or worried or traumatised.” 282  Agnes received some counselling upon her return from 
abduction and said that it helped her a lot, but that “I have not accessed enough counselling 
because it needs to be continuous. I feel these services are important in providing justice to 
women.”283 A number of small-scale counselling and psychotherapeutic treatment programs 
have been introduced in northern Uganda, and are yielding positive results. A 2010 
evaluation of the EMPOWER program reported a halving of both depressive and anxiety 
symptoms among people participating in the program (Sonderegger et al. 2011, 244). 
Nakimuli-Mpungu et al. (2013) reported similar improvements in people accessing five 
psycho-trauma centres established at district hospitals in five northern districts. 
                                                
278 Interviewed June 25, 2014. 
279 Interviewed March 20, 2014. 
280 Interviewed February 13, 2014. 
281 Interviewed March 11, 2014. 
282 Interviewed March 20, 2014. 
283 Interviewed February 12, 2014. 
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One key informant284 highlighted the need for counselling and psychosocial support services 
for all people of northern Uganda, but especially for women survivors of sexual violence. She 
reported that the ICD had been involved in lobbying the Government of Uganda for long-
term funding for psychosocial services, particularly for prospective witnesses, but also more 
broadly. She was critical of the current approach, which left counselling and therapeutic 
interventions to the NGO sector, as this resulted in a lack of continuity of service provision 
following donor priorities and funding cycles. Additionally, NGO provision tended to 
repeatedly target particular individuals and groups, rather than offer services to the whole 
population as a matter of right. Two key informants wanted to see a greater role for the 
Ministry of Gender in the provision of psychosocial support to ensure that women’s needs 
were maintained as a priority area and not lost in the many rebuilding tasks facing district and 
other local levels of government in the north.285  
 
In addition to the importance of improved mental health and functioning for the individuals 
affected, the UN Peace Building Fund identified the “drastic increase in mental illness” in 
Acholiland as a potential driver of future conflict (Wielders and Amutjojo 2012, 10). The 
study links poor mental health with “a decrease in trust, social cohesion and community 
resilience,” and notes that “the health system lacks the capacity to offer adequate 
psychosocial care” (Wielders and Amutjojo 2012, 10). Laplante and Theidon (2007) make 
similar observations about the implications of war-related trauma, depression, anxiety, and 
other mental health problems on the social bonds, and trust in governance and public 
institutions, necessary for building a stable and just society after mass conflict. They note 
that, given the logistical and legal difficulty of delivering individualised criminal justice for 
all survivors, the State provision of mental health services for survivors has a double positive 
impact in that it both assists individuals in recovery and detraumatisation, and represents an 
“important symbolic value by signalling the state’s assumption of responsibility for past 
wrongs and in acknowledging victims’ suffering” (Laplante and Theidon 2007, 245). 
 
As outlined above in Chapters 4 and 5, women in northern Uganda are continuing to suffer a 
range of serious mental health issues, ranging from grief, depression, and anxiety through to 
acute post-traumatic symptoms, including flashbacks and overwhelming sensory 
hallucinations. The poor mental health status of many Acholi women is seriously affecting 
their quality of life, impairing their ability to engage in social, political, and economic 
activities which are essential for the comprehensive improvement of their economic and 
social situations, and is impairing their ability to ensure a better future for their children. 
Counselling and other psychotherapeutic pilot programs have demonstrated that appropriately 
tailored mental health services are effective in reducing trauma, depression, and anxiety 
among the war affected population of northern Uganda. 
 
Women very clearly told this research project that getting access to effective physical and 
mental health care is a key element of justice. Access to healthcare will improve women’s 
health, reduce the pain and trauma with which many are living, reduce their care burden 
(caring for husbands, children, and other relatives in poor health), improve their productivity, 
and enable them to better support their children’s education. Improved health care now will 
have long-term and intergenerational benefits for entire communities. The Government of 
Uganda currently leaves most health care funding to the private and not-for-profit sector; a 
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significant and long-term commitment to raising the standard of health care across Uganda is 
urgently needed.  
 
7.4.3 Education for children 
 
While women reported a diversity of views about what sorts of things would help them feel a 
sense of justice, and help them to move on after the war, there was one answer that was 
consistent across every interview – enabling their children to receive an education that was 
not disrupted due to difficulty paying school fees. Women universally volunteered this as the 
single most important factor to help them in their recovery from the war, with many further 
explaining that seeing their children complete their schooling would give them confidence 
that their children would have a better life than they had had, and would ensure a better future 
for their communities. 
 
Although Uganda has a high rate of primary school enrolment (90 percent), it also has the 
second highest primary school dropout rate in Sub-Saharan Africa, with 68 percent of 
students dropping out before completing seven years of primary school education (Mwesigwa 
2015; UNESCO 2012). Women interviewed in this research expressed a strong desire to send 
their children to school, but all said they are struggling to pay school fees, and that their 
children are routinely sent home from school due to non-payment. Uganda has a nationally 
funded program of Universal Primary Education (UPE), which claims to make primary 
education free for all Ugandan children. However, “the term free primary education as 
defined in Uganda’s UPE policy is misleading … It is legal for schools to charge parents for 
uniforms, exams, tutoring, food, sports and other activities” (Lincove 2012, 803). A 2012 
study into primary education in Uganda concluded that “nearly 80 percent of families 
contribute to the costs of primary education,” and calculated the mean cost per annum at 
USD16.74 for boys and USD18.26 for girls (Lincove 2012, 803–804). These costs are 
unattainable for many northern Ugandan households, where 44 percent of people live on less 
than one US dollar per day (GoU 2014, 11). Women in this research overwhelmingly cited an 
inability to pay fees as the reason for their children not being in school. 
 
Eliza returned repeatedly during her interview to the issue of educating her children. She had 
successfully kept two children in school to the end of primary school, but did not have 
enough money to pay for their exams to enable graduation: 
 
Now as I speak, I have two children in primary seven – they are candidates – they 
have to sit to go to the next level. I have to struggle, I don’t know, I don’t know what I 
can do. At school they want me to pay – 36,000 (USD10) for each one of them – I 
don’t have this money. I don’t know. I don’t know where to start at all. I really really 
want to struggle so hard. I think so much about these children. I want them, at least 
one of them should be able to go to the next level. I am struggling with these children, 
the school fees.286  
 
Most women interviewed were struggling to keep their children in school at much younger 
ages. The consequences of a disrupted education can embed poverty trans-generationally, 
with particular effects for girls, as Faith explained. Faith has four children, and is only able to 
send one of them to school because of an inability to pay school fees. Faith was widowed 
during the war and has since been forced off her land, contributing to her poverty. She 
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explained that she feels “trapped in so many difficulties, especially when it comes to the 
children. I have not been able to look after them and pay their school fees as I should be 
doing as a parent.”287 She was particularly sad about the intergenerational effects of her 
children’s missed education. Regarding her daughter, she explained that 
 
when she reached P.6 [primary grade six], she had to drop out and now she also has 
produced children and now she is also there with me in the home, I have to take care 
of her and the children. 
 
Caring for her daughter’s children has added to her financial burden and affected Faith’s 
ability to pay for her youngest child to go to school: 
 
[T]he little one who is supposed to be in P4 is also not going to school. [He] helps me  
… he can do casual labour so we can get some little money to be able to cope up with 
the daily demands in the house. This hurts me a lot, it hurts me a lot that sometimes I 
do not even sleep in the night because I keep thinking about them. It comes with a lot 
of pain.288 
 
When the Ugandan government introduced UPE in 1997, it attached subsidies to girls’ 
primary school enrolment rates. The policy was successful in achieving near gender parity in 
primary school enrolments (90 percent for girls and 91 percent for boys) (Lincove 2012, 
802). The level of poverty in northern Uganda and the costs of sending a child to school 
mean that parents are having to make difficult decisions about which child(ren) to educate, 
and for how long. When asked about how they make these difficult decisions, no women 
expressed any preference for their sons to be educated ahead of their daughters. More 
commonly, the male head of the household would make this decision and children born in 
captivity routinely missed out, whether a boy or a girl (Annan and Brier 2010, 157). Widows 
also reported particular difficulties in paying school fees, a difficulty closely linked to their 
disadvantage in accessing land and other productive resources, and women caring for orphans 
are facing increased costs for feeding, housing, and clothing additional children.  
 
Joyce explained that she has one child born in captivity and a further four children with her 
husband, who she married after returning home. The four younger children are all in school, 
but her husband refuses to pay school fees for her first born son. “If I had the capacity I 
would have sent him, but I can’t. … [My husband] is the one who decides.”289 Although her 
children were born after returning from abduction, Eliza faces a similar problem in her lack 
of decision-making power over household expenditure:  
 
I’m really struggling so hard to see that my children have a bright future but as I, the 
way I look at it, the look of things, I seem to be defeated now. I’m getting defeated. … 
Last year was the time when I [had] my baby and I had a caesarean birth and I could 
not work so much in my garden and this year we have this problem coming in, the 
problem of school fees. When I tried to talk to my husband that one of these goats be 
sold to pay for these children’s school fees and the balance I also see how to help 
with to meet our daily needs in the home. He refused, that I should not do it.290  
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Harriet is now 72-years-old, and the war has left her widowed and with several orphans to 
care for. She explained that, during the war, she, like all people in Acholiland, lost all her 
livestock. Since returning from the IDP camp, however, she has been “disinherited” of her 
land and is now “faced with poverty and … orphans to take care of.”291 Josephine is also 
caring for orphans and was damning about the failings of Uganda’s UPE policy, which she 
accused of placing additional burdens on women: 
 
There should be free education to all the children, UPE has failed to help the local 
community. There should also be adult literacy for the ladies who were abducted and 
they want to go back to school. Women are the people who suffered the most and the 
care burden still falls squarely on them, on top of looking after their own children, 
they have to take care of orphans.292  
 
Uganda has made significant progress in making primary education widely available, but 
more remains to be done. While Uganda’s spending on education is comparable to many 
OECD nations (Ugandan households and government combined spend 7 percent of GDP on 
education, compared to an average of 6 percent in most OECD countries), corruption and 
inadequate accountability within the system compromises its effectiveness (Winkler and 
Sondergaard 2008, 4). A World Bank study in 2008 into efficiencies in the Ugandan 
education system found unacceptable “leakage of resources between the central government 
and the school through ghost teachers [and] misuse of UPE grants to district governments” 
(Winkler and Sondergaard 2008, 5), and that “over three-quarters of teachers are not in class 
teaching when unannounced school visits are conducted” (Winkler and Sondergaard 2008, 6). 
Furthermore, the practice of permitting schools to charge additional fees to parents, and 
denying education to those unable to pay, is undermining the government objective of 
attaining universal primary education, and has a disproportionate impact on Acholi women 
living in poverty, and their children. Women in northern Uganda are trying hard to provide 
for their children, and see the guarantee of an undisrupted education for their children as a 
cornerstone of justice following the devastation of the war. One key informant 293 made the 
important observation that, when children are educated, it not only benefits that child, but the 
whole community, as they reinvest their knowledge and skills back in to the community.  
 
7.5 Dispute resolution and responding to violence  
 
Women reported that mediation in response to a range of conflicts is common and often 
desired, depending on the type of conflict and the relationship between the parties to the 
conflict. There are multiple actors involved in conflict resolution in Acholiland: traditional 
leaders (family heads, clan leaders, clan chiefs, and clan courts), Local Councillors (levels I, 
II and III),294 local specialist mediation teams (usually members of the community who have 
received training from NGOs in mediation), the police, and courts. Establishing which body 
is either the culturally or legally correct authority to mediate a dispute is not possible due to 
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multiple over-lapping, sometimes complementary, sometimes contradictory, functions and 
jurisdictions (Burke and Egaru 2011, 8). There is also a wide variation in different women’s 
preferences based not insignificantly on the competence, or perceived competence, of the 
individuals holding particular positions in different communities (UNPB 2013, 16; Porter 
2012, 88). The following sub-sections report on some of the strengths and barriers that 
women reported in both traditional and formal justice mechanisms. 
 
7.5.1 Traditional justice 
 
As stated earlier, women in this study expressed a strong (but not unanimous or exclusive) 
preference for traditional and mediation-based responses to conflicts and disputes. This was 
particularly so in relation to domestic violence, but much less so in relation to land. This is in 
keeping with other reports addressing conflict resolution in northern Uganda. International 
Alert reported that 71 percent of the 3,972 people surveyed preferred mediation as a response 
to SGBV, with clan leaders identified as the most appropriate authority to handle the case (IA 
2013, 48). Qualitative data in the same report explained that respondents largely thought that 
domestic violence should be dealt with by the clan, and that police should be called when the 
SGBV involved either an assault by a community member or child defilement (IA 2013, 50). 
It should also be noted, however, that the average distance between Acholi towns and police 
stations is 33km, a fact which ACCS suggests may significantly account for women’s 
preference for “informal community-based processes” for responding to SGBV (ACCS 2013, 
39).  
 
Several women explained that the “proper” pathways for resolving domestic violence began 
first with the male family head, followed by the clan leaders, and sometimes the LC. Evelyn 
explained that “the case is reported and resolved within the family chaired by the family 
head. If he fails to resolve the matter, it is reported to the clan head then finally to the clan 
chief.”295 If the violence is life-threatening or persistent, it may be reported to the police, as 
Pauline outlined: 
 
The process of achieving justice is in this hierarchy; father in law, brother in law, 
clan leaders, LCs and other people who look into matters of domestic violence. If the 
matter is gross they report to the police, for instance when the man beats you to a 
point of becoming unconscious, or where the man always fights and uses instruments 
that can cause death like pangas, spears, knives.296  
 
Women told us of several strengths of traditional and local dispute resolution mechanisms, 
including that they are accessible (women do not have to walk the long distances required to 
reach a police post or court), fast, culturally appropriate, they aim to restore the relationship, 
and they engage the community (who will then also take a role in monitoring the 
perpetrator’s behaviour). Using traditional mechanisms builds the capacity of those 
mechanisms, and restores community confidence in cultural leaders.  
 
Women overwhelmingly wanted to restore their relationships with husbands or others with 
whom there was a dispute, and to be able to live “in harmony” and “happiness.” Nekolina 
summarised the feelings of many women we interviewed when she said, “Peace is living 
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happily with my husband in my home, living in harmony with the community.”297 Nekolina 
further explained that traditional justice 
 
helps in restoring the relationship between the two parties involved … To me I feel the 
traditional way of settling disputes with local leaders would be a better process to 
acquire justice instead of the modern way of police.298 
 
Traditional mechanisms were also seen in many instances as more effective than “modern 
ways.” Marlene saw traditional justice as “preventive, because it prevents the same problem 
from reoccurring.”299 Camilla explained that clan leaders are present in the community and 
have authority, so that when they “caution the perpetrators, that caution results in some 
relative peace in the home.” 300  Bernadette had witnessed similar improvements in her 
community, stating that “[m]any times after being cautioned and advised there is a change. 
For instance, the men who over drink are advised to change and most cases there are 
changes after such mediations.”301 Esther spoke of the healing power of traditional justice, 
saying that “I felt good because my husband asked for forgiveness afterwards.”302  
 
Although the authority of clan leaders has been weakened by the war, traditional leaders do 
still hold authority. Women reported that where cultural leaders are strong, are perceived as 
having good knowledge of customary laws, and are seen as making fair judgements, their 
advice and rulings can be more effective than formal police or court orders, which are often 
seen as both physically and culturally distant. The effectiveness of some traditional 
institutions is explained by Porter (2012, 88–89) as stemming from the legitimacy ascribed to 
respected leaders: 
 
When the authority is recognized and trusted, parties accept the outcome of such arbitration, 
restoring broken social harmony. However, if an institution has legal, but not moral 
jurisdiction, outcomes of such processes are viewed with suspicion, seen as unfair and usually 
exacerbate existing tensions.  
 
There is a compounding positive effect of traditional leaders making fair judgements and 
being present to enforce them. Esther explained that “when one finds justice, the community 
members gain confidence in the available justice mechanisms hence continue to report 
cases.”303  Rose expressed a similar sentiment when she explained that traditional justice 
mechanisms involve clan leaders and community members, and that the more such 
mechanisms are used, the stronger traditional codes of behaviour and traditional justice 
mechanisms become, as “the community is also reminded of their [traditional codes] 
existence in the gatherings and when settling matters.”304  
 
It is beyond the scope of this project to explore traditional Acholi approaches to conflict and 
domestic violence. It is worth noting, however, that traditional Acholi institutions do have 
mechanisms for responding to domestic violence. The Liu Institute for Global Issues, the 
Gulu District NGO Forum, and Ker Kwaro Acholi (2005) explore traditional mechanisms 
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within Acholi culture for addressing conflict, and identify both processes and positions (the 
Atekere) specifically to address “domestic quarrels” (2005, 111). The existence of such 
mechanisms, particularly when viewed in conjunction with Porter’s (2012) observations 
about the importance of moral as well as legal authority, could hold potential for effectively 
addressing the high levels of domestic violence in many Acholi families and communities.  
 
Utilising traditional mechanisms for dealing with domestic violence and family disputes was 
widely seen by women as the most appropriate course of action. Sometimes, this was because 
(as outlined above) such mechanisms were seen to be “proper,” more effective, and more 
likely to improve harmony. Some women, however, indicated that their preference for 
traditional mechanisms was attributable more to avoiding possible negative consequences for 
breaking with custom. Grace had been persisting with traditional mechanisms for over six 
years when we met her. Her uncle and brother (as her sole surviving male relatives) had not 
recommended that the LC1 or another formal justice institution be involved. Grace explained 
that she “does not have the authority” to report the matter herself, as she “fear[s] that when I 
report the matter and I return back to my house, it will bring a lot of problems to me in this 
home especially as to why I had to report.”305 Several women living with violence similarly 
said that the decision to involve LCs or the police should be made by family or clan leaders, 
not women. 
 
7.5.1.1 Barriers 
 
Bribery and corruption 
 
While most women who seek justice for domestic violence use traditional justice 
mechanisms, and all agreed that they were faster and more accessible than formal 
mechanisms. Most women interviewed also reported serious problems with traditional 
mechanisms; they widely reported that local leaders (both clan and LC I leaders) asked for 
money and would decide in favour of the party that was able to pay (which very often was 
the man). The weaker financial position of women in the household meant that, when a leader 
does ask for money, she had little or no hope of receiving a fair hearing and accessing justice. 
Karena explained that: 
 
The wife is left in a powerless position to defend herself. She can’t get any redress 
from clan leaders because they are always bribed and sometimes they ask for some 
fee to open and hear a case, this is a compulsory requirement in these courts.306  
 
Marlene had had a similar experience. She explained that if a woman reports domestic 
violence to traditional leaders “after hearing the matter, those who come to hear the case ask 
for ‘Ojony pyer’ (sitting allowance). This is paid by the woman whether or not she is at fault. 
One has to sell anything in the house to get this fee.”307 Another woman explained that, 
without money, women have nowhere to go for justice: 
 
You find that whoever has money takes charge. That would be another problem on 
you the same woman. You have nowhere to go. You do not have anything. You don’t 
have money. When they go there [to the clan leaders], they will use money.308  
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Hannah explained that if women find the funds to pay the bribes, it is invariably at the 
expense of children, as such money would have been spent on food, school fees, or other 
necessities. She further added that, in traditional forums,  
 
women are often dominated by the men, they therefore become voiceless and thus 
keep quiet about their problems. To make matters worse, women are always ignored 
when they try to complain of any abuse on them.309  
 
Rugadya (2008, 30), in her review of land conflict in Acholiland, noted the advantages of 
traditional justice mechanisms (they were close, fast, affordable, and responsive), but 
cautioned that “they are prone to some of the same faults as statutory institutions such as 
corruption,” a risk heightened by the lack of documentation, monitoring, and accountability 
mechanisms in traditional justice processes. Burke and Egaru reported that some traditional 
leaders charge a small “sitting fee” for hearing cases (2011, 24).  
 
Given the significant number of women who told this research project that clan leaders ask 
for money from both parties, and that women’s lower capacity to match their husband’s or 
neighbour’s payment effectively put justice beyond their reach, this issue needs further 
investigation. Agatha, who is experiencing a land conflict with her deceased husband’s 
family, explained that “when you go to officials or the leaders, they will always go to the side 
of those who have money. If you don’t have money no one listens to you. This issue is 
terrifying us.”310   
 
Power/patriarchy 
 
Importantly, many women spoke about the power imbalance between men and women as a 
significant obstacle in traditional justice forums. Women complained of “being shut down in 
local courts,” that “many times, men do not take us seriously,” that “women are regarded as 
“mere women,” and that “when they try to speak out, men call them disrespectful.”311 
Harriet, a 72-year-old woman, said that  
 
Every time women try to fight for justice, they are insulted, despised, there are 
allegations of bias and impartiality however, I pay no attention to such reactions.312  
 
Many women were not able to be as defiant as Harriet, however, and reported instead that 
they are “silenced” and become “voiceless” and “quiet,” and try to “bear on her own.” 
Hannah explained the bias as stemming from the fact that women marry into the clan, and 
that therefore, the clan leaders are related to the man and are unwilling to rule against him: 
 
Local authorities refer domestic violence cases to be settled by the family head who 
are direct relatives to the husbands. These family heads always side with the men, this 
causes more tension and violence in the homes.313  
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Other women told us that “men are very aggressive during dispute resolution,”314 and this 
intimidates them into silence, or forces them “to stop the mediation.”315 Some women also 
reported that their local leaders do not see domestic violence and other complaints brought by 
women as serious matters. Carla said that “sometimes the local leaders tell us to our faces 
that they are fed up with the same stories and that we should stop approaching them but 
persevere.”316 Importantly, a number of women reported that, having tried and failed to 
access justice, they have now given up and are trying to manage alone. Phoebe tried to use 
traditional mechanisms to address violence from her husband, but explained that “when I 
called a clan meeting they all supported my husband’s side. I have now resorted to keeping 
quiet.”317  
 
Acholi culture is highly patriarchal; family and clan membership is patrilineal, land and 
property ownership is overwhelmingly male, local cultural and religious institutions are 
exclusively male, and local governance institutions are dominated by men (Annan and Brier 
2009, 157; Burke and Kobusingye 2014, 29; Oosterom 2011, 400). Although women in this 
study expressed a strong preference for traditional and local structures when responding to 
domestic violence, the patriarchal structure of Acholi traditional institutions is a significant 
hurdle for women when seeking justice. A number of observers have noted a significant trust 
deficit between Acholi communities and the Ugandan State, and that many formal State 
institutions are viewed with suspicion (Burke and Egaru 2011, 14; Porter 2012; Oosterom 
2011). Porter (2012, 87) reports that among Acholi women, particularly in regard to 
protection from violence, the government is seen as “the only institution with the latent 
potential to uphold their rights, yet they rarely choose to involve the government.” Porter 
proposes that this is explained in part by the high cultural value placed on social harmony, 
and that women are reluctant to take actions which may be viewed as detrimental to social 
harmony (Porter 2012, 93). Pursuing formal criminal justice would undoubtedly disturb 
social harmony, and women risk significant material and social disadvantage by doing so 
without a referral from an appropriate male authority. It is also questionable that formal 
justice mechanisms offer better justice outcomes for women experiencing violence, as 
compared against traditional mechanisms. Some women had tried to access formal criminal 
justice in cases of domestic violence, but met patriarchal attitudes among police. As 
Rosemary reported, “Most of the cases we report to the police are referred to be settled from 
home, and in the homes a woman’s side of the story is always disregarded.”318 Ideally, 
traditional justice mechanisms would take seriously domestic and other types of violence 
against women, and would provide protection for women in the communities.  
 
A number of NGOs have provided training for traditional and community leaders on 
women’s rights and the importance of eradicating violence against women. Oosterom 
reported both a distortion of women’s rights messaging coming from international NGOs, 
and a masculine backlash against the message: 
 
Messages about gender equality seemed to have led to suspicion among men that women 
would take over power rather than gain equal power. This came on top of the humiliation of 
badly damaged “manhood” during the war, which increased the likelihood of aggressive 
responses by men. (Oosterom 2011, 401) 
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This finding resonates with the words of key informants in this research. Many informants 
reported that “women’s rights,” including the right to be free from violence, was interpreted 
by the community and traditional leaders as a threat to men’s status and power, and was 
resisted: 
 
During the IDP camps, there were many NGOs sensitising on women rights. As the 
people hear the message, you interpret in your own way. The interpretation of the 
cultural leaders on the women’s rights is much more related to power. When you say 
“women’s rights”, they hear like you are saying “women power” or authority. So 
they interpret that “how can women have more power than us in a family?” … In that 
manner the moment you go to and talk about women rights, automatically they take it 
negatively. And they don’t let women enforce their right in any way. Whether the 
woman wants to access any justice, they (traditional leaders) want first to block it 
until they understand properly what your intention is. So, it means that for women to 
access justice properly, there must be recognition from the husband first of all, then 
the family members. If that happens, they can easily access justice either the informal 
or formal. Because if the family does not support, she cannot proceed.319  
 
Efforts to restore Acholi culture and its institutions may hold promise for the reduction of 
many types of violence and disputes in the communities, but there needs to be a 
commensurate recognition of the potential risks for women in reaffirming patriarchal beliefs 
and structures. These have been shown to be significant barriers in women’s efforts to access 
justice (Wielders and Amutjojo 2012; UNPB 2013; ICTJ 2014). At the same time, simply 
importing globalised training programs on women’s rights are not only likely to be 
ineffective, but in fact risk a backlash, and a stronger commitment among traditional leaders 
and Acholi men to entrenched patriarchal beliefs (Allen and MacDonald 2013, 14–15).  
 
7.5.2 Formal and legal justice 
 
While a majority of women reported that they preferred traditional mechanisms for domestic 
violence and other familial disputes, they also stated a desire for formal justice when 
traditional mechanisms had failed to stop the violence or resolve the dispute. Women 
engaged in conflicts or disputes over land also expressed a preference for formal 
mechanisms, as they saw little hope of having their land rights recognised by traditional 
mechanisms. In many instances, women were not prepared to entirely trade in their rights (to 
either land or freedom from violence) for the sake of social harmony. The Gulu District NGO 
Forum surveyed 1029 people across 15 sub-counties in Acholiland about a range of issues, 
including justice mechanisms. They reported that, while both men and women said traditional 
justice is more accessible, “most male respondents preferred the traditional justice system 
while female respondents preferred the formal justice system” (Gulu District NGO Forum 
2013, 46). However, despite an expressed desire for access to formal justice mechanisms, 
very few women had had any experience with such mechanisms beyond taking an issue to the 
LC I. A cluster of factors effectively put most formal justice mechanisms beyond women’s 
reach. 
 
Bernadette, a widow, had a positive outcome in her land dispute. Bernadette’s husband’s 
family tried to chase her away from their land. She took her case to court and the “judgment 
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was in my favour.” She explained that the process of achieving justice had been difficult. She 
had to “walk long distances” and sometimes had to “go hungry,” due to the “very high 
financial implications, like court fees. I had to part with a lot of money and the process takes 
a long time.” She considered the process worthwhile, however, as the judgment in her favour 
had  
 
improved [my] standard of living. When I won the case I was able to sell part of the 
land and I used the money to build another house and from which I earn some money 
that helps me look after the children and pay school fees.320  
 
More commonly, women spoke of the barriers they face in accessing formal justice, in 
particular a lack of understanding of the processes involved, the distances required to travel, 
prohibitive costs, bribery and corruption, length of judicial processes, and the low status 
accorded to women in formal proceedings. 
 
7.5.2.1 Barriers 
 
A number of reports have documented the barriers that women face in accessing formal 
justice for both land and inter-personal violence matters. The ACCS reported that the cost 
and travel distances for Acholi men and women often meant land disputes could not be taken 
to court, a factor which they identified as fuelling “mob justice” (ACCS 2013, 43). Women 
wanting to prosecute husbands or family members for domestic violence face particular 
difficulties, as violence between spouses is largely seen by society, LCs, the police, and 
others in the justice system as a private matter “best handled within the home” (Wagman et 
al. 2012, 1408; Nainar 2011, 16; Kaye et al. 2005). The US Department of State has reported 
high levels (70 percent) of community acceptance that spousal abuse is justified in certain 
circumstances, such as if a woman burns the food or refuses sex (US Department of State 
2008, 5). Uganda introduced legislation prohibiting domestic violence in 2010,321 following 
years of lobbying from women’s rights groups, and both challenges and neglect in the 
Parliament (GoU Pop Sec 2013, 77; Wagman et al. 2012, 1408). The legislation, however, is 
very new, and implementation is lagging. The GoU identifies three key obstacles to the 
effective implementation of the legislation – cultural preferences for “societal cohesion and 
harmony,” delays in adopting regulations, and an as-yet unreceived “allocation of an 
adequate budget” for the legislation (GoU Pop Sec 2013, 77). Any charges brought under the 
laws require the services of the police, who, according to High Court Judge Kasule based in 
Gulu, 
  
do not spend resources to perform some of the basic investigative functions such as visiting 
the crime scene, interrogation of key witnesses, forensic verifications and medical 
examinations of victims and survivors. Bad investigation by the police is often the reason for 
acquittal of offenders for lack of evidence. (Nainar 2011, 27) 
 
One key informant322  additionally pointed out the interconnectedness between the law’s 
capacity to respond adequately to domestic violence, and the lack a broad range of social 
services necessary to ensuring a woman’s safety. He said that a woman may decide to take a 
case to court, and, even if she is able to meet the myriad costs associated with such an action 
(police transport and investigation fees, medical report costs, photocopying, prisoner and 
                                                
320 Interviewed March 11, 2014. 
321 The Domestic Violence Act (2010).  
322 Interviewed May 2, 2014. 
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prison warden transport costs, and witness transport costs), without psychosocial support 
services, women’s refuges, and witness protection, she may still experience “secondary 
victimisation.” Another key informant 323  further pointed out that women’s continued 
economic dependence on men meant that to pursue formal charges against her husband (or 
against another person without her husband’s support) risked severing the relationship, and 
risking even worse poverty. She believed that the potential economic consequences of 
becoming a single woman coerces women to accept resolutions that do not meet their justice 
needs. Formal legal mechanisms are only one link in a chain of legal and social structures 
necessary to effectively prevent and respond to domestic violence.  
 
Patriarchal attitudes to women (as dependent on, and secondary to, men) extend also to 
formal courts adjudicating land matters involving women as litigants. A joint UNDP, IOM, 
and NRC report on land conflict in northern Uganda found that, while Ugandan law “strictly 
prohibits customs that alienate or undermine women,” government officials charged with 
responsibility for administering the law “are time and again not addressing women’s and 
girls’ needs in northern Uganda” (UNDP et al. 2010, 10). Women’s disadvantaged position in 
asserting land rights has a flow on-effect upon her ability to enforce her legal rights to be free 
of violence. High Court Judge Kasule explained that  
 
because women do not have an income/homestead of their own and men refuse to pay for the 
cost involved if a woman wants to seek justice, the woman ends up with no justice for the 
violation she suffered. (Nainar 2011, 28) 
 
Lack of familiarity 
 
Most people living in Acholiland have very limited understanding of statutory law, their legal 
rights, and of legal processes. This lack of knowledge further impairs people’s ability to 
access legal justice mechanisms (Rugadya 2008, 26), and is further compounded for women 
who have lower levels of formal education, lower literacy levels, and fewer interactions with 
formal systems (Burke and Kobusingye 2014, 17). 
 
Liza was going through a court process at the time of interview. She believed she had bought 
her late husband’s land from the sub-county, but her husband’s family took the matter to 
court, disputing her ownership. Throughout the interview, she repeated, “It is not really now 
clear to me,” “I do not know,” “I cannot really say…” Liza was finding the whole process 
highly stressful, and feared that her in-laws would bribe the Magistrate. She wondered if 
“they just went to the courts of law which I do not know, whether it’s just a way of 
intimidating people or something like that.”324  
 
Another woman who had unsuccessfully attempted to take a land matter to court talked about 
how stressful the process had been: 
 
For a fact you cannot sleep. Your head will pain. Even when you are eating some 
good food you prepared purposely, you will not enjoy. You will not sleep. You sleep 
for a few minutes and find that your mind is on that issue.325  
 
                                                
323 Interviewed May 5, 2014. 
324 Interviewed June 17, 2014. 
325 Interviewed during Validation Workshop, June 18, 2015. 
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She was concerned that she had no-one to help her in the process, and did not understand 
what was required. She was also sure that her in-laws had paid a bribe to the judge, and that 
this determined the final judgment. 
 
The lack of familiarity with formal justice mechanisms heightens the need for legal 
representation or advice in engaging formal justice mechanisms. Legal aid is not provided by 
the Government of Uganda, but some legal assistance services are provided by NGOs. One 
key informant326 notes that this directs legal aid provision according to NGO priorities rather 
than justice needs. He further notes that the limitations of donor-funded legal aid work means 
that some NGOs require a co-payment from clients, and that the most vulnerable, along with 
those with no access to resources, are therefore excluded from the service. The UNDP, IOM 
and NRC recommended that free legal aid be provided to target women engaging formal 
legal mechanisms in relation to land rights, as they risk “double victimization in the post-
conflict transition,” and face “gross marginalisation” in legal processes (2010, 47).  
 
Money (costs and corruption) 
 
The financial costs of accessing formal justice were the most repeated barrier, in terms of 
paying for the transport costs of police to investigate a matter; the court costs associated with 
running a case; and the cost of paying bribes. Many women remarked that given women’s 
lack of decision-making control over family resources, and their greater poverty relative to 
men in their communities, the costs of running a case were prohibitive. Nancy explained that 
“the biggest challenge we face in accessing justice is that it attracts financial implications 
it’s for only those who can afford and the women in this community cannot afford to pay for 
it.”327  
 
Women told us of many cases in which an inability to meet all these costs resulted in them 
not being able to access formal justice. Beth told us that her former son-in-law kidnapped her 
daughter and took her into the bush, where he tied her up and raped her for three days. Beth 
“reported the matter to the police who asked me to get transport so they can search for him.” 
Unable to pay the money asked for, “the case has since died a natural death.” Beth surmised 
that “[t]his kind of situation leaves us in a dilemma on whether justice is meant for us 
women.” She saw the failings as a responsibility of the Government of Uganda, saying that 
“[t]he government should enforce the laws in place to help the poor. The police should be 
provided with transport to help us achieve justice and not turn to us for money for their 
facilitation.”328  
 
Improvements to police services and police effectiveness have been significant targets of the 
PRDP. Efforts have included: building new police stations and police posts; purchasing 
hundreds of new vehicles to enhance police mobility and ability to respond in a timely 
manner; and improved training for police officers on a range of matters, including gender 
sensitivity 329  (Gulu District NGO Forum 2013, 42; Wielders and Amutjojo 2012). 
Nonetheless, women continued to report that police seek funds for transport costs, and if 
these are not paid, no action is taken. Judge Kasule highlighted the police practice of seeking 
                                                
326 Interviewed May 2, 2014. 
327 Interviewed March 12, 2014. 
328 Interviewed February 7, 2014. 
329 Gender sensitivity training for police is not included in the PRDP plan or budget. However, several UN 
agencies and international NGOs have implemented extensive gender and SGBV training programs with the 
Uganda Police Force. For more, see UNDP (2011b). 
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fees as a particular frustration in women’s efforts to obtain services rightly due to them. 
Although these transport and investigation costs are “rightfully the responsibility of the State, 
… the State lacks or does not allocate resources to cover such expenses, those that want their 
case to be pursued have to bear such costs” (Nainar 2011, 27). Given the increased resourcing 
of police, and the provision of additional police vehicles under the PRDP, it is unclear 
whether the request for transport costs is actual reimbursement of police costs incurred 
(setting aside questions about who ought to bear responsibility for such costs), or if they have 
other roots. 
 
Some costs associated with accessing formal justice mechanisms are scheduled fees. The 
ACCS estimates that a woman wanting to pursue prosecution in a case of SGBV can expect 
to pay UGX250,000 (USD71.43), “which is beyond the means of most Ugandans” (ACCS 
2013, 39). Burke and Kobusingye (2014, 47) note the “tremendous inaccessibility [of courts] 
in terms of cost,” and report that the NGO provision of legal aid to widows and Extremely 
Vulnerable Individuals (EVIs) in court adjudicated land disputes ranges from USD200–
USD600 per person (Burke and Kobusingye 2014, 51). These costs alone put legal justice 
mechanisms beyond the reach of the vast majority of Acholi women. Nancy reported that 
financial costs prevented her family from being able to pursue charges against her sister’s 
husband, following a life-threatening assault:  
 
My sister was stabbed by her husband in her lower abdomen. She reported the matter, 
a statement was made and the matter taken to court. However, in the courts they were 
asking for money that my family and sister could not pay, therefore the case could not 
continue. The husband was release from cells and my parents couldn’t do anything, 
they just had to look on. It’s painful but without money it’s null and void.330  
 
In addition to scheduled fees, many women reported that bribery and corruption is rife in 
formal justice systems. These additional costs further amplify the effects of women and 
men’s unequal social and economic status, as women are less able to pay. One woman 
highlighted the disparity between men’s and women’s ability to access justice, remarking that 
“while you talk using your mouth, for them they use money. So women do not have 
power.”331 When Nancy’s family (cited above) could not afford the costs associated with 
criminal charges, they sought justice from the LC, but were unable to match the perpetrator’s 
capacity to pay a bribe: 
 
The organs that are to provide justice are also bribed. For instance in matters of 
domestic violence reports to LCs are asked for money to start up on the case but 
because the lady has no money, the husband rushes to pay the money and the case is 
closed for good without a fair hearing.332  
 
Women’s lack of economic power, alongside both scheduled costs and bribery and 
corruption, was cited by almost every woman interviewed as a major barrier to accessing 
justice. It is having a cyclical impact, in that, without the protection of justice, women are 
denied the means and opportunities to improve their economic status, and live lives free from 
violence (Fiske and Shackel 2015).   
 
                                                
330 Interviewed March 12, 2014. 
331 Interviewed during Validation Workshop, June 18, 2015. 
332 Interviewed March 12, 2014. 
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Time and distance 
 
Formal justice mechanisms were widely perceived by women as being unreasonably slow in 
the delivery of justice outcomes. They were also usually located several kilometres away 
from the woman’s home, meaning either additional costs for transport or long walks. As most 
formal institutions require a series of hearings before a case can be decided, such burdens are 
borne several times, acting as a significant deterrent to women contemplating legal action. 
Margaret, upon the recommendation of her LC, had tried to bring charges against her 
husband for persistent and severe violence. She was not successful in securing a prosecution, 
despite repeated efforts on her behalf. When asked what sort of problems she had 
encountered during the process, Margaret replied:  
 
The problem I faced was that I would walk on foot to these places with great 
difficulty. Sometimes it would rain on me. I would get so hungry and would not even 
have milk for the baby because I had not eaten.333  
 
In the end, Margaret abandoned her efforts to get justice through the law, and instead sought 
protection through an NGO providing services for women experiencing domestic violence. 
While this service provides her with important safety in the short-term, her longer-term issues 
with obtaining protection from her husband, child custody, and access to land, remain. 
 
One key informant saw distance and time as a major barrier for people in northern Uganda in 
their attempts to access formal justice mechanisms. He explained that, in an effort to improve 
the standard of judicial services in northern Uganda, “lay magistrates courts” based in sub-
counties were phased out, and replaced with Magistrate Courts based in district headquarters. 
While the quality of legal decision-making may have been improved by this move, “it’s a 
challenge for people who are far from the centres and do not have the money, with so many 
adjournments and delays, so most people fall out along the way.”334  This accords with 
testimony from many women, who said the courts were “far,” involving “long distances” 
and required either hours of walking (as Margaret described above), or finding money for 
transport. This accords with the findings of other studies; International Alert reported that 
people in Acholiland were reluctant to access the court system because it was seen as too 
slow, too far away, and corrupt (2013, 52). The “the tremendous inaccessibility in terms of 
cost and distance of Magistrates [and High Courts],” for the vast majority of people in 
northern Uganda, may in part explain why only 3 percent of land cases are dealt with by 
these courts (Burke and Kobusingye 2014, 9, 47). 
 
Status of women 
 
As discussed earlier, formal justice mechanisms, including police and courts (particularly 
Local Council Courts [LCC]) are also patriarchal institutions dominated by men, and “biased 
in favour of men” (Kaye et al. 2005, 630; Nainar 2011). Although Uganda has introduced a 
number of affirmative action and quota systems to improve women’s representation on a 
range of courts and committees, particularly those in relation to land, Burke and Kobusingye 
(2014, 17) note that selection processes “tend to favour socially conservative women who do 
not necessarily support the broader interests of women.” The appointment of women to 
decision-making bodies is an important and welcome step; however, many negative attitudes 
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towards women remain, and the deeply entrenched view that women should not speak in 
public forums is a significant barrier for women in seeking justice.  
 
Women spoke extensively about the ways in which women’s social positions in the 
community are replicated in formal justice institutions. Fowsia echoed the words of many 
women interviewed, when she said that “[w]omen are always shut down in local courts, they 
do not give them the space to speak out. When they try to speak out, men call them 
disrespectful.”335 Karena saw the problem as stemming from women’s very low status in 
society, saying that “[w]omen are considered worthless and mere property that men can do 
away with at any time.”336 Rosemary complained about the shared beliefs among both formal 
justice workers and traditional leaders, saying that “[m]ost of the cases we report to the 
police are referred to be settled from home, and in the homes a woman’s side of the story is 
always disregarded.” She believed that justice would help her to “not suffer like I am now. I 
would be looked at like a person and not a worthless woman like the community here 
perceive us.”337  
 
Formal justice mechanisms are important and powerful institutions in society. When they 
replicate, rather than challenge, patriarchal attitudes and behaviours towards women, they 
miss an important opportunity to work towards the Government of Uganda’s stated aim of 
improving gender equality throughout the nation. 
 
Compliance with rulings 
 
The final barrier to be discussed, regarding women’s struggles to achieve justice through 
formal mechanisms, is that of weak enforcement mechanisms, and a reliance on police 
attending in a timely manner. Coupled with the fact that courts and statutory law are 
generally perceived as “distant” and lacking “moral jurisdiction” (Porter 2012, 86–87), many 
people do not comply with court decisions that go against them. Traditional justice 
mechanisms have both higher rates of compliance (due to their greater moral jurisdiction), 
and are able to be monitored and enforced by local and traditional leaders, as well as fellow 
community members that observed the proceedings.  
 
Marlene had successfully pursued a land case through the LC2 court, the sub-county court, 
and eventually the Magistrate’s Court in Gulu. The respondent, however, has repeatedly 
broken court orders, and continues to trespass on Marlene’s land: 
 
My son reported the case to the police who arrested him. He was remanded and 
sentenced to community service, he apologised and was released. When he returned 
on the land, he continued to trespass on my land and now he has trespassed eleven 
feet. The police came and inspected the extent of his trespass. I have to follow up the 
case with the police but I have no money from last year. I am financially 
constrained.338  
 
Although Marlene was able to secure her land rights through the formal justice system, she 
continues to have her land rights infringed upon. The costs associated with enforcing the 
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court order fall to her, but, after spending all her money on multiple legal processes, she is 
unable to meet enforcement costs.  
 
Christine explained that her community is deeply affected by land conflicts, many of which 
result in violence and sometimes death. She gave the example of her neighbour (a widow) 
who had been tied to a tree and beaten by the other party. Christine was highly sceptical 
about the formal justice system’s capacity to resolve land disputes, or the violence resulting 
from it: 
 
Many times, the real owners of the land, the ones who are not causing trouble will be 
satisfied with the ruling. But the people who are trying to grab many times they are 
never satisfied. They want to push and push and push. So after this ruling has been 
done, of course the other party will not be satisfied and this rift between the two will 
still continue and they cannot look at each other in the right way. The disputing 
parties … when they go to the place, one must carry a panga or a spear… So there is 
no happiness.339 
 
Christine returned to the issue of her neighbour, and explained that the neighbour’s son had 
been to the police three times, but that the dispute was escalating rather than receding. She 
feared that, without an adequate response from the police, the son would enact vigilante 
justice: “If the matter is not settled properly won’t it lead to death?”340  
 
7.6 Conclusion 
 
Women in Acholiland are struggling to build dignified and sustainable lives for themselves, 
their children, and their families. In the post-conflict landscape of northern Uganda, marked 
by poverty, trauma, and a damaged social fabric, women are being disenfranchised in 
conflicts over land and economic resources, and are exposed to “rampant” levels of domestic 
violence. Both formal and traditional justice mechanisms are failing to adequately respond to 
women’s urgent justice needs, effectively leaving women in a justice void. Women want 
counselling and psychosocial support to recover from the trauma of the war; the means 
through which they can escape poverty; and the means for their children to complete their 
school education without disruption. Women told this research that they see a greater role for 
the Government of Uganda in ensuring they are able to access land, be free from violence, 
and to live in harmony with their communities. The Government of Uganda will need to 
work closely with traditional leaders and institutions in this task, and ensure that women’s 
justice needs are recognised, valued, and embedded within all policy and budgeting 
processes. 
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CHAPTER 8: POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE 
 
 
 
The wrongs done to us doing the war should be made right especially the young generation 
should have a different experience from what we went through.341  
– Carla  
 
 
The Government of Uganda’s post-conflict justice regime finds its roots in the Juba Peace 
Process (concluded in 2008), and the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation 
(signed June 2007). These documents set out broad agreement on mechanisms for 
accountability, including legal justice, traditional justice, reparations, and reconciliation. 
Although the Final Peace Agreement has never been signed, the GoU nonetheless began the 
process of establishing a framework for post-conflict justice. The GoU has subsequently 
taken several steps towards establishing a framework, as well as the institutional mechanisms 
necessary for implementation.  
 
Below is an overview of key events and mechanisms in establishing a post-conflict justice 
framework in Uganda. 
 
2000  GoU Parliament passes the Amnesty Act  
2003  GoU refers LRA war situation to ICC 
2004  ICC launches investigation 
2005  ICC unseals indictments against five senior LRA Commanders 
2006  Cessation of hostilities between LRA and GoU 
  GoU and LRA engage in the Juba Peace Process 
2007  GoU and LRA sign the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation 
  GoU launches the Peace, Recovery and Development Program (PRDP),     
scheduled to run from 2007 to 2012 
2008  Juba Peace Process concludes, Final Peace Agreement not signed by LRA 
  GoU initiates the Justice, Law and Order Sector Transitional Justice 
Working Group (JLOS TJWG) charged with responsibility for drafting a 
national transitional justice policy 
  Return to homesteads from IDP camps begins 
2009  PRDP effectively begins 
2010  Ugandan Parliament passes the International Criminal Court Act, to 
domesticate the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998) 
  Establishment of the International Crimes Division within the High Court of 
Uganda 
2011  ICD’s first case begins, against Thomas Kwoyelo, a mid-level Commander 
of the LRA. Trail halted later that year while the Supreme Court heard an 
appeal relating to his eligibility for amnesty under the Amnesty Act 
2012  GoU allows Part II of the Amnesty Act (providing blanket amnesty) to 
lapse 
  PRDPII launched (acknowledges more work needed to achieve 
development parity between northern and southern Uganda); scheduled to 
run to 2015, and then further development to be incorporated within the 
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National Development Plan (NDP) 
  Corruption within the Office of the Prime Minister revealed to have resulted 
in the embezzlement and misappropriation of US$14 million from PRDP I 
projects 
2013  GoU reinstates Part II of the Amnesty Act 
2014  JLOS-TJWG finalises draft of the National Transitional Justice Policy, and 
forwards to Cabinet for approval 
2015  (January) Dominic Ongwen surrenders and is transferred, with GoU 
consent, to ICC custody for trial 
  (April) Supreme Court confirms Kwoyelo prosecution can proceed; due to 
resume in ICD in 2016 
  (May) GoU announces PRDP III; scheduled to begin December 2015 
 
8.1 “Transitional” justice in Uganda 
 
Although preceded by the International Criminal Court Act (Act No. 11/2010) and the 
establishment of the International Crimes Division, the centrepiece of Uganda’s post-conflict 
justice regime is the draft National Transitional Justice Policy. The draft Policy sets out the 
blueprint for post-conflict justice, accountability, and reconciliation in Uganda, and identifies 
five “thematic areas” for transitional justice: amnesty, criminal justice, truth-telling, 
traditional justice, and reparations. The document proclaims the GoU’s “commitment to 
building institutions that will bring justice to the past while showing their commitment to 
good governance in the future” (JLOS TJWG 2013, [7]), and furthermore acknowledges that 
 
[t]he lack of a holistic and coherent Government Policy and the inadequate legal framework 
to deal with crimes or wrongs in pre-conflict, conflict and post-conflict situations has 
culminated into dissatisfaction with the extant justice systems among the public especially 
victims of conflict situations countrywide. (2013, [10]) 
 
The draft Policy promises to be instrumental in changing this legacy, and draws upon a range 
of strategies from the increasingly standardised transitional justice tool kit – prosecutions, 
truth commissions, amnesty, reconciliation, reparations, and alternative and traditional justice 
mechanisms. The draft Policy is currently awaiting approval before the Ugandan Cabinet; if 
it is accepted and ratified by Parliament, it will commit the government to multiple initiatives 
and justice strategies. One such initiative is the establishment of a truth commission with a 
mandate to hear testimony on matters occurring from 1986 onwards; to pay reparations (both 
collective and individual) to those most affected by conflicts; to support traditional justice 
processes; to prosecute certain crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the International 
Criminal Court Act (2010); and to continue to offer amnesty for lower ranking combatants 
(JLOS TJWG 2013; Otim and Kihika 2015). The policy has a national application; however, 
the discussion here is restricted only to the policy’s references and application to the GoU-
LRA conflict in northern Uganda.  
 
Transitional justice has rapidly become an international norm, directing a range of 
interventions that “attempt to deal with past violence in societies undergoing or attempting 
some form of political transition” (Bell 2009, 7). Transitional justice grew out of situations 
(e.g. post-WWII Germany, or Argentina and Chile in the late 1980s) in which there was a 
change of government, from an authoritarian regime to democratic rule underpinned by the 
rule of law (Teitel 2003). It aimed to both address harms committed by the former regime, 
and to fortify the position of principles such as accountability, justice, and truth as 
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foundational to a stable, democratic nation. Conceptions of transitional justice have 
broadened over the last two decades, and no longer require regime change; rather, its role in 
supporting countries transitioning out of conflict has been foregrounded. It is this conception 
of transitional justice that is promulgated in the UN Secretary General’s 2004 report, in 
which Kofi Annan stated that transitional justice is  
 
the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come to 
terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice 
and achieve reconciliation. (UNSG 2004, [8]) 
 
The result of this normative shift has been that transitional justice, with its broader state and 
bureaucratic appeal, “was now adopted enthusiastically by policy makers and viewed as 
necessary to sustaining ceasefires and achieving a successful transition from conflict” (Bell 
2009, 9).  
 
This shift is relevant when considering transitional justice in Uganda, where there has not 
been a political transition of the kind in which most transitional justice mechanisms find their 
roots. If transitional justice is taken as the more pragmatic “transition out of conflict,” 
Uganda’s conflict has not formally ended – the Final Peace Agreement has not been signed, 
the LRA remains an active fighting force, and the UPDF continues to be engaged in military 
actions against the LRA. While not active in northern Uganda for some years, “the LRA 
remains active across the border and continues to be a cause for insecurity and anxiety” 
(Wielders and Amutjojo 2012, 10). 
 
In the absence of either a political transition or a confirmed end to the conflict, the ICTJ 
proposes that “transitional justice logic and objectives face specific challenges” in Uganda 
(Otim and Kihika 2015, 4). The ACCS, while welcoming Uganda’s “holistic” draft National 
Transitional Justice Policy, is also concerned about the GoU’s tight control over the 
transitional justice agenda, and the lack of consultation in the policy’s drafting. It stated that  
 
[a]s a result, the government-led and government-owned transitional justice processes, 
without broader participation and inclusion of civil society voices, cannot bring the 
transformation needed in societies emerging from conflicts. (2013, 5) 
 
Women participants in this research articulated a number of justice needs that fall within the 
scope of transitional justice; some of these needs are addressed within the draft National 
Transitional Justice Policy, while other important elements are absent. Five key elements of 
transitional justice needs were articulated by women, with almost universal agreement across 
all research sites, ages, marital statuses, and experiences of the conflict: 
 
• Guarantee of non-recurrence and peace 
• Reparations 
• Reconciliation 
• Apology 
• Accountability 
 
Women were additionally asked about their views on what should happen to Joseph Kony 
and other Senior Commanders of the LRA, as well as the ICC indictments. It is important to 
note that, at the time of conducting most of the fieldwork, the indictments had been issued for 
nine years and the three surviving indictees all remained at large, thus making the question a 
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somewhat hypothetical one. However, in the time between the conclusion of the initial 
fieldwork (July 2014) and the Validation Workshop (June 2015), Dominic Ongwen 
surrendered, was transferred into ICC custody, and is currently awaiting trial, thereby re-
enlivening the issue of the ICC’s role in northern Uganda. When the ICC first unsealed its 
indictments against five senior LRA members (Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo, 
Dominic Ongwen, and Raska Lukwiya), it triggered heated debate among the Acholi people 
of northern Uganda. Many feared that the indictments would discourage the LRA from 
entering peace negotiations, and would work against the intentions of the Amnesty Act 
(2000) Cap. (294) (“Amnesty Act”).  The ICC’s involvement was further criticised for 
focusing exclusively on the atrocities committed by the LRA, and not on the actions of the 
UPDF and other State actors; this led some to question the impartiality of the ICC.342 
Questions of ICC involvement in northern Uganda, and women’s thoughts about justice as it 
pertains to LRA leadership, are addressed further throughout this chapter. 
 
8.1.1 Guarantee of non-recurrence and peace 
 
Women in northern Uganda have suffered enormously throughout the war. Women and girls 
have been abducted and enslaved; forced into squalid IDP camps; witnessed barbaric attacks 
by LRA cadres; endured beatings, rapes, and other humiliations; and suffered the loss of 
parents, children, and husbands. They have sustained economic devastation and are 
struggling to rebuild viable, safe, and dignified lives. LRA attacks have not occurred for 
several years, the north has been largely demilitarised, and most people have now returned to 
their homes; however, a great number of women continue to feel insecure, fearing that this is 
merely a lull in the fighting, rather than the end of the conflict.  
 
The desire for a guarantee of non-recurrence was repeated by almost all women interviewed, 
often without prompting:   
 
The government should also intervene to help the local community and guarantee that 
the war will not reoccur and that they will remain peaceful and happy.343  
 
I feel the conflict should not reoccur, so women and people in Uganda can have a 
permanent settlement and rebuild their homes.344  
 
It my wish that the government should not provoke Kony, we are tired of war and we 
do not want any more war. What we went through was way too much pain. Now that 
we are just beginning to forget about the war … that we shall not go through the 
same experiences again. We hear rumours that Kony is preparing to make a come-
back any time to again terrorise us. This has raised so much fear among the locals, 
especially myself. I feel so insecure.345  
 
Women explained that continued fear affects them both emotionally and materially. Dorine 
explained that her land lay fallow for many years when she and her husband were in an IDP 
camp. Since returning, the land needs a lot of work, including re-digging drainage ditches, 
                                                
342  The ICC’s involvement in northern Uganda has generated large amounts of scholarly and public 
commentary, and is well covered in many places. For further discussion on this issue, see, e.g., Waddell and 
Clark (2008), Branch (2007), Souaré (2009), and Clark (2010).  
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clearing of land mines (one unexploded land mine was observed near her home during 
fieldwork), and re-conditioning the soil. Dorine said that she feels ambivalent about doing 
this work, in case the war resumes and she is again forced to flee. This ambivalence also 
extends to regular agricultural tasks: 
 
Dorine:  And you know, even when we plant, we just plant it now as an after 
thought. We still have this fear, “Maybe I’m wasting my time. Maybe 
the rebels will come back and all this will be a waste.” 
Interviewer:  Do you fear the rebels will return? 
Dorine:  Yes, because they have. I have gotten very many disappointments from 
them.346 
 
The fear of a resurgence in conflict works counter to programs and initiatives aimed at 
improving the security, economic prosperity, and development of northern Uganda, and may 
even be contributing to the identified food insecurity facing the region (SPRING 2010, 21).  
 
This fear of recurrence also impairs women’s ability to recover psychologically from the war. 
Dorine said that fear of the LRA returning meant that “now my heart is not at ease. I cannot 
be settled in mind.”347 Lorna explained the precarity of the peace, and how it affects her: 
 
We are a little settled, there is no more running for our lives, but we do not have any 
guarantee that the war has ended, we still live in fear and I believe that unless Kony 
is captured, he can come anytime and resume terrorising us like in the earlier years. I 
feel I am a prisoner of war in my own homeland, I feel terribly wronged by this 
war.348  
 
Joyce said she listens to the radio for news of the LRA’s location, and that if she hears that 
they are in South Sudan, she will know that the war is about to resume. Her main concern is 
  
about my children. Where will I leave my children? I worry my children will go 
through the same mistreatment, the same suffering I went through. Every time I think 
of him [Kony] returning I think of where I should keep my children safe, but there is 
no safe place.349  
 
Laplante and Theidon (2007, 240) found similar needs for a guarantee of non-recurrence 
among survivors of Peru’s conflict with the Shining Path insurgency, arguing that such a 
guarantee is crucial for survivors to establish the necessary sense of safety for participation in 
truth-telling, and other transitional justice processes. In addition to its foundational value in 
civic and justice objectives, the establishment of psychological safety is widely accepted as a 
pre-requisite for psychological healing from trauma (Herman 1997; Johnson and Thompson 
2008). Judith Herman’s (1997, 155) model of trauma recovery outlines that “recovery 
unfolds in three stages. The central task of the first stage is the establishment of safety.” 
 
The Advisory Consortium on Conflict Sensitivity (ACCS) also found widespread concern 
throughout northern Uganda about the risk of a recurrence in fighting, reporting that  
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[m]any communities in the North remain trapped in conflict cycles that are supported by 
drivers and fed by grievances, pushing them towards what many respondents believe is an 
inevitable return to overt conflict. (2013, 53) 
 
While the Juba Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation refers briefly in clause 9.1 
to “guarantees of non-recurrence,” this critically important aspect of transitional justice does 
not appear in the draft National Transitional Justice Policy. Women reported very clearly to 
this research that a guarantee of non-recurrence provides an essential foundation for the 
achievement of justice, healing, and rebuilding. Julia, who was abducted for twelve years, 
made an impassioned plea for peace, not only in Uganda but globally: 
 
What I need to tell you is that – in your reports I know you are going to include all 
these three countries, and all of them have suffered violence during the conflicts. 
What I want to say is that, women at least should be given a chance to live peacefully, 
to have some peace. Women have gone through so much in conflict areas, they use 
women as a tool for satisfaction and women are dying, women are suffering, women 
are being washed away by water during these times. Women are suffering all these 
things in all parts of the world where there’s conflict, so my humble prayer is that this 
should stop. I have seen it with my own eyes and I appeal to the whole world to at 
least give women some peace.350  
 
8.1.2 Reparations 
 
As outlined throughout this report, the people of northern Uganda have suffered acutely and 
sustained enormous losses throughout the war. Every woman interviewed wanted some form 
of reparation for her experiences and losses. As Patricia clearly stated, reparations are “the 
best kind of justice because it restores me to my previous position, then I am able to forgive 
and move on normally with life.”351  
 
Reparations are a critical element of transitional justice. The UN Secretary General’s 
(UNSG) report on transitional justice noted that, after widespread human rights violations, 
 
States have the obligation to act not only against perpetrators, but also on behalf of victims – 
including through the provision of reparations. (2004, [54]) 
 
Reparations serve multiple purposes in post-conflict situations. Reparations help people to 
rebuild economically after conflict; to access medical and psychological treatment for 
injuries, illness, and traumas sustained during the war (which often inhibit the most 
vulnerable individuals and groups in society from participating equally in post-conflict social, 
economic, and political life); and, importantly, can have a restorative effect, helping in 
“restoring victims’ confidence in the State” (UNSG 2004, [54]). The UNDP noted that  
 
Reparations, if well designed, acknowledge the victims’ suffering, offer redress, some form of 
compensation and acknowledge the responsibility of the State to make amends for past 
wrongs. (2011a, 20) 
 
The draft National Transitional Justice Policy recognises the central importance of 
reparations as a general principle. It goes further, however, by acknowledging that  
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in traditional justice, justice is not done unless some form of compensation or reparation from 
perpetrators is received by the victim, their families or community members for the wrong. 
(JLOS TJWG 2013, [49]) 
 
The draft Policy recommends that the GoU establish a State-funded reparations program; 
guaranteeing a secure budget allocation sufficient to meet the costs of reparation 
commitments is essential for the desired reparative effects to be realised. The ICTJ noted that 
the final draft of the National Transitional Justice Policy recommends that a specific fund for 
reparations be established, financed from consolidated revenue (not ad hoc budget measures) 
(Otim and Kihika 2015, 6). The security of funding for a reparations program is critical to its 
success, and delivery must not be exposed to the vulnerabilities that face ad hoc, NGO, or 
donor funds. Many women expressed a lack of trust and confidence in government and NGO 
programs, as revealed in Rosemary’s response when she was asked what transitional justice 
mechanisms are: 
 
Nothing really. When we returned form the camps, the government told us of a plan to 
compensate the people whose land was used as camps, but this has never been raised 
again. An organisation called Gusco also tried to resettle some few people who 
returned from the bush but their program also ended.352  
 
The ability of reparations to be able to contribute to restoring community trust in the 
government requires that any prospective reparations fund be able to deliver on commitments 
made. 
 
In April 2014, the Ugandan parliament voted unanimously in support of a resolution calling 
on the GoU to establish a gender-sensitive reparations program for women and men affected 
by the GoU-LRA war (ICTJ 2014). The resolution was the result of coordinated lobbying 
from victim-survivor groups and civil society organisations in Uganda. Suzanne, who was 
abducted for eight years, had been involved in advocating for the resolution on reparations. 
She emphasised that “women must be involved in the process for designing reparations, 
otherwise women and children will not be helped.”353 She further pointed out that women 
will need support in their involvement in designing reparations processes, as “women feel 
low. They must first be picked up.”  
 
A number of women outlined some principles that any reparations program must incorporate. 
The first, as per Suzanne’s recommendation above, is the inclusion of women in the design 
process, and onwards. Uganda’s patriarchal systems, entrenched in both formal and informal 
political and justice systems, are highly likely to produce a distribution of reparations 
(whether individual or collective) which do not adequately respond to women’s justice needs. 
Secondly, reparations should have in-built mechanisms which ensure that the most vulnerable 
are reached. For Suzanne, this meant “getting out to the villages, and make sure you reach 
the real beneficiaries. Often it’s the better off that know about these programs.”354 Caroline 
observed a similar phenomenon in the distribution of NUSAF goods; she had received an ox 
to help her re-establish her agricultural activities after the war, and, while she was happy to 
have the ox, she recognised that those most in need had missed out: 
 
                                                
352 Interviewed January 13, 2014. 
353 Interviewed June 27, 2014. 
354 Interviewed June 27, 2014. 
 
 
 132 
The government programs designed for the affected community during the war have 
not fully supported people affected. For example, those affected very much during the 
war such as those who lost their limbs,… women whose husbands were killed during 
the war and those who sustained permanent injuries and became lame as a result of 
the same have not benefited, yet, in my opinion they should be given first priority. 
Unfortunately or fortunately, people like me who have strength benefited.355   
 
The third principle identified by women was the requirement that the processes by which 
reparations are awarded be transparent and widely disseminated. Women had observed some 
members of the community benefiting from grants under the PRDP and NUSAF, as well as 
from aid distributed by NGOs. Without any public information explaining the rules by which 
recipients were selected, such distributions had triggered anger and jealousy between 
community members. As Mary explained:  
 
NGOs, I do not remember their name gave resettlement packages such as pangas, 
hand hoes and seeds, however this help was not sufficient because only a few people 
benefitted. … More support in terms of reparations should be given to all the 
members because those who missed were very unhappy, they grumbled and developed 
grudges against those who got. This has brought division among the people who 
relieved and those who missed.356  
 
Reparations are effective tools of justice, “providing concrete remedies, promoting 
reconciliation and restoring victims’ confidence in the State” (UNSG 2004, [54]). 
Transparency and fairness in delivery are critical in reparations’ achievement of 
reconciliatory and civic objectives.  
 
Finally, women said that reparations should be designed in consultation with the community 
(noting Suzanne’s aforementioned advice about deliberately including women in 
consultations). Nadia took care to stipulate that such consultations should be genuine, and 
that community views need to be evident in the final policies produced: 
 
The government’s decision should be informed by what the local community thinks is 
best for them and thus the local community must be consulted before any decisions 
are reached because it is us, the locals, who suffered most. And what the local 
community advises should not be altered.357  
 
The GoU has the opportunity to make significant gains in the restoration of Acholi women’s 
and men’s trust in the State. While all aspects of transitional justice will have an effect on 
civic confidence, reparations are particularly important. As Laplante and Theidon (2007) 
noted, the justice needs of people living in poverty are often expressed primarily in economic 
terms. The people of northern Uganda are living in greater poverty than any other region in 
Uganda (GoU Pop Sec 2013). Many women perceived their current poverty to be a direct 
consequence of the war; this includes their inability to ensure their children received an 
education, to ensure access to medical care, or even to give “visitors the kind of welcome I 
would wish.”358 Dorine was aware of exactly how much she had lost, as well as the current 
impact of the losses, and the government’s lack of action to redress those losses: 
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Why I’m saying this, I had very many animals. I had about 25 cattle, 38 goats. But 
gone! Everything! I lost everything to the Kony war. I had so many chickens, about 
60, over 60. So all these were gone. Because from these I would be easily able to pay 
my children in school. So when we came back from the camps, they [the government] 
said they were going to do something about the effects of the war, they’re going to do 
something. But nothing! Nothing has ever been done.359  
 
Anna similarly said that “I lost trust in our government because they promise a lot but never 
fulfil their promises.” Nonetheless, she believes that transitional justice is important, as it 
“will make me feel the government feels our pain.”360  
 
The ACCS (2013, 34) also noted that the government’s failure to deliver on its promises of 
compensation fuels “bitterness towards the government,” and identified it as a key conflict 
driver. Avocats Sans Frontieres (ASF) argued both that “[t]he duty on the State to repair is 
well established and a basic human right” (2013, 21), and that reparations should be 
“prompt” (2013, 22). The timeliness of the reparations program is an important element for 
the GoU to consider within its overall policy goal of improving civic confidence. One key 
informant with whom we spoke acknowledged the urgency of reparations:  
 
I think when we talk about transitional justice processes complimenting each other, 
the ideal strategy is to have these processes compliment each other – the practicality 
is that this may not be able to be achieved, so in that case, if we are to do a 
sequencing approach, reparations should be high on the radar, because unless these 
victims are healed, unless these victims have that confidence that they are well, that 
their wounds are healed, they are not going to be very keen to support other 
processes. You cannot talk about justice when someone is still hurting.361  
 
Reparations can be a mixture of individual and collective, material and symbolic. Women 
spoke of all these types of reparations, with a particular focus on the following: provision of 
health care and counselling services; provision of land, capital, and training for small 
business development; provision of livestock; financial compensation; and funding for 
children to complete their education. Additionally, a number of women wanted memorials for 
those killed in the war (particularly at massacre sites), assistance in locating people who had 
disappeared during the war, and assistance with the cost of ceremonies (e.g. for mourning 
people killed during the war, for traditional justice, and for celebrations of culture that “help 
women revive their lives and forget their miserable past.”362) The forms of reparations 
identified during this research closely matched those found by the UHRC and UNOHCHR 
(2011), in their extensive report on victims’ views on remedies and reparations in northern 
Uganda; they also paralleled the joint consultations of the Justice and Reconciliation Project 
and the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, which identified compensation and 
livelihood, education, medical care, psychosocial support, acknowledgement, and 
memorialisation as priority areas for reparations (JRP and IJR 2011). 
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Women spoke of the need for both individual and collective reparations. Many women 
wanted individual financial reparations, particularly through the replacement of the livestock, 
seeds, and tools necessary for rebuilding agricultural outputs. As Sonia said: 
 
People should be helped, they should be given reparations, like animals to help them 
meet their basic family needs. Justice means helping us find alternative means of 
living. Providing for us seeds or finding means of economically empowering us.363  
 
While agricultural inputs would help women who have access to land, those without land 
wanted help with forming a non-land-based livelihood, both through training in vocational 
skills and the provision of start-up capital. Francine said that help establishing a small 
business would be acceptable, but that she would prefer monetary compensation so that she 
could buy her own land, as it represented greater inter-generational wealth than a small 
business: 
 
This is my first preference because at least my children are male children, so at least 
if they can have some land to look to, then it’s good for them to have a place they can 
call their own. Even if I get another man, the same problem will re-occur of not 
wanting my children.364  
 
Phoebe also preferred land over start-up capital, but she suggested that the government 
“should find some piece of land for such women to relocate.”365  
 
Many women also wanted collective reparations, particularly in the form of counselling, 
health, and education services; they recognised that much of the damage done during the war 
impacted everyone in the community, and continues to affect social relations. Both Rosemary 
and Nighty emphasised the widespread need for counselling in their community: 
 
Counselling and health related services should be increased for the people, especially 
those whose children were abducted. Even the few who returned need counselling.366  
 
Counsellors are very important, they should be brought in the area because people 
are so traumatised, they will help relieve trauma and one is to open up to them on 
their worries and troubles.367  
 
Gladys said that, while she did not lose economic property during the war, she was 
traumatised, and is now also stigmatised. She wanted psychosocial support and education as 
reparation: 
 
I suffer from trauma and stresses because of what I experienced from the bush like 
seeing people being killed, I also suffer from stigma because the community up to 
today call us names “returnees from the bush.” Being a young girl, I had no property 
but other women lost their property, some women’s legs, nose, hands, mouth were cut 
in my presence which still traumatise me. I feel really traumatised. Justice to me 
means giving me support, when government gets support from donors; I should be 
                                                
363 Interviewed March 13, 2014. 
364 Interviewed June 28, 2014. 
365 Interviewed March 20, 2014. 
366 Interviewed February 13, 2014. 
367 Interviewed February 13, 2014. 
 
 
 135 
one of the people to be supported. It also means forgiveness, compensation of 
properties. The survivors should be educated, they should be given continuous 
psychosocial support.368  
 
As discussed in Chapter 7, children’s education was universally raised by women as a 
primary justice mechanism. Women linked the disrupted education of their children to the 
conflict, both in terms of the widespread disruption to education caused by fighting and other 
violence, and the inability of mothers to pay school fees in the post-conflict phase. Women 
saw the reconstruction of schools as critical for ensuring a better future for their children and 
the community, and wanted this to be complemented by either the abolition of all associated 
school fees, or the establishment of a fund to assist parents in paying these fees. Marlene 
highlighted that orphans are particularly vulnerable, and that reparations should target their 
education in particular:  
 
Support should also be given to support the children, especially the orphans who 
were left behind. The government should be able to give us support. UPE does not 
work because we as parents have to meet so many requirements - PTA and other 
scholastic materials.369  
 
The GoU has contributed significant funds to development in northern Uganda through the 
Peace, Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP). The PRDP was launched in 2007, and 
effectively began in 2009; its successor, PRDP 2, launched in 2012, with a third stage due to 
begin in December 2015. The PRDP aims  
 
to stabilise Northern Uganda and lay a firm foundation for recovery and development. 
Specifically, the PRDP aims at promoting socio-economic development of the communities 
of Northern Uganda to bridge the gap between the North and the rest of the Country, so that 
the North achieves “national average level” in the main socio-economic indicators. (GoU 
OPM 2011, i) 
 
The PRDP entailed some new project funding (30 percent from the GoU and 70 percent from 
donors), and consolidated pre-existing recovery programs, such as the Northern Uganda 
Social Action Fund (NUSAF), the Emergency Humanitarian Action Plan (EHAP), and the 
Northern Uganda Reconstruction Programme (NURP), to enable more coordinated and 
effective service delivery (Claussen et al. 2008, 16). The PRDP has four strategic objectives:  
 
• Consolidation of State Authority 
• Rebuilding and empowering communities 
• Revitalisation of the economy 
• Peace building and reconciliation  
 
The PRDP has initiated several important projects since its inception, including improving 
police services and infrastructure; examples of the latter include developing community 
buildings (e.g. health centres, schools, court houses, and police stations), as well as digging 
latrines, boreholes, and roads (RLP 2013).  
 
While the PRDP has played an important role in the post-conflict development of northern 
Uganda, it is critically important that it not be seen as a substitute for reparations. While 
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some of the goods and services which have been provided under the PRDP and NUSAF 
overlap with items which women have called for as both collective and individual 
reparations, the PRDP has focused far more on “consolidating State authority,” with only 2.7 
percent of its budget being directed to “peace building and reconciliation” (Dolan 2008, 6). 
Most importantly, it is not embedded within any State acknowledgement of responsibility for 
harms suffered during the war, in any State obligations towards citizens who have suffered 
injustice, and nor was it designed as a response to specific war-related harms. Reparations 
gain much of their restorative power, their ability to build confidence in civic institutions, 
from their structural location within a transitional justice framework. Reconstruction work 
undertaken outside of a justice framework, such as the PRDP, cannot deliver the justice 
dividends possible through reparations. As the UHRC and UNOHCHR stated: 
 
In efforts surrounding reparation, it is necessary to distinguish the primary differences 
between reparation and post-conflict reconstruction or development. … Reparation signifies 
public acknowledgement of the State’s or perpetrator’s commission of harms or violations 
and/or the State’s failure to prevent violations and harms. Reparation signifies State 
responsibility to redress these serious violations. By contrast, development policies do not 
entail State responsibility for wrongdoing or an acknowledgment that harm has been suffered. 
Development policies are not conceived to achieve justice for victims of serious violations or 
address irreparable harms. (2011, 19–20) 
 
The PRDP, while an important reconstruction program, is not attached to any kind of justice 
mechanisms, and does not contain within its design or operation the necessary features to 
enable it to have reparative justice effects. Women expressed some confusion about the 
PRDP, and the NUSAF in particular, as the NUSAF makes payments and provides items to 
individuals directly. Many women were unsure if the NUSAF and PRDP are reparations 
programs, and expressed concern that these programs are not responsive to harms suffered 
during the conflict. In some instances, this has been fuelling anger that “favouritism,” 
“sectarianism,” and “connections” are unfairly advantaging some, and disadvantaging 
others (RLP 2013).370 Mary, who received an ox through the NUSAF, said that  
 
[m]ore support in terms of reparations should be given to all the members because 
those who missed were very unhappy, they grumbled and developed grudges against 
those who got. This has brought division among the people who relieved and those 
who missed.371  
 
The GoU currently has a window of opportunity to rebuild trust, and contribute to the 
satisfaction of Acholi women’s justice needs through the provision of reparations explicitly 
embedded within a justice framework, and directly linked to specific harms caused by the 
conflict. This needs to be clearly separated from general post-conflict reconstruction, to avoid 
exacerbating division and to enhance social cohesion. 
 
8.1.3 Apology 
 
Women also raised the importance of a formal apology from the government. The call for an 
apology was particularly strong among formerly abducted women, many of whom considered 
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that the government had failed to protect them against abduction, and were thereby 
responsible for all the subsequent harms they suffered. Suzanne said: 
 
I did not sign for Amnesty and I do not want it. I was abducted from school. I consider 
that the government failed to protect me and should apologise to me.372  
 
Eleanor did apply, and received Amnesty under the Amnesty Act (2000). She said that, while 
she has apologised and asked for forgiveness, she believed that the government had failed to 
protect her and other abducted children, and that the government should seek their 
forgiveness: 
 
And yet we came back home the government they didn’t protect us, then we came 
back home then also government give us the amnesty. So we are not feeling good for 
that one. Because they have failed to protecting us. It is the govern who … it is not for 
us to ask for the Amnesty … We want also government to ask for the apology … 
because they didn’t protect us. Like for us women we suffering for nothing.373  
 
Cilla thought that an apology would help with her reintegration into, and reconciliation with, 
the community: 
 
Yes that can really make us feel a sense of justice because if the government comes up 
openly to apologise to the people, that comes in with another kind of relief because 
we begin to see that there is also somebody who is also taking on this blame because 
the people will also begin to perceive it, that it was not us but also some other people 
who were causing this problem to us. So it will also make me happy.374  
 
Julia perceived that the continuity of political leadership throughout the war, and now into the 
post-conflict phase, made an apology all the more important:  
 
First, they should apologise to us for all the suffering we’ve been through. Because 
all the sufferings we’ve been through has been, we met them during the current 
regime and the President has been the same person all the way through. There has 
not been any change of Government.375  
 
This desire for an apology was also found by the UHRC and UNOHCHR, who reported that 
war-affected men and women 
 
overwhelmingly stated their need for public acknowledgement of and apologies by the 
Government of Uganda for harms and failure to prevent harms. Numerous interviewees said 
that until the Government of Uganda made this important step, they would consider any other 
reparation efforts as little more than attempts to buy their silence about what had happened. 
(2011, 89) 
 
President Museveni issued an apology on January 26, 2014, for past abuses committed by 
members of Uganda’s armed forces, citing specific massacres as well as acknowledging that 
“there were incidents of looting property including cattle,” and rape. He committed to 
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“personally organize Mato-put … with the concerned families and communities” (Museveni 
2014). This apology is a welcome development, and an indication that war-affected women’s 
calls for an apology for the government’s failure to protect them may yet come. It is 
important, however, that any apology acknowledge the State’s complicity in the harms 
caused during the war, whether through its failure to protect its citizens, the enactment of 
government policies (such as forced encampment), or harmful acts committed by agents of 
the State. Furthermore, an apology must arise out of a holistic justice process, and be attached 
to both a documenting of harms (including prosecutions where appropriate), and material 
reparations.  
 
8.1.4 Reconciliation 
 
Reconciliation is foundational to Acholi principles of justice (Porter 2012; Liu Institute for 
Global Issues et al. 2005; Quinn 2009). Hansen (2009, 6) reports that “[i]n Uganda, and in 
particular in the north of the country, the cultural history is often defined by people’s alleged 
ability to forgive and to reconcile.” In keeping with other studies of justice in northern 
Uganda, 376 women in this study repeated reconciliation as a central element and goal of 
justice. Reconciliation was spoken about in two distinct but overlapping ways: on an 
individual level, between a specific perpetrator and a specific victim of violence, and 
collectively, within communities deeply and widely affected by the conflict. The terms 
“restore relationships,” “restoring the community,” “harmony,” “united,” and “peaceful” 
were repeated frequently by participants. Harriet explained that “no justice can be reached 
unless both sides are heard,” and that a good process “settles the matter once and for all. A 
spirit of brotherhood then ensues and the long lasting feud is broken.”377 Kathleen explained 
that justice involves testifying to the truth, apologies from wrongdoers, forgiveness by 
victims, and then “reconciliation of the two parties.” Reconciliation, however, “takes time,” 
and requires “patience.”378  
 
The draft National Transitional Justice Policy acknowledges the central importance of 
reconciliation in the development of peace and justice, and its place “as a necessary precursor 
to sustainable development” (JLOS TJWG 2013, [3]). Furthermore, the draft Policy 
recognises the multi-layered demands of reconciliation, and the vital requirement of national 
engagement in order to deliver lasting peace and stability dividends:  
 
Peace and reconciliation demand comprehensive societal transformation that must embrace a 
broad notion of justice, addressing the root causes of conflict and the related violations of all 
rights. (JLOS TJWG 2013, [3]) 
 
This acknowledgement of the need for a national reconciliation that seeks to address the “root 
causes of conflict” is vitally important. The draft Policy proposes that a truth commission be 
established, as a key national mechanism to promote reconciliation. There is broad support 
for this among the women we interviewed, who spoke of “truth-telling” as the first step in 
building justice. As Bernadette explained:  
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Justice to me is a fair hearing which involves truth telling and witnesses called to 
testify to the truth pertaining to that matter. To me the most important type of justice 
is apology and restoring peace between parties.379  
 
Most key informants in this research also supported truth-telling, and saw it as integral to any 
reconciliation process. One key informant emphasised the need for truth-telling nationally as 
a foundation for justice. He perceived that a lack of truth-telling about many conflicts post-
independence “is sitting at the bottom of our problems. … [T]he issue of truth telling is very 
demanding in this country, it is the basis of other processes.” 380 Another key informant 
likewise recognised the importance of truth-telling, and thought it might be an effective way 
of affirming women’s experiences and promoting healing. In her opinion, a truth-telling 
commission would provide women with a safe forum in which their experiences can be 
heard: 
 
I have come across so many women who, they have never had anybody to listen to 
their story, they remain there and are traumatised, they are not moving forward. It’s 
quite healing if somebody came out and told her story, either in truth telling and 
reconciliation or the formal, because I think that really is the healing process.381 
 
One key informant was also supportive of a truth-telling commission, based largely on her 
long engagement with women in northern Uganda. She was also cautious, however, about 
possible repercussions for women, and noted that any truth-telling process would need to 
carefully think through gender issues, particularly those relating to sexual violence. She 
pointed out that women currently “feel so unsafe”: 
 
So the mechanism should be where every woman will feel very safe and very confident 
to speak the truth. That “what I am going to speak here will not be used against me 
whether by the community or by the State, or by my family or by the press. It will not 
turn against me, you know, where I will be vindicated at a water point after all you 
know.” And then that blame game, it should be a mechanism where the blame game… 
“After all it was your fault, where were you going at that particular hour?” That 
faulting of especially victims of gender based violence. If you did not do that, that 
would not have happened to you. So it is too frustrating. So you would rather keep 
quiet than you know being faulted and endlessly blamed.382 
 
Anyeko et al. (2012) reported that over 90 percent of the 1,414 respondents in their study 
wanted some form of truth-telling process. “In particular, people want to know why this war 
happened, who is to be held accountable and what has happened to their loved ones who are 
missing” (114). The authors reported that many Acholi see truth-telling as necessary to 
prevent future conflict. Importantly, they further outlined that reconciliation is a process, of 
which truth-telling is only one part. Respondents told them that the policy of Amnesty was 
highly valued, and an important step in encouraging LRA members to escape the LRA and 
return home. They were clear, however, that the forgiveness offered through Amnesty is only 
the beginning of a process towards reconciliation, and that justice must occur in order for 
reconciliation to be achieved: 
 
                                                
379 Interviewed March 11, 2014. 
380 Interviewed in Kampala on May 12, 2014. 
381 Interviewed in Kampala on May 5, 2014. 
382 Interviewed in Kampala on May 5, 2014. 
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Forgiveness, therefore, is like an olive branch – a way for civilians to indicate their 
willingness to reconcile. It is not, however, the same as mato oput (reconciliation) which is a 
process involving truth-telling through mediation, acknowledgement, compensation and 
symbolic reconciliation. … Truth-telling was imagined as a process wherein former LRA 
members, UPDF soldiers and communities would sit to discuss what happened, to explain 
why it happened and to identify, with the assistance of a mediator, a means of agreeing on 
compensation (which could be symbolic) and reconciliation (mato oput). (Anyeko et al. 2012, 
116–117) 
 
The Liu Institute of Global Affairs, Gulu District NGO Forum, and Ker Kwaro Acholi (2005) 
also found that reconciliation in Acholi culture is a multi-faceted process, one which requires 
truth-telling, acknowledgements, apologies, forgiveness, and compensation before it can be 
achieved. Reconciliation is an integral element of justice, and indeed its ultimate goal. This is 
not only an Acholi cultural value, but accords with studies into truth-telling, justice, and 
reconciliation in other parts of the world (Laplante and Theidon 2007; van der Merwe 2001); 
it likewise corresponds with global standards of transitional justice (UNSG 2004; ASF 2013).  
 
Some communities are undertaking reconciliation processes at localised and inter-personal 
levels, with some positive results emerging regarding the improved reintegration of formerly 
abducted women, and in improvements to social relations within the community. Joyce 
participated in some mediation and reconciliation workshops run by CARE, who also trained 
some community members in mediation skills: “If there is any conflict in the community, they 
are trained to help.” Additionally, the trained community mediators would facilitate 
community reconciliation meetings. Joyce explained that  
 
[i]n the meetings, village meetings, a former abductee or a former camp member 
would tell their story, then they would pick up from there and start to teach, send 
these messages of non-discrimination. They would tell them “these people also went 
through very difficult times as you have heard. Let’s not treat them this way, let’s not 
discriminate against them, let’s not call them names. You’ve just heard what they 
said, let’s not back-bite them.”383  
 
Additionally, the Women’s Advocacy Network (WAN), based in Gulu but with members 
across much of Acholiland, offers free community and family mediation and reconciliation 
assistance. Radio Mega also runs several weekly radio programs aimed at improving 
community reconciliation (Otim 2009); women living in areas with FM reception reported 
that the radio programs make a substantive difference to their lives.384  
 
While the efforts of local communities and civil society organisations towards reconciliation 
are important, they need to be understood as only one layer of reconciliation, and should not 
detract from efforts to instigate macro-level reconciliation programs. Community-based 
reconciliation efforts address inter-personal and inter-familial relationships, but in the 
absence of formal, national-level reconciliation mechanisms, there is a risk that the conflict 
will increasingly be understood as a “northern affair,” and the national and structural “root 
causes of the conflict” will remain unaddressed (Hansen 2009; RLP 2004, 23). The 
Government of Uganda has an important role to play in establishing national-level 
reconciliation processes. The Transitional Justice Working Group has produced a series of 
discussion papers and reports addressing reconciliation and truth-telling, including 
                                                
383 Interviewed June 24, 2014. 
384 These community based reconciliation programs are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6. 
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discussions of critical issues to be considered in the design and enactment of such processes 
(e.g. reparations, witness protection, and interaction with key legislation, such as the 
Amnesty Act and the International Criminal Court Act). Notwithstanding the difficulties and 
complexities involved, women in northern Uganda have expressed a strong desire for 
reconciliation, and government steps towards this would likely be well received. 
 
8.1.5 Amnesty, accountability, and prosecutions 
 
8.1.5.1 Brief background to amnesty and prosecutions in Uganda 
 
The Government of Uganda has employed a range of strategies to end the war with the LRA, 
including military strategies, offering Amnesty, peace negotiations, and legal prosecutions. 
These strategies have at times represented an inconsistent approach, and have generated 
contradictions and tensions between different approaches. This section focuses in particular 
on women’s views of the GoU’s use of Amnesty, and the prospective prosecution of LRA 
leaders for war crimes and crimes against humanity.385  
 
Following sustained pressure from civil society organisations, particularly Acholi CSOs, the 
GoU introduced the Amnesty Act (2000). The Amnesty Act offers indemnity from 
prosecution for any combatant who reports to the relevant authorities, and “renounces and 
abandons involvement in the war or armed rebellion” (s 4(1)(b)). The Amnesty Act had been 
an effective tool in encouraging LRA members to desert the LRA and return home (JLOS 
TJWG 2013, [20]); over 26,000 former LRA members have been granted Amnesty since its 
introduction. 
 
In 2003, the GoU referred the “situation concerning the Lord’s Resistance Army” to the ICC, 
the first State to self-refer (Nouwen and Werner 2010, 946).386 In 2004, the ICC began 
investigating the situation, and in 2005 issued indictments against Joseph Kony, Raska 
Lukwiya, Okot Odhiambo, Dominic Ongwen, and Vincent Otti (ICC 2015). 
 
The GoU welcomed the indictments against the five LRA leaders; however, its initial 
enthusiasm has since shifted over the years (Nouwen and Werner 2010; Clark 2008). The 
first major shift occurred in the lead up to the 2006 Juba peace talks, when it appeared that 
the ICC indictments might be an obstacle to the peace process (Ssenyonjo 2007; Traylor 
2009–2010, 34; Branch 2007); the GoU then emphasised the existence of the Amnesty Act, 
and downplayed the significance of the ICC indictments, to provide reassurance to the LRA 
leadership. President Museveni went further, publicly announcing a “total amnesty” for LRA 
combatants, including Joseph Kony, as part of the Juba peace talks (Vasagar 2006). 
Museveni perhaps over-estimated the degree of control he could exercise over the ICC’s 
involvement in Uganda; he had previously stated publicly that “[i]f we told the ICC that we 
had found an internal solution, they would be happy” (quoted in Ssenyonjo 2007, 425).  
                                                
385 The full history and complexity of issues raised by the Amnesty Act, ICC indictments, and GoU legal 
frameworks are beyond the scope of this report, but have generated a large amount of other academic and legal 
scholarship. See, for example, Waddell and Clark (2008), Nouwen and Werner (2010), Ssenyonjo (2005), and 
Traylor (2009–2010).  
386 Nouwen and Werner (2010, 948) argue that corruption scandals, criticisms of Uganda’s military actions in 
northern Uganda, and increasing international attention directed at the humanitarian emergency in northern 
Uganda, were “beginning to tarnish the government’s reputation,” raising concerns within the government that 
its status as a “donor darling” may be at risk. They further noted that, in 2004, between 35% and 50% of 
Uganda’s national budget came from international donor aid (2010, 948). 
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During the Juba peace talks, the LRA insisted that the ICC indictments be withdrawn – a 
demand the GoU was unable to meet. The GoU did, however, agree to a clause in the Juba 
Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation, which stipulated that “accountability 
mechanisms shall be implemented through the adapted legal framework in Uganda” (cl.4.4). 
The GoU then began taking steps to enable domestic proceedings as an alternative to ICC 
prosecutions, widely assessed by legal observers as an effort to trigger the complementarity 
provisions of the Rome Statute (Nouwen and Werner 2010, 952; Otim and Wierda 2010, 3). 
Key measures taken include the passing of the International Criminal Court Act (2010), and 
the establishment of the War Crimes Division of the High Court of Uganda (now the 
International Crimes Division [ICD]) (Otim and Wierda 2010, 3). Jeffrey has argued that the 
aim of the ICD’s establishment was to “allow the ICC to withdraw its indictments against the 
LRA leaders” (Jeffery 2011, 90). 
 
There is widespread public support for the Amnesty Act in Acholiland, the area most affected 
by the war, primarily because it was seen as the most effective way to bring the war to an end 
(Branch 2007, 184). However, the Amnesty Act is incompatible with the Rome Statute and 
international criminal law; as Cassese observes,  
 
as international crimes constitute attacks on universal values, no single State should arrogate 
to itself the right to decide to cancel such crimes, or to set aside their legal consequences ... 
the requirement to dispense justice should trump the need to respect State sovereignty. 
(quoted in Newman 2005, 344) 
 
It is unlikely that the ICC would have withdrawn the indictments, regardless of any 
agreements made at Juba. This was pointed out in 2005 by Peter Onega, the Chairperson of 
Uganda’s Amnesty Commission: 
 
Since the ICC takes precedence over our national laws, even people already granted amnesty 
could be taken for trial before the ICC – if this happens the amnesty process and the law will 
be rendered useless. (as quoted in Ssenyonjo 2007, 425). 
 
The Juba peace talks ultimately did not result in a signed agreement, and the LRA moved 
away from northern Uganda and into neighbouring Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC) and Central African Republic (CAR). Northern Uganda gradually adjusted to a 
relative peace, and IDPs began returning to their homes from late 2008 onwards. Concerns in 
northern Uganda progressively shifted away from the legal and political conundrums raised 
by the tensions between the Amnesty Act and possible prosecutions of LRA leaders (whether 
domestic or international), towards more immediate issues. In 2013, “as years passed without 
arrests, the Court has begun to look at winding down operations” in Uganda (Tenove 2013, 
5). It increasingly seemed that the many difficult questions raised by the Ugandan situation 
would remain unresolved; the January 2015 surrender of Dominic Ongwen, allegedly the 
second-in-command of the LRA, however, has re-enlivened many of these debates. Dominic 
Ongwen surrendered to United States forces in the CAR in January 2015, and is currently in 
custody at the ICC. Charges against Ongwen were confirmed by the ICC in March 2016 and 
the trial date is yet to be set (ICC 2016). 
 
8.1.5.2 Acholi women’s views on amnesty and accountability 
 
The majority of women interviewed expressed views which are broadly supportive of the 
ICC’s approach to criminal prosecutions – namely, that Joseph Kony and senior LRA 
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commanders need to be held accountable for their actions, and that lower ranking LRA 
cadres, particularly those who were abducted, should receive Amnesty and be permitted to 
return to live in their communities. Irrespective of whether women supported prosecution, or 
preferred that Kony and senior LRA commanders be granted Amnesty, almost all expressed 
their views in the context of needing a resolution to the conflict, and a guarantee of non-
recurrence. Caroline was of the opinion that the prospect of prosecutions would prolong the 
war, and therefore wanted Amnesty to be extended also to senior LRA commanders: 
 
No, they should not be punished. ... Punishing them will bring us more crisis in the 
region, they should instead be given Amnesty and later undergo traditional peace 
building mechanisms to restore their relationship with the community.387 
 
Marlene, however, was firm that Kony has had multiple opportunities to make peace, and can 
no longer be trusted. For Marlene, only his capture will assure peace: 
 
If the ICC can, it should arrest Joseph Kony himself as a Chief Rebel Commander. 
Kony can never surrender or come to apologise. He needs to be captured. He should 
be killed in the same way he has done to people including other rebel leaders in his 
company. Many peace talks have been held but he just keeps changing his position.388  
 
A small but significant number of women do not support prosecution of any of the LRA 
leadership, including Joseph Kony. This was expressed primarily as a desire for peace, and a 
belief that peace would be best achieved through complete Amnesty. 
 
Carmel saw prosecution as “the government’s way of doing things,” and that it was not in 
keeping with Acholi traditional justice.389 Rosalyn expressed compassion for Kony, and a 
desire for recognition of their shared humanity: 
 
I know Kony wronged, but I think he does not have to be punished. They need to be 
forgiven, we need each other, they are also human beings.390  
 
Florence based her views on what would be most likely to bring her some healing. She saw 
little value in prosecuting: 
 
If Kony comes up to apologise it would relieve me from the pain I have accumulated 
as a result of his action. Arresting and trying Kony for his actions can not relieve me 
of the pain he has caused me.391  
 
The opinion that Kony and other senior LRA commanders should be Amnestied or forgiven, 
however, was the less common view. The more prevalent view expressed by women was that 
Kony and other senior LRA commanders needed to be brought in from the bush, so they 
could be assured that the war was over. The overwhelming majority of women saw two main 
criteria for determining who should be prosecuted, and who should receive Amnesty: the 
nature of crimes committed; and whether the person “went willingly,” or was abducted. Most 
women believed that people who were abducted should not be prosecuted, and that the 
                                                
387 Interviewed March 18, 2014.  
388 Interviewed March 20, 2014.  
389 Interviewed June 25, 2014.  
390 Interviewed January 23, 2014. 
391 Interviewed January 22, 2014. 
 
 
 144 
Amnesty Act should remain in place for lower-ranking LRA cadres and abducted individuals. 
As Josamary explained: 
 
They should not be punished because this will hinder them from coming back. They 
should be forgiven. … Punishment should be done to those who did the most atrocities 
during the war.392  
 
Helen’s words reflect a majority view – a desire that efforts to encourage the voluntary return 
of LRA members be continued: 
 
Kony has caused us so much suffering. It is because of Kony that I never got a chance 
to go to school. Today I don’t have a future – I am labouring, I am suffering. I think 
the government, if the government can get Kony and capture him wherever he is... He 
should be captured. They should prosecute him and send him to jail. But those people 
who are still in captivity … they should … if there was a way …. A possibility that 
should see how to help them return home. Because for us, we heard from the radio 
that they would send announcements that those who are still in captivity, “Please 
come home, there is nothing wrong with your case but please come home.” These 
announcements are not running on the radio anymore – I don’t even know why but 
they should send these announcements to them to give them the courage to return 
home. They should be allowed to also settle back home.393  
 
Some women thought that both LRA commanders and some agents of the State should be 
prosecuted for their involvement in the war. As Sophie said: 
 
I believe in forgiveness for all, but if there is to be punishment then it should be for 
Kony and some people in the government.394  
 
Indeed, the ICC decision to prosecute only LRA members has been criticised from a range of 
stakeholders, including Acholi community leaders (Lawino 2012; Walusimbi 2015), civil 
society organisations (ASF and JRP 2013, 8; JRP 2013, 5), and legal and international 
politics scholars (Otim and Kihika 2015, 7; Waddell and Clark 2008, 42).  
 
When the ICC first began investigating the GoU-LRA war in 2004, many Acholi leaders 
were concerned that indictments would hinder the peace process. A delegation of Acholi 
leaders travelled to the Hague to meet with the ICC Prosecutor and to discuss their concerns. 
While some concerns that prosecution will impair efforts at peace still remain (as evinced by 
lobbying for the reinstatement of Part II of the Amnesty Act in 2013 – footnote refs), it seems 
that a mix of targeted Amnesty and targeted prosecutions is acceptable to Acholi women 
participating in this study. This echoes the findings of other consultations and surveys of 
“victims’ views” conducted over the last five or more years (JRP 2013; UNOHCHR 2007; 
ASF and JRP 2013). A study by the UNOHCHR noted a diversity of views, but  
 
certain trends do emerge in perspectives on these themes. Most notably, this research study 
shows that the population broadly believes that both the LRA and the Government – and 
specifically their leaders – should be held accountable for the harms they have caused during 
the conflict. (2007, ii) 
                                                
392 Interviewed February 6, 2014. 
393 Interviewed June 18, 2014. 
394 Interviewed February 10, 2014. 
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A 2013 consultation by Avocats Sans Frontieres (ASF) and the Justice and Reconciliation 
Project (JRP) returned similar findings – ongoing support for the continuation of grants of 
Amnesty for lower-ranking LRA members and abductees, but prosecution of Kony and 
senior commanders for their crimes committed (ASF and JRP 2013, 12). The report also 
noted the difficulty in determining who is a perpetrator and who is a victim. The impending 
case of Dominic Ongwen will crystallise many of these unclear boundaries; Ongwen was 
abducted as a young boy (around ten-years old), but rose through the ranks to become a 
senior commander who gave orders for horrific atrocities. A group of women discussing 
Ongwen’s situation during the Validation Workshop held on 18 June 2015 appreciated the 
difficulty: 
 
 Woman 1: The issue of Dominic is a hard one 
 Woman 2: He was very close to Kony. 
 Woman 3: Dominic was also abducted when he was young. 
 Woman 4:  Yes, he was abducted when he was young. 
Woman 1:  But when he gives you an order you have to follow. If you don’t you 
also die. You die.  
Woman 2:  (Deep sigh) The kinds of killings that some people have done in this 
world is so so painful.395 
 
Women’s understanding of the ICC and its processes was very low; many had never heard of 
it, while others had only a vague understanding that “it is a very high court,” “it wants to 
catch Kony.” Some women had heard of the ICC, but misunderstood its purpose and 
function. Victoria, who had been abducted and was a forced “wife” of a commander, was 
supportive of ICC prosecution, but (reflecting a lack of detailed accurate knowledge about 
the ICC) was concerned that the ICC would also seek to prosecute her:  
 
Kony should be prosecuted, but not those who were abducted. It makes me afraid that 
when they start prosecuting Kony, they will come also for us.396  
 
Most women were interested in knowing more about the ICC. Esther recommended that 
meetings should be held in villages, so that women can more easily attend and participate: 
 
Such meetings (ICC discussions) should be brought nearer to the village so that 
everyone can benefit. We are hoping that some support shall be given to people who 
attend these meetings in future.397  
 
Anna felt she had been excluded through a lack of knowledge of the ICC, saying that, had she 
known, she would have liked to participate as a witness in proceedings: 
 
The community has to be educated on transitional justice and the processes involved 
there in, they should be made aware of what is involved and how it functions, because 
most of us do not know how to demand or mobilise for realisation of justice. I did not 
get any chance or opportunity to participate otherwise I would have testified as to 
how my husband was killed and my son abducted in my presence.398  
                                                
395 Interviewed June 18, 2015. 
396 Interviewed September 24, 2013. 
397 Interviewed March 19, 2014. 
398 Interviewed January 30, 2014. 
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As already stated, the researchers returned to Uganda in June 2015 and met with a group of 
women who had participated in the research, to present initial analysis to them and to allow 
them input as to the direction and progress of the research. This Validation Workshop was 
timely in that, unlike fieldwork interviews, it was held after the surrender of Ongwen.399 
During discussions, women raised Ongwen’s surrender and said that it had sparked a number 
of debates in their communities. In particular, it has enlivened questions about the nexus of 
Amnesty and prosecution, and of the distinction between “victim” and “perpetrator.” 
Importantly, it has also fuelled fears among people who have received Amnesty, afraid that 
they, too, may be prosecuted; this has had a destabilising effect on them, and their 
relationships within their communities. Olive, who had spoken to researchers in 2014 about 
the stigmatisation she and other returnees were facing in the community, said that this had 
escalated dramatically following Ongwen’s surrender, and that some community members 
were taunting returnees about soon being prosecuted and hanged. Finally, women said that 
the surrender of Ongwen, and the revival of community-level discussions about his 
prospective trial, had brought back traumatic memories of atrocities and mass human rights 
violations committed by both UPDF and LRA forces during the war, indicating an increased 
and urgent need for psychosocial support. 
 
Little up-to-date information is available about the impact of Ongwen’s surrender and 
prospective ICC trial; however, the Refugee Law Project held a consultation in Gulu on 
January 16, 2015 (ten days after Ongwen’s surrender), to hear community members’ views 
(RLP 2015). The report which followed that consultation reflects similar tensions – difficulty 
distinguishing between victims and perpetrators; indecision between prosecution and 
Amnesty; debates over whether Ongwen should face criminal or traditional justice; and 
further debates as to whether he should be tried in an international or domestic court. The 
report also addresses questions of government liability, with some participants arguing that 
“the Government, the army, the police, the community, the parents, the school, all different 
groups or categories who failed to protect this child from abduction are liable” (RLP 2015, 
5). 
 
Given the contentious history of ICC involvement in Uganda, the low levels of understanding 
among many Acholi women, and the precarious peace that currently exists in many 
communities, it is imperative that the ICC work in collaboration with multiple civil society 
organisations and community leaders to engage all affected communities, including those that 
are not directly implicated in the prospective trial of Ongwen. This engagement needs to be 
bi-directional, so that the ICC is kept updated about debates, tensions, rumours, and fear-
mongering that may be happening within communities; this is necessary to allow the ICC to 
be able to disseminate accurate information about the implications of Ongwen’s surrender, 
and the progress of proceedings. These engagements need to ensure that women are included, 
and are able to ask questions and express their views. This may mean separate meetings or 
avenues of communication for women. 
  
                                                
399 Conducted on June 18, 2015.  
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION 
 
 
The twenty-year war between the Government of Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army 
has wrought devastation throughout Acholiland and other regions of northern Uganda. 
Women have suffered particular harms during the war, and are experiencing ongoing 
violence, marginalisation, and deprivation in the fragile post-conflict environment. 
 
This research spoke with 98 women impacted by violence in northern Uganda, ranging from 
21 to 90 years of age, who had lived through the war. This report presents their views and 
experiences about women’s justice needs, and highlights some key harms (both past and 
ongoing) that require a justice response. 
 
A key message arising from this research is that gender sensitive justice cannot be 
approached in an atomistic manner. For justice to be effective for women, it needs to be 
holistic, and to take into account the complex social, economic, cultural, and political 
contexts in which harms are inflicted, and in which justice needs to be delivered. Poverty, 
violence, and patriarchy combine to produce a landscape in which women are exposed to an 
intersecting web of harms. Justice, accordingly, needs to be designed to incorporate legal, 
psychosocial, economic, and politico-cultural remedies that, together, will better enable 
women to live sustainable, dignified lives, free from violence and with opportunities for their 
children into the future. 
 
This report has highlighted the legacies of harm and injustice that have been created, both by 
enforced and prolonged mass displacement, and from forced abduction. The war has caused 
enormous damage to the social fabric of Acholi communities; women, men, and children 
have all been directly and personally affected by the war. While many women showed 
admirable resilience, the war has, as the UN Peace Building Fund observed in 2012, “[led] to 
a drastic increase in mental illness, which is linked to general distress and a decrease in social 
cohesion and community resilience” (Wielders and Amutjojo 2012, 10). A great many Acholi 
men began drinking alcohol excessively in the IDP camps, and continue to do so today. The 
high rates of drinking are fuelling alarming levels of violence, much of which is directed 
against women. For many women, therefore, the war has not ended, as they continue to live 
with extraordinary levels of violence. 
 
Women have been left to take almost exclusive responsibility for household productivity, 
including both work in the home and in the fields; in the latter, they work long hours doing 
backbreaking agricultural work without adequate tools, livestock, or other agricultural inputs 
(such as seeds and fertiliser). Despite their disproportionate contribution to household 
economies, women have not achieved a commensurate level of power over household 
economic decision-making. Too often, the fruits of women’s labour are spent on alcohol, 
which in turn feeds greater violence against them. 
 
Since returning home from IDP camps, there has been a significant rise in conflict over land. 
Widows and unwed mothers (whether through abduction, encampment, or family 
breakdown) are especially disadvantaged in access to land. Given the centrality of land to the 
Acholi economy and social structures, this exclusion has profound ramifications for women’s 
economic, physical, and social well-being.  
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Women who have returned from abduction, particularly those who have returned with 
children, are facing stigmatisation and discrimination in their communities. The process of 
reintegration focused almost exclusively on initial reception and return, leaving communities 
to wrestle with the complex and delicate task of reconciliation. While some communities and 
groups are doing important and effective reconciliation work, such efforts are isolated and 
small scale. There is an increasing body of evidence emerging to indicate a growing rift 
between former abductees and other members of the communities. In the absence of 
government leadership and a national discussion about the war, communities are beginning to 
blame their past and current suffering on returnees. This rift has the potential to destabilise 
northern Uganda’s fragile peace, particularly in the context of widespread poverty, trauma, 
alcoholism, violence, and land conflicts.  
 
Acholi women expressed a strong desire for reconciliation, and a willingness to talk and 
listen. Acholi culture values forgiveness and social harmony highly. These attributes provide 
a strong foundation for reconciliation and healing, but this task cannot be left to 
impoverished, war-affected communities alone. 
 
In all these issues, women are profoundly distanced from justice. Healthcare services, 
education and legal protection in northern Uganda are all inadequate, and are failing to 
respond to women’s justice needs. Police posts and courts are too expensive and too far away 
from communities to provide effective legal protections. They are often patriarchal and 
sometimes corrupt. Health services are under-staffed and lack necessary drugs and 
equipment. Despite a policy of free Universal Primary Education, schools charge fees for 
tuition, books, uniforms, and other items, with the result that few Acholi children are able to 
attain a complete primary education. Disrupted and incomplete education is a major concern 
for women in Acholiland, who told this research project that they see a proper education as 
foundational to their children’s and communities’ future stability and success. 
 
There are many women in northern Uganda that are ready to take an active role in delivery of 
justice and in harnessing political action towards women’s greater benefit. Many women in 
this study talked about wanting to see other women as actors in justice and political spaces 
throughout society however, few women are currently in such roles. 
 
Traditional justice mechanisms are far more accessible to women, and it is to these that most 
women turn for help with violence, stigma, or land disputes. Traditional leaders, however, 
vary greatly in their appreciation of women’s justice needs. Due to Acholi culture’s 
patrilineal structure, women move to their husband’s home upon marriage, and it is from his 
clan leaders that women must seek justice. Too often, this results in an inadequate response, 
in which women are advised to “be patient,” and to learn to cope with injustice.  
 
Transitional justice for most women is very distant and theoretical. While reparations and 
compensation have been promised, little has been delivered. Women see the Government of 
Uganda as having the power and responsibility to drive transitional justice, including through 
the payment of reparations, the memorialisation of victims, and the delivery of an apology for 
the conflict. They also, however, have very little trust in the government to deliver them 
justice; women were aware of many instances in which the government made (ultimately 
unfulfilled) promises of help, particularly relating to assistance in returning home from the 
camps. 
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The Government of Uganda has produced a draft National Transitional Justice Policy 
addressing five key thematic areas: amnesty, criminal justice, truth telling, traditional justice, 
and reparations. If approved and enacted holistically, this policy holds great promise to 
substantively address many of the harms caused by the war. The policy currently does not 
include an acknowledgement of violations committed by State actors, a formal apology for 
the State’s role in the war, or a guarantee of non-recurrence of fighting, all of which were 
raised by women as important elements of justice. The policy has been awaiting approval 
from Cabinet for the last twelve months. 
 
Women overwhelmingly believe that the leaders of the LRA need to be held accountable for 
their actions, whether by the Government of Uganda or the International Criminal Court. 
There is general support for the involvement of the ICC, but a low understanding of how it 
works, who it is prosecuting, or how it affects those who have returned. Women were also 
critical of both the ICC’s and the Government of Uganda’s focus on violations committed by 
the LRA, to the exclusion of those committed by State actors – chiefly, the UPDF – leading 
up to, and during, the period of encampment. 
 
9.1 Recommendations 
 
To the Government of Uganda: 
 
• Progress the draft National Transitional Justice Policy, and take immediate concrete 
steps towards its implementation. 
• Broaden the terms for reparations to include violations committed in relation to 
internal displacement, and to address harms arising from encampment. Reparations 
need to be embedded within other transitional justice mechanisms (such as a truth-
telling process, a national apology, and prosecutions), in order to maximise their 
reparative value. Victim-survivors, however, should not have to wait for such 
mechanisms to conclude in order to receive reparations; a mechanism for interim 
reparations should be immediately established.  
• Ensure the representation of women from identified vulnerable groups (notably 
widows, formerly abducted women, former IDP women, and child mothers) in the 
design of transitional justice mechanisms (including reparations). 
• Acknowledge the harm caused by both the action and inaction of the State during the 
war, including its failure to protect its citizens against abduction and attacks from the 
LRA, and the violations committed against Ugandan citizens by the UPDF and 
government-backed militias, including looting and destruction of property, beatings, 
rape, and killings. 
• Prohibit the charging of any fees for primary education, to ensure that all children can 
receive a full and uninterrupted primary education. 
• Continue efforts to address land conflicts, with particular attention on the 
vulnerability of women (notably widows and unwed mothers).  
 
To the international community: 
 
• The ICC should ensure that, as proceedings against Dominic Ongwen progress, it 
proactively seeks to learn and understand the effects this may be having in northern 
Ugandan communities, and to communicate information about its processes among 
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communities. Outreach activities need to be designed in a gender-sensitive manner to 
ensure that women are accessed directly and through any intermediary. 
• Governments of donor nations and inter-governmental organisations can maintain 
pressure on the Government of Uganda to remain committed to its transitional justice 
agenda. The Cabinet has held the draft National Transitional Justice Policy for twelve 
months; some commentators within Uganda speculate that the policy has been 
shelved until the country’s elections (due in 2016) are completed. It is unacceptable 
for political concerns to delay urgently needed reparative justice for victim-survivors 
of the war. 
• The international community must maintain its determination to capture Joseph Kony 
and the remaining LRA commanders and cadres. The capture and disarmament of the 
LRA is foundational to women’s security, as well as the communities’ ability to move 
on.  
• Governments of donor nations and inter-governmental organisations should 
particularly encourage the Government of Uganda to progress efforts at national 
reconciliation and reparations. There are concerning indications of escalating tensions 
and grievances, which risk the future durability of the current peace. 
 
For service delivery and programming: 
 
• Psychosocial and trauma counselling services are needed to assist women and men to 
recover from the conflict. Such services should be tailored to respond both to severe 
trauma (possibly requiring psychiatric intervention), and less acute trauma, including 
depression and anxiety. Programs that are being delivered in northern Uganda are 
proving to be efficacious. Such approaches should be expanded, perhaps through 
matched Government of Uganda and donor funds.  
• Programs addressing alcohol consumption (particularly by men) are urgently needed. 
Current social services provision tends to focus on women more than men, but given 
the central role that excessive alcohol consumption plays in both reducing 
productivity and driving violence, helping men to significantly reduce alcohol 
consumption and resume productive and caring roles is likely to have a positive effect 
on families and communities. 
• Domestic violence support services are urgently needed. While domestic violence 
shelters are a new phenomenon in northern Uganda, women have reported high levels 
of trust in them, and satisfaction with their services. Domestic violence programs will 
need to engage with traditional leaders and LCs, who are very often the first contact 
point for women outside the family. There is growing evidence that concern about the 
rate of domestic violence is shared by Acholi communities and their leaders (taking 
note in particular that International Alert reported that only 0.1 percent of Acholi 
respondents nominated culture as the cause of domestic violence, and none said that 
culture condones it). Top-down imported strategies are unlikely to be effective; rather, 
programmatic strategies that include traditional leaders from the inception and design 
stage are more likely to achieve success. Such programs should be considered in 
conjunction with trauma and alcohol services, as recommended above.  
• Formal legal justice is effectively beyond the reach of most women in northern 
Uganda. Legal education and legal aid services for women have proven effective in 
improving women’s access to justice, particularly in land disputes. 
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Appendix B: Demographic information – Uganda women participants* 
 
 
 
 
  TOTAL Agago Amuru/Gulu Pader 
Total 
interviewed 
 98 23 57 18 
Marital 
status 
Married 18 5 8 5 
Widowed 16 4 9 3 
Cohabiting 8 0 7 1 
Separated 4 0 3 1 
Single/unmarried 5 1 4 0 
Unknown 47 13 26 8 
Age 18–25 11 4 3 4 
26–40 37 7 21 9 
41–55 24 6 13 5 
> 56 9 3 6 0 
Unknown 17 3 14 0 
Educational 
level 
None 6 0 6 0 
Primary 1–3 
(Lower Primary) 
13 2 7 4 
Primary 4 
(Transition Year) 
3 1 0 2 
Primary 5–7 
(Upper Primary) 
15 2 10 3 
Secondary 1–4 
(Lower Secondary) 
4 1 3 0 
Secondary 5–6 
(Upper Secondary) 
0 0 0 0 
Diploma 1 0 1 0 
Literate, no other 
information given 
1 1 0 0 
Unknown 55 16 30 9 
 
 
*Locations reflect location of interview. Amuru and Gulu were treated as one location due to proximity. In 
some instances, incomplete demographic data was collected and is presented as “unknown” in this table.  
 
